How Poland’s air force is responding to Russian drones in the skies

Poland changed from Visual Identification, or VID, to Positive Identification, or PI, for air-defense operations. The change matters because pilots no longer need to fly close enough to see an aircraft’s markings, type or nationality before deciding whether to engage it. That makes responses faster against suspected drones and other airborne threats.

Under VID, a pilot confirms the target by sight. Under PI, the pilot can rely on radar information, data from other systems and intelligence. Nowak specifically said information passed on by Ukraine can help support an engagement decision. The pilot therefore does not need a close visual inspection before acting.

The change reflects pressure on Poland’s unfinished air-defense network. Nowak said the Air Force is operating at the highest readiness every night, while new ground and air components remain three to four years away. PI gives Poland more flexibility now, but it also places greater importance on the accuracy of sensors, intelligence and identification procedures.

Positive Identification, or PI, is a method that allows a pilot to make an engagement decision from collected information rather than a close visual check. It matters because aircraft and drones can be tracked and assessed without sending a fighter close enough to inspect their markings, shape or nationality by sight.

Visual Identification, or VID, requires the pilot to confirm the target’s type, markings or nationality visually before engaging. PI uses radar data, information from other systems and intelligence instead. The article says that intelligence passed on by Ukraine can also contribute to the decision. These inputs let pilots respond without waiting for a direct view.

Poland adopted PI procedures from Oct. 1 as its air force faces nightly, high-readiness demands. Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak said the new approach is more flexible and responsive. It is a temporary operational advantage while Poland waits for broader air-defense capabilities still three to four years away.

Poland is concentrating most of its military effort on protecting its airspace. Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak said 80 percent of his service’s attention is focused on air defense. This unusually heavy focus reflects the pressure of responding to airborne threats while the country’s modernization program remains incomplete.

The new system is not yet fully in place. Nowak said Poland is only about 30 percent advanced in the process. The country is procuring new weapons systems, but many are still waiting to be implemented. The ground and air components of Poland’s integrated air defenses are expected to take another three to four years.

That gap is shaping current operations. The Air Force maintains the highest readiness every night, putting heavy strain on people and equipment. Poland is also changing engagement procedures and considering aircraft and missile options to address drones. These measures provide interim capacity, but they do not replace the integrated network still under development.

Keeping fighters at the highest readiness every night means crews, pilots and aircraft must remain prepared for repeated responses. Maj. Gen. Ireneusz Nowak said this pace is placing heavy strain on personnel and equipment. The pressure is especially serious because Poland’s replacement air-defense capabilities are not yet fully operational.

The cost problem is clear. Poland is using fighter jets to shoot down relatively cheap drones, even though Nowak acknowledged that this is a bad cost ratio. Norway’s Lt. Gen. Rolf Folland also warned that air forces cannot use all their munitions in one burst. They must be able to repeat defensive actions over and over.

For now, Poland has no other option, according to Nowak. The country wants massive, responsive weapons systems for drone operations. Planned additions, including APKWS missiles on F-16s and F/A-50GF aircraft, face delays or integration problems. Until those systems mature, readiness demands will continue to burden people, aircraft and weapons.

Poland lacks its full air-defense network because modernization is still underway. Nowak said the ground and air components of the integrated system are three to four years away. The country has started procuring new weapons systems, but acquisition alone does not make them operational. They must still be implemented and integrated.

The article gives several examples of delays. APKWS missiles for Polish F-16s have not entered service because Poland could not obtain the fuses used and certified by the U.S. Air Force. Business restrictions and limitations blocked that supply, so Poland is waiting for a new fuse type. The F/A-50GF also faces weapon-integration challenges.

Nowak estimated that Poland is only 30 percent advanced in the modernization process. Meanwhile, the Air Force must maintain nightly maximum readiness and rely on fighters against drones. The result is a temporary capability gap: Poland is buying better tools, but personnel and existing aircraft must cover the threat until those tools are ready.

Poland’s main alternative is to develop large, responsive weapons systems designed specifically to counter drone operations. Such systems could reduce the need to send expensive fighter jets against relatively cheap targets. Nowak said Poland needs this capability because the current cost ratio is unfavorable, but he did not identify a complete replacement network.

The article names two near-term aircraft-based options. Poland is trying to integrate Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System missiles onto F-16s. It is also considering the F/A-50GF as a drone hunter. The F/A-50GF has begun combat duty, but its weapon integration is not complete, and Nowak expects it to be fully operational in about two years.

These options remain works in progress. Poland is still waiting for a new fuse for the F-16 missile effort, while the F/A-50GF faces integration delays. The country therefore continues using fighters despite the cost. The article does not specify a finished ground-based alternative, only the need for responsive weapons systems.

An integrated air-defense system combines information from multiple sources and connects it to defensive weapons. Radar can track an airborne object. Other systems and intelligence can add context. Aircraft or ground weapons can then respond, while command links help coordinate the decision. This matters because no single sensor or weapon has to work alone.

The article describes part of this mechanism through Poland’s Positive Identification procedures. A pilot can use radar data, information from other systems and intelligence, including information passed on by Ukraine, instead of flying close enough to identify an aircraft visually. The resulting information supports a faster engagement decision.

Poland’s complete network is not ready. Nowak said its ground and air components are still three to four years away, and modernization is only about 30 percent advanced. Until integration improves, fighters are filling the gap. Future weapons, including F-16 APKWS missiles and the F/A-50GF, are intended to add capacity, but both face implementation challenges.