Kyiv’s 3 Main CHP Plants Stop Producing Power

Kyiv’s three largest combined heat and power plants—CHP-5, CHP-6 and Darnytsia, also called CHP-4—can no longer generate electricity. The report links their loss to repeated Russian attacks, including strikes overnight on Oct. 13-14. This removes a major source of electricity produced inside the capital.

Their previous contribution could reach approximately 1.3 gigawatts. That does not mean every electricity source in Kyiv disappeared. Smaller distributed facilities still operate, and the city remains connected to the national grid. However, Kyiv must now rely more heavily on electricity arriving through transmission lines from elsewhere in Ukraine.

The loss matters most when those lines or substations are damaged, or when winter demand rises. It also does not mean heating has vanished across the city, because heat comes from several facilities. But electricity is needed to run pumps and other equipment moving water and heat. Repairs, imports and available generation elsewhere will shape future outages.

CHP-5, CHP-6 and the Darnytsia plant previously provided up to approximately 1.3 gigawatts of electricity. Kyiv’s peak winter consumption reaches approximately two gigawatts, according to lawmaker Serhiy Nahorniak. Comparing the figures shows how large the plants were relative to the capital’s demand.

The 1.3-gigawatt figure equals roughly 65 percent of two gigawatts. In simple terms, the plants’ former maximum output was close to two-thirds of Kyiv’s peak winter requirement. That comparison is approximate because both figures are estimates, and plant output could vary.

The plants did not supply every watt Kyiv used. Other facilities and electricity transmitted from elsewhere also mattered. Still, losing that much local capacity leaves less room when winter demand rises or transmission infrastructure is damaged. The remaining system must deliver more power from outside the capital, while repairs, imports and other generators help determine how much electricity reaches consumers.

Local generation produces electricity near the people and businesses using it. When Kyiv loses major plants, electricity available elsewhere in Ukraine must travel into the capital through the transmission network. This makes the city more dependent on the condition and capacity of that network.

The article gives a clear example: available generation elsewhere cannot compensate for damaged delivery infrastructure unless enough power can physically reach consumers. Kyiv’s local plants previously contributed approximately 1.3 gigawatts, so their loss leaves the national grid carrying a greater share of the capital’s needs.

That creates a vulnerability during attacks and severe winter demand. Damage to lines or substations can restrict supply even when other Ukrainian plants are producing electricity. Ukrenergo can then order restrictions across the wider system, and distribution companies apply them locally. Smaller generators and imports may help, but they cannot fully replace a functioning route into Kyiv.

In standard grid terms, generation is the production of electricity at power plants or smaller facilities. Transmission moves large amounts across longer distances, such as from other parts of Ukraine toward Kyiv. Distribution then sends available electricity through local lines and substations to homes, businesses and essential services.

The article shows why each stage matters. Electricity produced elsewhere cannot help Kyiv if attacks damage the transmission network bringing it into the capital. Even when power reaches the city, local damage can affect individual lines or substations. Neighboring buildings may therefore have different supply conditions because they connect to different parts of the distribution system.

A failure at any stage can cause outages or restrictions. Ukrenergo manages the wider system and determines limits, while distribution companies deliver available power and apply those limits. Restoring one connection may not restore a whole district. The same network also powers pumps, hospitals, heating equipment, transport and communications.

When attacks damage power plants and transmission infrastructure together, Kyiv loses both local production and access to replacement electricity. The city remains connected to the national grid, but that connection is useful only when enough power can move through undamaged equipment. This makes a combined strike especially disruptive.

The article reports that reduced voltage after one attack prevented water-pumping equipment from working normally in several districts. Some facilities stopped in an emergency, leaving residents with reduced pressure or no running water. Neighboring buildings can also experience different conditions because they use different lines or substations.

The effects extend beyond homes. Water pumps, heating equipment, hospitals, transportation and communications all require reliable electricity. Scheduled stabilization cuts may be replaced by emergency restrictions when operators urgently balance the system. Generators, mobile boilers, batteries and other backup systems can support essential facilities, but they provide a smaller reserve than the main grid.

Several alternatives can reduce the impact of lost major plants. Electricity can come from other parts of Ukraine, provided transmission routes remain usable. Kyiv also has smaller distributed generating facilities already operating. Imports may add supply, while local backup equipment can keep essential services running during interruptions.

The city reported approximately 700 generators for water and heating facilities, 70 mobile boiler units, and three diesel power stations totaling 16 megawatts for water supplies. Another 40 megawatts was planned by year’s end. Healthcare facilities had 480 generators, and 15 hospitals had independent water wells.

Residential buildings also received more than 6,000 generators, inverters and batteries through municipal programs. These systems support individual buildings and critical facilities rather than replacing Kyiv’s main generating plants. Their usefulness depends on fuel, equipment, repairs and the duration of an outage. Imports and distant generation likewise help only when transmission and distribution networks can carry the electricity to users.

Electricity generation and consumption must stay closely balanced across a grid. Homes, businesses, hospitals and pumps use power continuously, while plants and other sources must provide enough supply at each moment. If available generation or delivery capacity falls below demand, the system faces growing stress and operators must act quickly.

The article describes this mechanism through Ukrenergo’s restrictions. The national operator assesses the wider system, then distribution companies deliver available electricity and apply limits. DTEK Kyiv Grids warns that emergency restrictions can interrupt published schedules when operators urgently need to balance the system. These cuts reduce demand so remaining equipment can keep operating.

This is why an outage may occur even when some plants are still producing. Damage to transmission lines, substations or local distribution equipment can prevent supply from reaching consumers. Kyiv’s lost local generation makes the margin smaller, especially during winter peaks. Future outages depend on additional attacks, repairs, generation, imports and the grid’s ability to move power.