Frozen Russian Assets: Europe Rejects US Control Plan – FT

The United States proposed unfreezing some Russian sovereign assets and transferring them into a new financial vehicle under Washington’s oversight. The idea was presented as part of efforts to revive negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine. The meeting in Miami included Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, the European Commission, NATO, and US negotiators.

European representatives rejected the proposal outright. They opposed handing control of the reserves to another party and opposed returning any funds to Moscow. One participant told the Financial Times they were told the plan was “simply not going to happen.”

The dispute matters because Europe already links the reserves to Ukraine’s financing and possible future compensation. The EU keeps the principal frozen while using extraordinary earnings from it. The Miami talks ended without an announced breakthrough, leaving the question unresolved.

Russian sovereign assets are reserves held by Russia’s central bank. They belong to the Russian state and are distinct from private property owned by sanctioned Russian businesspeople. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Western countries immobilized these state reserves and restricted transactions involving their management.

The article gives a concrete example: much of the EU-held money is kept through Euroclear, a Brussels-based securities depository. EU restrictions prevent Moscow from freely accessing the reserves. The assets remain frozen, but they continue generating extraordinary earnings that the EU channels toward Ukraine-related support.

This distinction matters legally and financially. State reserves are being handled through government sanctions and central-bank restrictions. Private assets belong to individuals or companies and are a separate category. The article does not describe those private holdings as part of the sovereign-reserve totals or the current EU mechanism for using windfall profits.

Western countries immobilized roughly €260 billion in Russian sovereign assets after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These are Russian central-bank reserves, not private property belonging to sanctioned businesspeople. Immobilization means Moscow cannot freely access or manage the reserves under the restrictions described in the article.

The European Union holds the largest stated share. Around €210 billion, or approximately $235 billion, remains blocked in the EU. Much of that amount is held through Euroclear, the Brussels-based securities depository. The article also gives the broader total as about $291 billion.

The scale explains why control of the reserves is central to peace and financing discussions. European governments want the assets to remain immobilized until Russia ends the war and compensates Ukraine. At the same time, the EU already uses earnings generated by the reserves, while keeping the underlying principal frozen.

European leaders want the underlying Russian reserves to stay frozen until Russia ends its war and compensates Ukraine. The freeze therefore serves two connected purposes: it prevents Moscow from freely accessing state funds, and it keeps those funds tied to the war’s eventual settlement. The article describes this as a shared position among European leaders.

The EU strengthened that position in December 2025 by prohibiting transfers of the central bank’s assets or reserves back to Russia. These measures did not transfer ownership to Ukraine. Instead, they maintained the freeze while European governments debated whether and how to use the money.

This policy makes the reserves part of future compensation planning. Europe already connects them to Ukraine’s financing and possible reparations, while allowing windfall profits to be used now. Belgium has raised legal and financial concerns about using the principal. European officials therefore rejected both returning funds to Moscow and placing control elsewhere.

The frozen assets already help Ukraine through extraordinary earnings, rather than through transfer of ownership or spending of the underlying principal. The EU keeps the Russian reserves immobilized and channels the windfall profits generated by them toward assistance and loan-related support for Ukraine.

According to the Council of the EU, the reserves have generated €8 billion in windfall profits. Ukraine has received €3.8 billion of that amount. Another €4.2 billion has contributed to repaying EU-G7 loans or been set aside for that purpose. Under current rules, 95 percent of revenues supports Ukraine’s repayment mechanism, while five percent supports the European Peace Facility.

This arrangement lets Europe support Ukraine while preserving the frozen principal. It also connects the reserves to longer-term financing. A separate €90 billion EU loan for 2026-27 is backed by the EU budget, and Ukraine would repay it after receiving Russian reparations, subject to the EU’s legal rights.

The principal is currently part of Europe’s broader financial strategy for Ukraine. The EU keeps it frozen, uses its earnings, and reserves the right to use the assets for repayment in accordance with international and EU law. Releasing the principal or placing it under US control could therefore change how those future claims are handled.

Today, 95 percent of revenues supports repayment of roughly €45 billion in EU-G7 loans. Five percent supports the European Peace Facility, which finances military assistance. The EU’s separate €90 billion 2026-27 support loan is financed through European borrowing, with repayment linked to Ukraine receiving Russian reparations.

The article does not specify exactly what would happen if the principal were released. It does show why governments are cautious: changing control could affect the reserves’ connection to loan repayment, military-support revenues, and future compensation. Ukrainian negotiators have also sought matching releases and faster military assistance if Russia violates a truce.

Governments can freeze another country’s central-bank reserves by imposing sanctions and prohibiting transactions involving their management. Such measures can block access without transferring ownership. In this case, EU restrictions prevent Moscow from freely accessing the Russian reserves, while the underlying assets remain frozen.

Using the principal is more difficult than using profits because it may affect state property and questions of sovereign immunity, ownership, and authority. It can also expose financial institutions and governments to lawsuits, retaliation, or claims that the action violates domestic or international law. These are general legal and financial risks; the article does not give a full legal analysis.

The article specifically reports that Belgium has raised legal and financial concerns about mobilizing the principal. European leaders therefore support keeping the assets immobilized until Russia ends the war and compensates Ukraine. The EU uses windfall earnings instead, while reserving possible future use of the assets under applicable law.