Nepal should be a ‘strategic broker’, not a buffer, says Amitabh Mattoo

A buffer is a country viewed mainly as space separating stronger powers. A bridge connects those powers but may still be valued chiefly for geography. A strategic broker has more agency. It builds relationships, supports dialogue and helps shape agreements among competing actors. For Nepal, this means turning its location into diplomatic influence rather than accepting a passive role.

The mechanism is purposeful engagement. Nepal could use diplomacy, stronger institutions and regional cooperation to offer trusted channels for communication and collaboration. Mattoo linked this approach to strategic diversification and meaningful agency for smaller states. The goal is not to control Asia’s order, but to gain room to negotiate its interests.

This matters as China rises, India pursues strategic autonomy and India-China relations evolve. The article does not promise a simple transformation. It presents Nepal’s role as a strategic choice, supported by institutions and regional engagement, while Asia’s future remains shaped by multiple actors and competing interests.

The article identifies India and China as the central major powers in Nepal’s strategic environment and in Asia’s changing power balance. It discusses China’s rise, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and evolving India-China relations. It also refers more broadly to regional and global powers, but does not name them or detail their interests.

The key mechanism is competition combined with interaction. Major powers bring different strategic priorities, while smaller states face pressure to respond to their choices. The article frames Asia as a plural future shaped by multiple actors, competing interests and strategic decisions, rather than by one predetermined power.

For Nepal, the implication is to avoid being treated only as an object of rivalry. Mattoo’s proposed response is diplomacy, institutional cooperation, strategic diversification and regional engagement. These tools could help Nepal work with India, China and wider regional actors without reducing its policy to a choice between two powers.

The source does not quantify Nepal’s dependence on India and China. It provides no percentages, trade totals, investment amounts or transit figures. Therefore, the article cannot answer precisely how much Nepal relies on either country for economic access. Its focus is strategic rather than statistical.

What it does establish is the context: Asia’s power balance is shifting, China is rising, India is pursuing strategic autonomy and India-China relations are evolving. These changes can affect smaller states such as Nepal. The article connects that setting with the importance of strategic diversification, strong institutions and meaningful agency.

The practical implication is that Nepal should widen its relationships and strengthen its ability to make choices. Regional engagement and institutional cooperation could reduce excessive exposure to any single external relationship. However, the article does not identify specific trade partners, projects or sectors, so claims about the exact scale of dependence would require additional evidence.

Nepal has traditionally been viewed as a buffer because it lies between India and China, allowing its territory and policies to be understood through the security concerns of stronger neighbors. It has also been called a bridge because its location can connect the two powers. These labels emphasize geography and dependence more than independent policy choice.

The important distinction is agency. A buffer is mainly managed around rivalry, while a bridge is mainly valued for connection. Mattoo’s strategic-broker idea asks Nepal to use diplomacy and institutions to influence relationships actively. Regional engagement would turn location into a platform for cooperation, not merely a space between competing powers.

The source does not explain this history in detail, so this geographic interpretation provides context beyond the article. Its present argument is clear: as Asia’s power balance shifts, Nepal should not remain confined to inherited labels. Strong institutions and strategic diversification could give it a more active regional role.

Acting as a strategic broker could give Nepal greater agency in a changing Asian order. Instead of being treated mainly as a buffer or bridge, Nepal could help manage relationships, support cooperation and make its own strategic choices. This matters because Asia is being shaped by several actors and competing interests.

The mechanism would be institutional and diplomatic capacity. Strong institutions can coordinate policy and sustain commitments. Diplomacy can keep channels open with competing powers. Regional engagement can connect Nepal to wider discussions, while strategic diversification can prevent overreliance on one relationship. Together, these tools could make Nepal a more credible partner.

The article does not claim that Nepal would become a major power. It suggests a more realistic gain: meaningful agency for a smaller state. As China rises, India pursues strategic autonomy and regional dynamics evolve, Nepal’s choices and institutions could determine whether it remains reactive or helps shape its surrounding order.

Diversification means widening Nepal’s relationships, channels and areas of cooperation while keeping decision-making independent. It does not require rejecting India or China. Instead, Nepal could engage both while also participating in broader regional conversations and institutional partnerships. This approach fits the article’s emphasis on strategic choice and smaller-state agency.

The key mechanism is avoiding a single point of dependence. Diplomacy can maintain communication with competing powers. Institutional cooperation can make agreements more predictable and durable. Regional engagement can create additional connections and opportunities. Strong domestic institutions would help Nepal assess commitments and protect its interests across these relationships.

The source does not name specific countries, organizations or projects for diversification. It presents a general strategy suited to Asia’s plural future, where multiple actors and competing interests shape outcomes. Nepal’s challenge would be to build balanced engagement without becoming passive, while using diplomacy and institutions to preserve room for independent choices.

Strategic autonomy means preserving the freedom to assess interests and choose policies independently, even while working with powerful countries. In the article, India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is part of Asia’s changing strategic picture. For Nepal, autonomy would mean engaging major powers without surrendering its ability to set priorities.

Strong institutions make that freedom practical. They can coordinate foreign, economic and regional policies, preserve continuity and create rules for evaluating outside proposals. Diplomacy then becomes more credible because partners can rely on national decisions. Regional engagement and strategic diversification add further options when major powers compete.

Smaller states need these safeguards because they have less material power than the actors shaping Asia’s order. The article emphasizes that meaningful agency is still possible through strategy and institutions. It does not offer a detailed institutional blueprint, but it clearly presents stronger institutions as essential to navigating China’s rise, India-China relations and wider regional change.