Climate change and drone attacks exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in war-torn Sudan

Sudan’s conflict is a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, and the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF. Allied militias also fight alongside both sides. The war began in April 2023, and neither faction has captured the whole country. This divided control keeps fighting and humanitarian access difficult.

The SAF is Sudan’s official army. It controls the north and center, including the capital, Khartoum. The RSF maintains its presence in western Darfur and parts of southern Sudan. Fighting has recently intensified in North Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile state, forcing civilians to flee during the planting season.

This territorial split matters because people’s safety and access to food depend heavily on who controls their area. More than 12.4 million Sudanese have been displaced inside Sudan or into neighboring countries. Continued fighting prevents stable farming, disrupts aid delivery, and deepens one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

A drone attack is an attack carried out by an unmanned aircraft controlled remotely or operating with limited autonomy. Drones can observe targets and, in military use, drop explosives or launch missiles. Their use can threaten civilians because strikes may occur far from conventional front lines and can hit homes, markets, roads, or gathering places.

The provided article mentions drone attacks in its headline, but it does not describe particular strikes, identify who launched them, or say they are the leading cause of civilian deaths. It therefore cannot support that specific claim. Established reporting on modern conflicts shows drones can increase risks through explosive attacks and constant surveillance, but their effects depend on targeting and safeguards.

The article instead gives a broad death-toll estimate of 40,000 to 250,000 people, noting that reliable figures are difficult to obtain. It also describes intensified fighting, displacement, and scorched-earth tactics. Without more evidence, drone attacks should be understood as one reported danger, not a measured leading cause.

Sudan’s crisis combines mass death, displacement, hunger, and malnutrition. The estimated death toll ranges from 40,000 to 250,000 because reliable figures are difficult to obtain during continuing combat. More than 12.4 million people have fled their homes, either to other parts of Sudan or to neighboring countries.

Food insecurity is also enormous. Action Against Hunger estimates that 24.6 million people are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. In 2026, an estimated 825,000 children younger than five have severe acute malnutrition. Overall, 4.2 million children and pregnant or breastfeeding women are thought to be acutely malnourished.

These figures show how war affects people beyond the battlefield. FEWS NET expects several areas, including displacement camps in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, to reach IPC Phase 5, called Catastrophe. The response plan needs $2.9 billion but is only 41% funded, leaving major needs unmet.

Catastrophe, or IPC Phase 5, is the most severe level in the internationally recognized Integrated Food Security Phase Classification system. It describes an extreme food crisis in which affected households face exceptionally severe shortages. People may be unable to meet basic food needs, and survival can depend on urgent assistance.

The article says FEWS NET expects several areas of Sudan to reach this level, including camps for internally displaced people in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. These communities have already fled conflict and often have limited income, supplies, healthcare, and safe access to markets. War makes it harder for aid workers to reach them.

Phase 5 matters because it means hunger is no longer only a household hardship. It can become a widespread threat to lives and health. Sudan’s underfunded response plan leaves less capacity to prevent conditions from worsening, while conflict, climate shocks, and shortages of fertilizer and diesel continue reducing food availability.

Climate shocks worsen war’s damage by reducing food production while conflict disrupts markets and movement. Extreme heat can damage crops, strain electricity systems, and increase water stress. Drought affects roughly half of Sudan, while heavy rains and localized flooding damage other areas. Together, these shocks make farming and daily survival harder.

The article reports barren riverbeds and dried-out fields after a massive heatwave, with power cuts lasting up to 12 hours in some regions. Fighting has also forced thousands of civilians to flee during the planting season. That timing matters because farmers may lose the chance to sow crops, while damaged roads and insecurity restrict access to fields, markets, and aid.

Shortages of fertilizer and diesel deepen the impact. Agricultural equipment needs diesel, and expensive fuel raises the cost of moving food and humanitarian supplies. The result is less resilient farming, costlier distribution, and greater hunger. With aid funding shrinking, communities have fewer resources to recover from each new shock.

Foreign arms supplies can prolong a civil war by giving armed factions weapons, ammunition, and other resources needed to sustain combat. In Sudan, observers cited in the article say the war will not end until foreign backers stop supplying arms. Continued outside support reduces pressure on the SAF and RSF to negotiate or halt operations.

The article identifies official SAF support from Egypt, Turkey, Russia, and Iran. It says the United Arab Emirates is alleged to be the RSF’s main backer, although Abu Dhabi denies that claim. These external relationships matter because they connect Sudan’s internal conflict to wider regional and international rivalries.

The article’s section heading says a limited arms embargo curbs hope for an end to the war, but the excerpt does not explain its exact rules or enforcement. Its central warning is clear: if weapons continue entering the conflict, fighting can continue, civilian displacement can grow, and humanitarian needs can rise while peace efforts remain weak.

Food systems depend on linked inputs and transport. Fertilizer helps farmers produce crops, diesel powers agricultural equipment, and fuel also moves food and humanitarian supplies. If any link fails, planting, harvesting, or distribution becomes more difficult. In Sudan, imported fertilizer and diesel are therefore essential to both farming and relief operations.

The supplies travel from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The article says Iran blocked shipping in Hormuz, while Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen threatened and sometimes disrupted shipping through Bab el-Mandeb. Fertilizer deliveries consequently collapsed from 450,000 metric tons to about 50,000 in 2026.

Diesel shortages create a second bottleneck. Farm equipment cannot operate normally, and transporting agricultural or humanitarian goods inside Sudan becomes more expensive. The International Food Policy Research Institute reported sharp increases in staple food and fuel prices in September 2026. Global shipping risks therefore become local hunger risks.