As airstrikes in Gaza continue, support for 'armed resistance' grows, Hamas popularity drops - poll

The poll found that support for armed resistance increased among Palestinians in Gaza, even as identification with Hamas declined. Gaza support rose from 21% in August to 37%, slightly above the 33% average across the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, only 19% identified with Hamas, down from 24% in August and 35% ten months earlier.

This difference matters because political identity and views on tactics are not the same. A person could support armed resistance without identifying with Hamas. The poll also found that diplomacy remained more popular overall, at 42%, while 18% favored popular nonviolent resistance. These figures show that Palestinians held mixed views about the most effective path to statehood.

The results point to a divided political landscape. Hamas had less declared support, yet armed resistance gained ground in Gaza. The think tank linked that increase to ongoing Israeli strikes. Support for different strategies may continue changing as insecurity, ceasefire expectations, and political conditions develop.

In this context, “armed resistance” refers to using weapons or organized violence against an opposing power to pursue Palestinian political or national goals. It contrasts with diplomacy and popular nonviolent resistance, which the poll listed as separate strategies for establishing a Palestinian state.

The article does not define the term more precisely or list particular operations. It reports support for “armed resistance” as a survey response and discusses that support alongside Israeli military strikes, Hamas, and the wider conflict. Therefore, the figure measures an attitude toward an armed strategy, not participation in a specific activity.

That distinction is important when reading the results. A respondent expressing support may be endorsing a general political approach rather than declaring membership in Hamas or involvement in violence. The poll found 33% overall support for armed resistance, including 37% in Gaza, but only 19% identified with Hamas.

The survey included 909 Palestinians in the West Bank and 488 in the Gaza Strip. Together, that is 1,397 respondents living outside Israel-controlled territory. Across both Palestinian territories, 33% supported armed resistance as an effective path toward establishing a Palestinian state.

The poll reported a margin of error of 3.5%. This indicates the likely range around a reported percentage caused by sampling rather than a survey of every Palestinian. The margin applies to the poll’s estimates under its stated methodology, not to every possible source of uncertainty.

The figures provide a broad snapshot of opinion, while subgroup results need careful reading. For example, support reached 37% in Gaza, compared with 21% in the August poll. That increase is larger than the stated margin of error, but precise comparisons still depend on subgroup sample sizes and the poll’s method. The article does not provide those subgroup sizes.

The Palestinian think tank attributed Gaza’s increased support for armed resistance to ongoing Israeli strikes in the Gaza Strip. The reported rise was substantial: 37% of Gazan respondents supported armed resistance, compared with 21% in the August poll. The article presents the strikes as the main explanation offered for that change.

The proposed mechanism is a response to continuing insecurity and military pressure. People experiencing or observing strikes may become more receptive to armed action as a way to respond or seek political change. This explains the poll’s interpretation, but the survey itself records opinions and does not prove that strikes caused each respondent’s view.

The shift occurred alongside continued uncertainty about the conflict. Sixty-one percent expected insecurity to continue, and most respondents said neither Israel nor Hamas had won the war. Diplomacy still had greater overall support than armed resistance, showing that Gaza’s change did not replace all other political preferences.

The two-state solution described here is an agreement establishing a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state. The poll found that 53% of Palestinians supported this arrangement, with East Jerusalem serving as the Palestinian capital. It therefore combines recognition of two states with a proposed location for Palestinian political authority.

The capital’s location matters because it gives the proposed Palestinian state a defined center of government and reflects a major territorial and political claim. East Jerusalem is not treated in the article as a minor detail. It is part of the question of what a negotiated statehood agreement would look like.

Support was not uniform. Overall support reached 53%, but only 48% of respondents in Gaza backed establishing a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish one. The results suggest that a two-state framework has majority support in the poll, while agreement varies by territory and would still face disagreements over borders, authority, and implementation.

Respondents identified several alternatives to armed resistance for establishing a Palestinian state. Diplomacy was the most popular, supported by 42% of Palestinians. Another 18% favored popular nonviolent resistance. Together, these approaches represented more support than armed resistance, which stood at 33% overall.

The poll also asked about consultative talks with Israeli figures described by respondents as “anti-occupation.” Fifty-six percent supported those talks. This option reflects engagement with Israeli individuals who oppose the occupation, rather than armed action. The article does not explain what form those consultations would take.

These results show that Palestinian opinion was not focused on one strategy. Diplomacy led nationally, while Gaza showed higher support for armed resistance at 37%. The findings suggest that future efforts toward statehood would need to account for both demand for negotiations and support for nonviolent or armed forms of resistance.

A poll’s margin of error estimates the uncertainty created by surveying a sample instead of the entire population. In this survey, the margin was 3.5 percentage points. A reported result is therefore best understood as an estimate with a range around it, assuming the poll’s sampling and methods are sound.

For example, a reported 33% could plausibly lie several points higher or lower because of sampling variation. If one poll shows 33% and another shows 35%, the two results may overlap once the margin of error is considered. That makes it risky to describe a small difference as a definite shift in public opinion.

The margin does not explain every possible error, and subgroup comparisons can be less certain when their samples are smaller. The article reports Gaza’s rise from 21% to 37%, a 16-point change. That is much larger than 3.5 points, although full interpretation still requires details about subgroup sampling and survey methods.