Germany's far-right AfD forges a pro-Russia alliance with the BSW

Saxony-Anhalt’s parliament passed a motion calling for an immediate end to German financial and military aid to Ukraine. The AfD and BSW supported it. They also urged state premier Sven Schulze to seek peace negotiations with Russia through the Bundesrat. The vote matters mainly as a political signal, not as a policy change.

The key mechanism is constitutional: German states do not have specific powers over foreign policy. Their representatives in the Bundesrat can influence some federal legislation, but this motion cannot order Berlin to stop supporting Ukraine. Other parties rejected the proposal. CDU lawmaker Stefan Ruland said demanding a ceasefire only from the attacked side means capitulation, not peace.

The vote showed that the AfD and BSW can cooperate despite different political origins. Their shared opposition to Germany’s Ukraine support may help build trust during coalition talks. However, the motion itself has no direct effect on Germany’s national policy toward Ukraine.

The Alternative for Germany, or AfD, is described in the article as a far-right populist party. The BSW combines left-leaning economic ideas with right-wing populist positions on immigration. Their cooperation is therefore unusual because they come from different political traditions. Both, however, criticize Germany’s support for Ukraine and favor closer accommodation with Russia.

The BSW began in 2024 as a breakaway from the socialist Left Party. Its founder, Sahra Wagenknecht, retained economic positions associated with the left while taking socially conservative positions. The AfD has repeatedly expressed sympathy for Vladimir Putin’s political system. Björn Höcke called Russia a champion of free and sovereign states after the war began.

Observers say shared opposition to the political establishment helps connect the parties. Their cooperation may endure, but political scientist Armin Pfahl-Traughber questions whether the BSW still belongs on the political left. Both parties remain distinct, despite their Russia-related alliance.

The AfD emerged as the clear winner of Saxony-Anhalt’s September 2026 election, taking just under 44% of the vote. This was a major electoral result, but it did not give the party control of the state parliament. Winning the most votes is not the same as holding a majority of seats.

The key mechanism is parliamentary arithmetic. Because the AfD fell short of an absolute majority, it needs support from other parties to form a government and pass measures. The BSW narrowly won representation and is the only party willing to hold formal talks with the AfD. All other parties have ruled out cooperation because authorities classify the AfD as confirmed right-wing extremist.

The election therefore produced a strong AfD position but no independent government. The talks with the BSW could determine whether the AfD can govern. They could also create a durable partnership between parties with different ideological histories but overlapping views on Russia and Ukraine.

The Bundesrat is Germany’s upper house, representing the federal states. In this case, Saxony-Anhalt’s parliament wants state premier Sven Schulze to use the Bundesrat to advocate peace negotiations with Russia. The request matters as a public political statement, especially during coalition negotiations.

But the states have no specific powers in foreign policy. The Bundesrat therefore cannot use this motion to order the federal government to stop financial or military aid to Ukraine. The motion expresses the state parliament’s position, but it does not create a binding national decision. That is the central legal mechanism limiting its effect.

Germany’s Ukraine policy will consequently remain a federal matter. The vote may influence political debate and show cooperation between the AfD and BSW, but it will not directly alter Berlin’s policy. Its larger importance lies in coalition bargaining and the possibility of closer cooperation inside Saxony-Anhalt.

The AfD won the Saxony-Anhalt election but lacks an absolute majority. That leaves it dependent on another party to govern. The BSW narrowly entered parliament and is the only party willing to hold formal talks with the AfD. This makes the BSW unusually important to the state’s political future.

The joint motion against German aid to Ukraine provides concrete evidence of shared positions. Both parties also support peace negotiations with Russia and criticize the political establishment. Their cooperation could make formal talks easier by creating trust around a highly visible issue. It does not prove that they agree on every policy or that a coalition will succeed.

Still, the arrangement could produce closer and potentially enduring cooperation. All other parties have rejected collaboration because the AfD is classified as confirmed right-wing extremist by Saxony-Anhalt’s security authorities. The BSW therefore faces a choice between enabling AfD-led government talks and remaining outside governing power.

A “cross-front” alliance is an attempted partnership between far-left and far-right forces against Germany’s political establishment. The idea is associated in the article with Jürgen Elsässer, who has long tried to build bridges between those camps. It matters because it describes cooperation based less on a shared full ideology than on common opposition.

The recent AfD-BSW meeting in Saxony-Anhalt created a clear parallel. Representatives attended a confidence-building dinner hosted by Elsässer’s far-right publishing house. They explored closer cooperation in a cordial atmosphere. Their shared positions include rejecting the establishment, criticizing support for Ukraine, and taking a pro-Putin stance.

Still, political scientist Armin Pfahl-Traughber does not call the relationship a cross-front alliance. He questions whether the BSW remains left-wing, describing its position as economically left but culturally right. Historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk goes further, calling the BSW reactionary rather than left-wing.

Foreign policy and military aid are national responsibilities, but parties can still make them central democratic issues. Their positions shape elections, public debate, and coalition choices. If parties challenge established policy, they can change which governments are possible even without legal authority to decide foreign affairs.

Saxony-Anhalt shows the mechanism clearly. The AfD won just under 44% but cannot govern alone. The BSW is the only party willing to negotiate with it. Their joint call to end aid to Ukraine demonstrates a shared issue that can help them cooperate. The motion itself cannot change national policy, yet the partnership may affect who governs the state.

That influence can strengthen representation for voters who oppose aid, but it can also deepen polarization. Other parties say demanding a ceasefire only from Ukraine would mean capitulation. The continuing debate may therefore affect democratic trust, coalition stability, and acceptance of Germany’s broader Ukraine policy.