Russia Builds Major New Drone Attack Base in 6 Weeks, Satellite Images Show

Russia has built a major launch facility for jet-powered attack drones in the southwestern Rostov region. The site covers about 0.9 square kilometers and sits near Millerovo air base. Its rapid construction matters because it expands Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine with faster drones.

Satellite imagery provides the clearest evidence. On August 31, the area was an empty field with only a few vehicles. Construction appeared the next morning. Later images showed eight concrete launch platforms on the western edge. Two already had launch rails, while rails were being built on two others.

Other work continued during the week when the latest images were taken. Defense experts said the facility looked close to completion. Mike Monnik estimated it could become operational within weeks, or sooner. The imagery therefore suggests the base is nearly ready, although Russia’s Defense Ministry did not comment.

A jet-powered attack drone is an unmanned aircraft driven by a jet engine rather than a piston engine. The article describes Russia’s newest Geran-4 and Geran-5 models as jet-powered attack drones. They matter because their greater speed can shorten the time available for detection, tracking, and interception.

The article contrasts them with Russia’s earlier, slower piston-powered drones. Jet drones can travel at speeds of up to 600 kilometers per hour. Ukraine’s interceptor drones were designed to cheaply stop the slower predecessors. Their speed advantage makes the newer weapons a different and more difficult target.

Russia has increased its use of jet-powered drones roughly sixfold over three summer months, according to Ukrainian military data reported by Reuters. Kyiv is now trying to develop a response. The shift could increase pressure on Ukrainian defenses, especially during expected winter attacks involving drones and missiles.

The new facility occupies around 0.9 square kilometers, which Reuters compared with roughly 126 soccer pitches. Its size and layout indicate a purpose-built launch complex rather than a temporary field position. That matters because permanent infrastructure can support repeated, organized drone attacks.

Satellite imagery showed eight launch platforms along the site’s western edge. Two already had rails installed, and rails were being constructed on two more. Mike Monnik said the platforms appeared capable of firing Russia’s Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered drones. Rob Jordan said the concrete pads and possible rails looked consistent with Geran launch tracks.

Monnik estimated that the facility might fire 100 jet-powered drones or more in 24 hours. He stressed that actual output would depend on supplies and operational objectives. Russia normally fires drones in smaller numbers spread throughout the day, rather than launching the full possible capacity at once.

The facility was built near Millerovo air base, which is home to Russia’s 31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment. The article does not state Russia’s exact reason for choosing the location. However, DroneSec assessed that the launch site likely sits within the air-defense coverage provided by systems at the air base.

That coverage could shield the drone facility from Ukrainian efforts to strike it. Air-defense systems at or around Millerovo might detect, track, and engage incoming weapons before they reach launch platforms, concrete pads, rails, or support vehicles. The proximity also puts the new site just 3.5 kilometers from the established military airfield.

This arrangement could help Russia protect an important new part of its attack network. It does not make the base invulnerable, and the article gives no confirmed record of attacks against it. Still, the suspected protective “bubble” would make attempts to target the facility more difficult as it becomes operational.

Fast attack drones are harder to intercept because they reduce the time between detection and impact. Defenders must find the drone, identify it, send an interceptor, and guide that interceptor into position. When the target moves faster, every stage has less time to succeed.

The article gives a direct example. Ukraine’s interceptor drones were designed to cheaply stop Russia’s slower, piston-powered predecessors. The newer jet-powered drones can travel at up to 600 kilometers per hour. Their speed therefore creates a mismatch: the defensive drones may not be fast enough to catch or reach the incoming weapon.

Russia’s use of jet-powered drones rose roughly sixfold over three months this summer, according to Ukrainian military data reported by Reuters. Kyiv is scrambling for a solution. The growing use of these drones could place greater strain on Ukraine’s existing defenses and increase the importance of faster or different defensive systems.

A practical alternative is layered defense instead of relying on one slow interceptor drone. Faster interceptor aircraft or missiles could engage the drones at greater distance. Ground-based air-defense systems and rapid-fire guns could provide another layer near likely targets. Electronic-warfare systems may also disrupt navigation or communications, where applicable.

The key mechanism is to match different defenses to different moments. Sensors detect and track the incoming drone. A long-range system can engage early, while shorter-range missiles or guns cover the final approach. Electronic warfare may interfere without requiring a physical collision. These methods can complement, rather than replace, interceptor drones.

The article reports no specific Ukrainian or NATO plan using these alternatives. It does report a relative lack of comprehensive counter-drone defenses in many NATO countries. Large attacks would also test ammunition supplies, sensor coverage, and operating costs. A layered approach could improve resilience, but its effectiveness would depend on the systems available and the number of drones arriving.

Air defense depends on a race between the incoming drone and the defender’s response. Speed determines how quickly the drone crosses defended airspace. Detection time determines how long defenders have to classify and track it. Faster drones compress that window, increasing the chance that a defense cannot engage before impact.

Coverage matters because sensors and weapons must reach the drone’s route. A gap can let an attacker pass even when defenses work elsewhere. Interceptors also need enough speed, range, and guidance to meet the target. If they are slower than the drone, they may not catch it. If they cost much more than the incoming weapon, repeated attacks can exhaust supplies.

The article highlights this problem through Ukraine’s slower interceptor drones and Russia’s jet-powered weapons. It also notes limited comprehensive counter-drone defenses in many NATO countries. Effective protection therefore requires early detection, overlapping coverage, suitable interceptors, and enough affordable supplies for sustained attacks.