Raivis Melnis, Latvia’s defense minister: ‘We are preparing to fight’

The crisis began when several attack drones penetrated Latvia’s airspace. Two struck near an empty fuel depot, exposing a gap in the country’s defenses. The incident helped trigger a government crisis and led to a change in defense leadership.

Raivis Melnis set a deadline for new capabilities along Latvia’s borders with Russia and Belarus. By October, the country had added radar systems, drone interceptors, and supporting software. Latvia also developed systems that can detect and intercept drones using equipment manufactured domestically.

Melnis said the drone threat is now manageable, not completely solved. He expects more drones and says Latvia will rely on its own systems, supported by NATO. The new defenses are therefore both a practical response and a warning that future incursions will meet resistance.

Melnis distinguishes between an imminent conventional invasion and a wider security threat. He says he does not currently see an imminent attack, but Russia has increased drones, cyberattacks, provocations, sabotage, illegal immigration, and propaganda. Latvia must prepare for the possibility that these pressures could worsen.

That requires balancing limited resources. Military units support border guards, the Interior Ministry, and security services against hybrid activities. At the same time, Latvia must preserve an army capable of fighting if war comes. NATO exercises and permanently deployed units also keep forces practiced and visible.

The phrase therefore describes readiness, not a prediction of immediate war. Melnis says Latvia is preparing because a threat exists across the border. He wants Latvia and its allies to maintain unity, support Ukraine, and ensure that aggression would face a strong response.

Hybrid warfare combines different kinds of pressure rather than relying on a conventional military attack. Melnis describes Russia and Belarus as using activities that can disrupt security, strain institutions, and test public resolve. The goal, he says, is to break Latvia’s cohesion and its will to support Ukraine and its partners.

The methods mentioned include drones entering airspace, cyberattacks on systems, illegal immigration that burdens border services, sabotage, provocations, and propaganda. Latvia has deployed military units to support border guards and security services. It has also built stronger drone detection and interception capabilities.

These activities matter because they create sustained pressure without necessarily producing a clear battlefield. Melnis says such incidents have increased, even though he sees no imminent conventional attack. Latvia must therefore divide limited resources between immediate disruption and preparation for a possible future war.

International support is spread across NATO’s eastern flank. The article says NATO countries have deployed troops to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland. It identifies Spain as one contributor, with about 600 troops stationed at Latvia’s Adazi and Lielvarde bases.

The article does not state the combined number of foreign troops in Latvia or across all five countries. It therefore cannot support a precise total. What it does establish is a multinational presence, with Spanish forces serving alongside Latvian forces and regularly exercising with them.

That presence is intended to provide deterrence and reassurance. Melnis says allied soldiers are there not only to train, but also to fight if necessary. The known scale is thus partial: approximately 600 Spanish troops are identified, while the broader NATO deployment remains unquantified in the article.

NATO troops and exercises strengthen deterrence by making allied commitment visible. A potential attacker must consider that an assault on Latvia could involve forces from other member countries already operating there. Melnis says this presence sends a firm message to Russia and Belarus.

The mechanism works through both capability and signaling. Latvia keeps units near the border, while allied forces train regularly with them. Spain, for example, has about 600 troops at the Adazi and Lielvarde bases. Melnis says these soldiers are there not only for exercises, but also to fight if necessary.

This arrangement also reassures Latvia and its neighbors. It demonstrates that the eastern flank belongs to NATO and the European Union, rather than being defended by Latvia alone. Melnis presents allied unity as a deterrent and as protection against efforts to divide countries or weaken their resolve.

For Latvia, collective defense means that aggression against one member would trigger a wider response. Melnis says an attack against Latvia or its neighbors would be an attack against Europe and NATO. He expects the Alliance and European Union countries to respond forcefully.

That promise changes the calculation for any attacker. Russia would not be confronting Latvia alone. It would face the political unity, military forces, and support of allied countries. NATO troops already deployed in the region make that commitment more visible, while joint exercises help prepare forces to operate together.

Melnis calls an attack on a NATO country a strategic mistake for Russia. He does not describe such an attack as imminent, but says Latvia is preparing in case fighting becomes necessary. The commitment therefore serves two purposes: deterring aggression and reassuring countries living alongside Russia and Belarus.

Latvia connects Russia’s war against Ukraine to its own security because both involve the same neighboring power and the same struggle over European unity. Melnis served as Latvia’s military liaison in Ukraine and says Latvia must continue supporting Ukraine. He also describes Russia as an aggressive neighbor challenging Europe.

The connection appears in Russia’s methods as well as in the risk of invasion. Latvia reports more drones, cyberattacks, illegal immigration, provocations, sabotage, and propaganda. Melnis says these activities aim to weaken support for Ukraine and divide countries that should support one another.

Latvia therefore treats the conflict as a regional and European issue, not a distant war. Melnis says an attack on Latvia would become an attack on NATO and Europe. He sees no imminent conventional attack, but argues that unity, allied deployments, and military readiness are essential.