How the Army’s training ‘crucible’ bases are changing

Combat Training Centers are major Army training sites for brigade-sized forces. Visiting units enter a simulated battlefield, called “the box,” and face opposition forces, or OPFOR. The goal is to test combat skills before units face real-world missions.

A 14-day crucible combines movement, attacks, defense, and difficult problems created by exercise planners. Brigades may seize objectives, defend them, and fight through large training areas. The OPFOR knows the local terrain and trains specifically for each exercise.

This makes the training demanding and realistic. Tillis said visiting units often struggle during their first four or five days. The Army operates centers at Hohenfels, Fort Polk, Fort Irwin, and the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. They train units ranging from light infantry to heavy mechanized and special operations forces.

Hohenfels now treats drones as a trained combat capability, not equipment that soldiers can instantly master. Earlier exercises used relatively few unmanned systems, partly because units lacked familiar drones and German airspace rules limited flying. The center has since changed both conditions.

German authorities helped clear airspace permissions for heavier drone use. Hohenfels also began requiring arriving soldiers to have enough experience with the systems. Ukrainian troops joined the exercises on both the blue and red sides, bringing combat experience and large numbers of drones, including expendable strike systems.

The latest rotation involved almost 2,000 unmanned aerial systems, with more than 1,000 consumable. That reflects lessons from Ukraine, U.S. Central Command, and the U.S.-Mexico border. The larger lesson is that technology matters only when units can operate it under pressure.

A year earlier, a Hohenfels rotation might launch only a few hundred drones. Tillis gave a more specific baseline of about 400 unmanned systems and roughly 35 or 40 counter-UAS systems. The center has since expanded drone activity dramatically.

In the latest rotation, soldiers used almost 2,000 unmanned aerial systems. More than 1,000 were consumable, meaning they were intended to be destroyed during use. Ukrainian participants alone brought around 600 systems, about 550 of them consumable. These figures show a major shift toward mass drone employment.

The article does not state the latest number of counter-UAS systems. It does show that counter-drone training remains part of the exercise, alongside expanded drone operations. The increase reflects lessons from Ukraine, U.S. Central Command, and activity at the U.S.-Mexico border.

“Consumable” describes a system expected to be used up during an operation. In this article, the term refers to small, cheap, one-way strike drones. They are not treated like reusable equipment that must return safely after every mission.

The key mechanism is simple: the drone carries out a strike and is destroyed in the process. Ukrainian units brought about 600 systems to Hohenfels, and roughly 550 were consumable. Their experience helped American trainers recognize that exercises had not been using enough of these systems.

Hohenfels then expanded its inventory and employment of expendable drones. The latest rotation included almost 2,000 unmanned aerial systems, with over 1,000 consumable. This prepares units to train with large numbers of low-cost strike systems rather than practicing only with reusable quadcopters.

The three changes addressed different weaknesses in earlier exercises. Ukrainian soldiers added recent combat experience and competed on both the blue and red sides. German authorities helped remove airspace barriers that had restricted U.S. drone operations at Hohenfels.

The Army also changed the preparation standard. Units heading to Fort Polk or Fort Irwin must own and work with any drones they plan to use for at least 180 days. Hohenfels required arriving soldiers to have enough experience to operate their systems. Ukrainian participants reinforced this need by bringing real operators and about 600 systems.

Together, these steps made drone training more practical. Soldiers could fly in the available airspace, operate equipment they already knew, and face opponents who understood combat drone use. The center moved away from simply handing out technology and expecting troops to learn it during the exercise.

Arriving with drones is not enough. Soldiers must know how to operate them before entering the 14-day crucible. Tillis said he initially thought giving troops thousands of drones would let them figure out the technology, but trainers learned that soldiers needed time to practice.

Without that experience, a brigade may possess equipment but lack usable operators. Earlier units sometimes arrived without drones they knew how to use, contributing to limited employment. The newer standard requires units going to Fort Polk or Fort Irwin to own and work with intended drones for at least 180 days.

That rule shifts responsibility earlier, before the major exercise begins. It lets the training rotation focus on battlefield decisions, coordination, and counter-drone challenges instead of basic equipment familiarization. Hohenfels also uses Ukrainian operators, who bring practical combat experience and test visiting units from both exercise sides.

Realistic exercises expose weaknesses before a unit faces an actual conflict. Combat Training Centers make brigades move, attack, defend, and solve problems while opposing forces actively resist them. The experience is designed as a 14-day crucible rather than a simple equipment demonstration.

Drones add another layer of pressure. Units must operate unmanned systems, use consumable strike drones, and contend with counter-UAS capabilities. At Hohenfels, Ukrainian soldiers compete on both sides, while the OPFOR uses its detailed knowledge of local terrain. Centers also train across very different environments.

This approach gives commanders a clearer view of what units can actually do. Hohenfels focuses on lessons from Ukraine and other operational areas. The Pacific center trains in tropical Hawaii and Arctic Alaska, while its mobile unit operates in Asia. These conditions help shape preparation for varied future missions.