Israelis demand accountability over 7 October failures three years after attacks

On 7 October 2023, Hamas-led attackers crossed from Gaza into southern Israel, broke through the border fence, and attacked Israeli communities. About 1,200 people were killed, while 251 were taken hostage to Gaza. It was Israel's deadliest attack since the country's creation in 1948.

The demand for accountability concerns more than Hamas's responsibility for the assault. Israelis want to know what intelligence agencies and military leaders knew, what warnings reached political leaders, and whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu understood the danger. Female soldiers watching the border had reportedly warned superiors about preparations.

Three years later, there is still no independent state inquiry. Netanyahu is seeking election again while presenting himself as the strongest protector of Israel. Families such as Inbar Goldstein's say the country must examine the long process of abandonment, not only the events of that day, to prevent repetition.

An independent state inquiry would examine how the 7 October attack became possible, what officials knew, and how decisions were made. Its importance lies in independence: the investigation should be able to question military, intelligence, and political leaders without simply accepting their explanations. The goal is accountability and lessons for future protection.

The article identifies several questions such an inquiry could address. Female soldiers reportedly warned superiors about possible Hamas preparations. Reports also describe warnings from regional neighbours and concerns among senior security officials. Netanyahu denies some reported warnings and has blamed security chiefs, while they have not been independently judged in the article.

Its absence matters because Israelis still lack an authoritative account three years after the failure. Families fear that the same conditions could return. Without a trusted investigation, competing claims can replace evidence, responsibility can remain disputed, and reforms may not address the real weaknesses in Israel's security system.

The attacks caused mass loss across southern Israel. About 1,200 people were killed when gunmen broke through the border fence and attacked communities. Another 251 people were taken back to Gaza as hostages. The assault was Israel's deadliest since its creation in 1948.

Kfar Aza suffered especially severe losses. Sixty-four people were killed there, and 19 were kidnapped. The community also lost half of its 14-member civil defence squad. Those defenders were killed shortly after 07:00, near the kibbutz armoury, as attackers overran the community.

The figures explain why the demand for accountability remains intense. Residents and relatives are not discussing an abstract failure. They are remembering specific people, including Inbar Goldstein's brother and niece, and relatives who were kidnapped. Three years later, survivors and families want the country to explain how communities so close to the border were left exposed.

The article describes warnings before the assault from several directions. Young female soldiers stationed along the Gaza border reportedly noticed suspicious activity and warned their superiors about possible preparations. Senior military and intelligence officials also became concerned in the hours before the attack. Reports later alleged warnings from regional neighbours, including the United Arab Emirates.

The reported handling of these warnings is central to the dispute. Yaakov Katz describes commanders being recalled, calls among senior officials, and an elite intelligence unit sent to the border. Yet officials expected, at worst, a small incursion. Netanyahu says security chiefs chose not to wake him because they feared he would order a major deployment.

The claims are contested. Netanyahu denies some reported warnings, and his office called the UAE account an absolute lie. Katz argues that waking Netanyahu would not have changed the response because security chiefs did not expect a full assault. An inquiry is needed to establish what was known and communicated.

Hamas-led attackers carried out the assault, killed about 1,200 people, and took 251 hostages. The article therefore places direct responsibility for the attack itself on Hamas. Separate accountability questions concern Israel's failure to protect communities, including whether warnings were recognized, shared, and acted upon.

Military commanders and intelligence officials may need to explain their assessments and responses. The article reports border warnings, growing concerns, an elite unit sent to the area, and commanders recalled from leave. Netanyahu has blamed security chiefs, saying they deliberately did not wake him. Journalist Yaakov Katz disputes that a late warning would have changed the outcome.

Netanyahu also faces political questions because he was prime minister during the failure and is seeking election again. The article asks what he knew and whether warnings reached him. It does not establish final blame for Israeli officials. A credible inquiry would separate Hamas's criminal responsibility from questions about Israeli preparedness and leadership.

The immediate security risk is repetition. Israelis quoted in the article fear that ignored warnings, poor intelligence judgments, or weak communication could leave communities vulnerable again. An inquiry could identify where protection failed and turn those findings into changes in warning systems, decision-making, and border defence.

The political consequences are already visible. Netanyahu was prime minister during the failure and is running for election again, promising to protect Israel more strongly than anyone else. He blames security chiefs, while critics ask what he knew. Without an agreed account, responsibility becomes a continuing political battle rather than a settled national lesson.

Public trust could also weaken further. Families such as Inbar Goldstein's want the state to take responsibility, not only condemn Hamas. If no investigation establishes the facts, competing claims may survive and relatives may feel abandoned. The article's warning is direct: without inquiry and correction, the failure could happen again and again.

A containment policy tries to limit an armed group's danger without removing its ability to operate. That can appear stable when attacks are limited, but it may leave the group time to organize, test defences, and prepare a larger operation. The risk grows when officials treat warning signs as manageable rather than as evidence of a changing threat.

The article does not describe Israel's policy in those exact terms, but it records the consequences critics want examined. Female soldiers reported suspicious activity. Senior officials noticed growing Hamas activity, yet expected only a small incursion at worst. Netanyahu's critics call this part of a longer process of abandonment, extending beyond 7 October.

The lesson is not that every containment policy inevitably fails. It is that containment requires constant review, strong intelligence, and credible responses when evidence changes. If those safeguards are missing, apparent calm can conceal growing danger. An independent inquiry could show whether Israel misread that danger and how to prevent another surprise.