We need to make industry crash 100,000 drones next year

Consuming drones means using them in demanding military exercises instead of preserving every system in a warehouse. Some would be flown until they fail or crash, then replaced. This matters because drone technology, threats, and tactics change quickly. Stored systems may lose combat value before war begins.

The article compares this approach with spending munitions and jet fuel during training. A drone used in a well-designed exercise improves operator skill while revealing how the system performs. It also tests logistics and exposes design problems that manufacturers can fix.

The aim is not to destroy as many drones as possible. It is to balance inventory with deliberate consumption. The Pentagon is already pursuing large production, and training could use drones in “the hundreds of thousands per year.” That demand can prepare industry to redesign and mass-produce replacements quickly.

The Pentagon is working toward an American drone industrial base that can produce hundreds of thousands of systems next year. The article does not give a more precise production figure. This target reflects the expected scale of future drone demand and the need to replace systems used in training and combat.

Defense Innovation Unit Deputy Director Travis Metz told the Senate Armed Services Committee that military training should consume drones in “the hundreds of thousands per year.” That means training itself could become a major customer, not merely a small demonstration activity.

Such demand would do more than prepare operators. It would force manufacturers to build at scale, deliver reliably, and adapt designs quickly. The article argues that this repeated cycle can train the industrial base to support a war in which drones are rapidly expended and iterated.

A large stockpile can lose combat value because drones are tied to changing technology, threats, and tactics. A system that performs well when purchased may be poorly matched to a later battlefield. The article calls this risk a potential “stockpile of obsolescence.”

The danger is not simply physical aging. It is that designs, operating methods, and enemy countermeasures can change faster than stored equipment. A warehouse preserves the hardware, but it does not automatically preserve its usefulness in combat.

Deliberate use offers another kind of value. Exercises reveal what operators need, produce test data, and show manufacturers how to improve the next design. The article therefore recommends consuming some drones from the large quantities already being bought, while keeping enough inventory for war. The goal is the best combat value for the money, not maximum storage or maximum destruction.

The Drone Dominance Gauntlets are military events that test drones, operators, vendors, and the wider drone ecosystem. The article describes the first two events as exercises where performance, requirements, scenarios, data collection, and manufacturing readiness could improve together.

Between Gauntlet 1 and Gauntlet 2, the drones became better and more reliable. Marine operators developed checklists and common language, helping them move faster from setup to flight. The test team clarified requirements, separated scenarios more clearly, and made data collection and scoring more sophisticated.

The vendor-operator relationship also changed. They sometimes worked like one tactical-technical team. Operators explained what they wanted to accomplish, while vendors showed how the technology could do it. The article presents this improvement as evidence that consuming drones at scale can train forces and guide the next design iteration.

Deliberately using and replacing drones creates combat value beyond the individual aircraft. Operators gain experience, while exercises reveal better tactics and expose weaknesses. Replacing consumed systems also practices the logistics of sustaining a force that rapidly loses equipment.

The mechanism is a feedback loop. Operators use drones in realistic conditions and report what they need. Test teams collect performance data, while vendors observe failures and successes. Manufacturers then redesign systems, build replacements, and learn how to deliver them in useful quantities. The article says this cycle can improve the next generation.

The approach must remain balanced. The military should not buy extra drones merely to destroy them, nor preserve every drone for a future war. It should consume some portion of the large quantities already being purchased. That can produce operator proficiency, better tactics, exercised logistics, industrial learning, and more capable replacements.

A large exercise with thousands of drones and counter-drone systems would create a shared test of technology, operators, tactics, and production. Manufacturers and engineers observing the results could see how systems perform under realistic operational problems. The exercise would also reveal what forces need from future designs.

The article’s stated mechanism is a feedback loop. Operators use the equipment, test teams collect data, and vendors learn where systems succeed or fail. That information can guide redesign, mass production, delivery, and employment in operationally useful quantities. Replacing consumed systems would keep the cycle moving.

However, the supplied passage ends immediately after introducing this imagined exercise. It does not report specific outcomes, numbers beyond “thousands,” or a completed assessment. It does say the goal is to connect existing programs and integrate manufacturing into a continuous industrial exercise that prepares for the next major conflict.

The defense industrial base is the manufacturing capacity and industrial network that supplies military equipment. In this article, it includes vendors and manufacturers that design, build, deliver, and improve drones. It matters because modern warfare may consume systems quickly and demand replacements or new versions.

Rapid redesign and manufacturing become military capabilities when technology, threats, and tactics change. Ordering five prototypes cannot show whether a system can be trusted, delivered, and employed in useful quantities. Mass production and repeated exercises reveal whether industry can adapt at operational scale.

The article argues that industry should participate in exercises rather than wait outside them. Drone Dominance Gauntlets already show vendors and operators learning together. Project Flytrap, major exercises, and manufacturing-readiness assessments provide additional pieces. Connecting them could create a continuous industrial exercise that trains the force and prepares production for the next major conflict.