Netanyahu’s main rival vows to defeat Hamas within 18 months if elected PM

Gadi Eisenkot made a specific political and military promise: within 18 months of becoming prime minister, Hamas would no longer rule the Gaza Strip. This matters because it sets a clear deadline for changing who controls Gaza, rather than promising only an open-ended campaign against Hamas. It also links his election campaign directly to the future of the war-ravaged territory.

Eisenkot described two possible ways to meet the deadline. One was US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan, which calls for Hamas to disarm gradually and transfer power. The other was a series of “creative operations” by Israel’s military to destroy Hamas’s military wing. Both routes aim at ending Hamas’s governing role, but they rely on different mechanisms.

The promise was made before the October 27 election, near Gaza. It remains a campaign commitment, not a completed policy. If Eisenkot became prime minister, his government would need to negotiate, implement, or order the actions required to meet the 18-month target.

Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist movement with both political and armed wings. The article calls it a Palestinian movement and focuses on its military wing and governing role. Saying Hamas rules Gaza means it exercises the territory’s effective political authority, including decisions about security, administration, and public life. That is different from simply having fighters or influence there.

In practical terms, a ruling authority must organize services, enforce decisions, manage institutions, and represent the territory in negotiations. Hamas’s control therefore gives it power beyond battlefield operations. A plan to remove Hamas from rule would need to address both its armed capabilities and the civilian functions connected to governing. Disarming fighters alone would not automatically create a working administration.

The article does not describe Gaza’s institutions in detail, so these governance elements draw on the standard meaning of territorial rule. Its central point is clear: Eisenkot wants Hamas no longer in charge of Gaza. That would require another authority to take responsibility for the territory’s administration and security.

The Gaza Strip covers about 365 square kilometers and has more than two million residents, making it one of the world’s most densely populated territories. Those figures are widely used estimates, and population counts change over time. Gaza’s size and density matter because any campaign against Hamas would unfold among a large civilian population in a confined area.

In dense cities and refugee communities, military forces face short distances, crowded streets, underground or concealed positions, and limited room for civilians to move. Hamas’s military wing could use that environment to resist or hide. Israeli operations would therefore have to balance military objectives with civilian protection, access to aid, and the danger of prolonged destruction.

The political challenge would continue after combat. Removing Hamas from authority would leave a governing gap unless another body could provide security and services. Eisenkot’s 18-month promise therefore involves more than defeating armed units. It would require changing control across a crowded territory while gaining enough legitimacy and capacity to administer Gaza.

Hamas came to control Gaza after winning Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and then fighting with Fatah, the rival movement associated with the Palestinian Authority. In 2007, Hamas defeated Fatah forces in Gaza and took over the territory’s government and security apparatus. That split left Hamas governing Gaza while the Palestinian Authority retained influence in parts of the West Bank.

The key mechanism was not simply an election result. Hamas’s armed takeover in 2007 gave it direct control over Gaza’s institutions and territory. Since then, it has operated as Gaza’s de facto authority while also maintaining an armed wing. This combination explains why changing Gaza’s leadership requires addressing both governance and military power.

Hamas has held power in Gaza for nearly two decades, from 2007 to the present. Eisenkot’s promise would therefore seek to reverse a long-established political reality. Any replacement authority would face the practical task of taking over institutions, security responsibilities, and daily administration after years of Hamas rule.

Eisenkot described two fundamentally different ways to change Gaza’s leadership. The first is a negotiated path based on Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan. The plan would gradually disarm Hamas and transfer power to another authority. This route depends on an agreement, staged implementation, and cooperation from the parties involved.

The second path is military. Eisenkot said Israel could use “creative operations” aimed at destroying Hamas’s military wing. The mechanism would be coercion rather than negotiated compliance: weaken or eliminate Hamas’s armed capacity, then end its ability to remain the territory’s ruling force. Military success alone, however, would not specify who governs afterward.

Both options serve the same stated objective: Hamas would no longer rule the Gaza Strip within 18 months. The article does not explain the proposed successor authority, the details of Trump’s plan, or what operations would involve. Those unanswered questions would shape whether either route could produce stable political control rather than only a battlefield change.

Disarming Hamas and transferring power would separate Gaza’s government from its current armed ruler. In principle, another authority could take responsibility for policing, public administration, services, and negotiations. That could change how security decisions are made and create a new channel for managing Gaza’s civilian life. The article, however, does not name the authority that would replace Hamas.

The key mechanism would be a transfer of control, not disarmament alone. A successor would need enough security capacity to prevent renewed fighting and enough administrative ability to keep institutions functioning. If power changed without a credible replacement, competing groups could seek control. Civilian services could be disrupted, and insecurity could continue even after Hamas’s military wing was weakened.

The current reality is that Eisenkot offered an outcome without describing its full administration. Trump’s ceasefire plan provides for gradual disarmament and a transfer of power, while the military option focuses on destroying Hamas’s military wing. Either route would require decisions about who governs and how civilians are protected afterward.

Israeli elections determine which political leadership can form a government and control the prime minister’s office. The prime minister leads the executive branch and, with the government, shapes national security policy. That makes an election relevant to Gaza: a new leadership can adopt different military goals, authorize operations, and pursue negotiations than its predecessor.

The mechanism is political authority combined with state institutions. A prime minister does not personally conduct every operation or agreement. The government works through the military, security agencies, ministries, and diplomatic channels. It can approve a ceasefire framework, instruct officials to negotiate, and set conditions for military action, subject to Israel’s legal and political checks.

In the article, Eisenkot is challenging Benjamin Netanyahu before the October 27 vote. His promise shows how an election can become a choice between competing approaches to Gaza. If he wins and forms a government, he could seek to implement Trump’s ceasefire plan or order a different military strategy. The election itself does not guarantee success.