'They break their promises, Iran must be prepared for war': Ghalibaf says

Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Iran must be ready for war while continuing negotiations with the United States. His central concern is preventing another US attack. He warned that even a signed agreement would not guarantee American compliance because, in his words, “they break their promises.”

Ghalibaf linked military readiness to deterrence. He said Iran must fight “against a bullying enemy” and act courageously on the battlefield. His argument is that the ability and willingness to retaliate can make an attack too costly. He also demanded that America be “penalised” until it changes its conduct and accepts what he called Iran’s rightful demands.

The statement presents diplomacy and military preparation as parallel tracks, not alternatives. Iran is negotiating, but Ghalibaf says it cannot rely on promises alone. That position could harden Tehran’s approach, increase pressure on Washington, and make future talks more difficult if each side treats the other’s actions as evidence of bad faith.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s parliament, formally called the Islamic Consultative Assembly. He presides over parliamentary sessions, manages the chamber’s agenda, and represents lawmakers publicly. His position gives him a prominent platform, which explains why his televised warning matters politically.

The speaker does not possess sole authority over war decisions. Iran’s constitution gives the Supreme Leader the highest authority over the armed forces and broad national security direction. The president and government conduct much foreign policy, while parliament can approve laws, budgets, and some international agreements. Security institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, also influence strategic decisions.

Therefore, Ghalibaf’s remarks are influential but not themselves a declaration of war. They signal the stance of a senior political leader and may affect parliamentary debate or public expectations. Actual military action would require decisions by Iran’s wider leadership structure, not simply an order from the parliament speaker.

Deterrence is the effort to prevent an attack by making the expected costs greater than the expected benefits. A country can seek deterrence through military strength, defensive preparations, alliances, or the promise of retaliation. The goal is not necessarily to fight, but to persuade an opponent that attacking would fail or prove too expensive.

Ghalibaf’s version depends heavily on credible resistance. He said Iran must be prepared to fight “against a bullying enemy” and must fight courageously on the battlefield. The mechanism is a threat of costly retaliation: if the United States believes Iran can impose serious losses, it may decide not to attack. Deterrence works only when capabilities and intentions appear believable.

Deterrence is never a guarantee. Miscalculation, accidents, domestic pressure, or disagreement about an opponent’s resolve can still produce conflict. Ghalibaf’s comments show why he wants negotiations backed by military readiness. He believes promises alone are unreliable, while demonstrated strength could force Washington to change its conduct.

The United States has a far larger economy and military than Iran. Recent international estimates put US nominal economic output at roughly $29 trillion, compared with less than $500 billion for Iran, or about 60 times more. Military-spending estimates place US expenditure above $900 billion and Iran’s near $8 billion, a difference of more than 100 times. Exact ratios change by year and exchange rate.

This imbalance means Iran cannot realistically compete with the United States across every military category. Washington has greater resources for aircraft, naval forces, intelligence, logistics, and advanced weapons. Iran instead emphasizes territorial defenses, missiles, drones, local geography, and partners or aligned armed groups. Those tools can raise the cost of intervention without equalizing overall power.

The gap helps explain Ghalibaf’s emphasis on deterrence and punishment. Iran may seek to convince Washington that an attack would trigger wider, prolonged, or unpredictable costs. That strategy can discourage action, but it also creates escalation risks. A stronger opponent may still misjudge Iran’s ability or willingness to retaliate.

The clearest modern example is the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Iran accepted limits and monitoring on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement and reimposed major sanctions. Iran and other governments argued that Washington had abandoned a multilateral commitment, although the United States disputed that interpretation.

The dispute helps explain Ghalibaf’s claim that a signed agreement is not enough. The mechanism is a credibility problem: Iran may fear that it will make concessions first, receive temporary benefits, and then lose them after a change in US policy. Earlier US-Iran disputes, including the 1979 hostage crisis and decades of sanctions, also contribute to deep mistrust, though they were not all broken promises.

The article does not identify a specific past agreement. Ghalibaf’s remarks therefore express a broader political judgment rather than a detailed legal case. Unless negotiations include durable protections and verifiable steps, the JCPOA experience may make both sides demand stronger guarantees before compromising.

If negotiations fail and both sides prepare for war, the immediate danger is a cycle of military action and retaliation. The United States could launch strikes or strengthen its regional deployments. Iran could respond against US forces, partners, or regional interests. Even limited attacks might produce casualties, economic disruption, and pressure for larger action.

The key mechanism is escalation. Each side could interpret defensive preparations as offensive intent. A US move to deter Iran might look like preparation for attack, while Iranian missile, drone, or partner activity could be treated as proof of hostile plans. Sanctions could also intensify, worsening Iran’s economic pressures and reducing incentives for compromise.

The wider region could suffer from attacks on infrastructure, shipping, energy facilities, or neighboring states hosting foreign forces. Governments could face pressure to support one side or protect their territory. War would not guarantee either government’s goals. It could instead damage both countries, weaken regional stability, and make a negotiated settlement harder after fighting begins.

War is only one way to pressure another government. Countries can negotiate directly, use intermediaries, offer incentives, impose sanctions, restrict trade, pursue legal claims, or build international coalitions. They can also use confidence-building steps, such as inspections, hotlines, prisoner exchanges, or limits on military exercises. These tools aim to change behavior while avoiding large-scale violence.

Treaties work by recording reciprocal commitments and creating procedures for monitoring, compliance, and dispute resolution. Sanctions work by restricting access to money, trade, technology, or institutions, raising the cost of a government’s choices. Diplomacy works through repeated communication: officials clarify demands, test compromises, and exchange benefits for verifiable actions. These methods are stronger when several countries support them.

None is automatic. Treaties can be abandoned, sanctions can hurt civilians or strengthen resistance, and talks can fail when trust is low. The article shows why Ghalibaf favors military preparation alongside negotiations. A durable approach would combine credible consequences with diplomacy, monitoring, and incentives that make compliance more attractive than confrontation.