Al-Qaeda and IS rivalry sparks fierce fighting across Sahel

The rival jihadist coalitions fought at an unprecedented scale in the borderlands of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Islamic State-Sahel Province, or ISSP, said it killed more than 400 JNIM fighters, including several leaders, during clashes in Oudalan, Burkina Faso. The reported battle took place four days before the claim was issued.

The figure has not been independently confirmed. If accurate, it would be the deadliest single battle recorded between the two groups. It would also exceed the more than 200 deaths ISSP claimed in the same area in early September. Fighting between JNIM and ISSP has escalated since September.

The clashes reflect a wider struggle for territory, routes and recruits. The rivalry has continued since 2019 and recently spread beyond Mali and Burkina Faso into western Niger and northwestern Nigeria. Despite ISSP's claimed gains, JNIM remains the stronger group and may launch fierce counterattacks.

The Sahel is a semi-arid strip of land stretching from the Atlantic Ocean along the southern rim of the Sahara Desert to the Red Sea. The article describes it as a central arena for global jihadism. Extremist groups first took root in rural areas, then expanded into wider territories and across national borders.

The current rivalry is focused on the tri-border area where Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger meet. Recent fighting has centered on Oudalan province in Burkina Faso, near the borders with Mali and Niger. The clashes also erupted across the broader borderlands separating the three countries.

The conflict is no longer limited to that core zone. Fighting has spread into western Niger and northwestern Nigeria. ISSP has extended influence from Menaka in Mali into Niger's Tahoua, Dosso and Maradi regions, reaching the Nigerian border and connecting with ISWAP around Lake Chad.

The conflict is large, sustained and increasingly deadly. Between 2019 and the month before the article's publication, JNIM and ISSP fought more than 320 battles. Those confrontations caused about 2,200 deaths, according to conflict analyst Heni Nsaibia. The groups have therefore become persistent rivals, not occasional battlefield opponents.

Recent clashes may represent a sharp escalation. ISSP claimed more than 400 JNIM fighters died in one battle in Oudalan, after claiming more than 200 deaths in the same area in early September. Neither figure has been independently confirmed. The United Nations described the confrontation as the most intense direct global clash between an Al-Qaeda branch and an Islamic State-linked group.

JNIM remains the larger force. A UN expert report estimated that it has 7,000 to 8,000 fighters, while IS has about 2,000 members in the region. JNIM's larger strength could support fierce counterattacks, despite its recent losses.

JNIM and ISSP are competing for the same strategic resources. These include territory, border routes, local populations and people who can be recruited. The groups operate across neighboring countries, so controlling one border area can help move fighters, equipment and expertise into another. Their expansion brings them into direct contact more often.

The article describes the rivalry as a race for control of the borders between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. ISSP has pushed outward from Menaka in Mali into several regions of Niger. This movement reaches the Nigerian border and helps connect ISSP with ISWAP, the Islamic State branch active around Lake Chad.

Their competition is not only geographic. JNIM seeks local roots and alliances, while Islamic State follows a harder transnational approach. Each group wants authority over communities and routes in areas where the other already operates. Those overlapping ambitions make clashes difficult to avoid and encourage continued expansion.

JNIM and Islamic State differ in both political method and ideology. JNIM is described as developing local roots, building alliances with communities and focusing its attacks on state forces and foreign troops. It still commits abuses against civilians, but it seeks relationships that can help it operate within local societies.

Islamic State's Sahel branch takes a more hardline, transnational approach. It does not avoid attacking civilians who refuse to accept its authority. This creates a sharper form of coercion toward communities that resist its rule. The two groups' competing visions produce lasting ideological and strategic tension.

The difference has also appeared inside the factions. The United Nations reported limited defections from JNIM to ISSP. In July, JNIM claimed it killed one of its commanders after he defected to Islamic State. Even so, JNIM remains the leading terror threat in the Sahel, with a much larger estimated force.

The rivalry has worsened insecurity for civilians and governments across the Sahel. Extremists have expanded beyond their original rural strongholds, killing thousands, sowing terror and roiling governments. JNIM commits abuses against civilians, while Islamic State also attacks people who refuse to submit to its authority.

National governments have found the expansion difficult to contain. The ruling juntas in Ouagadougou, Bamako and Niamey face groups competing for routes, territory and local support across their borders. Their struggle is therefore not confined to one country or one insurgent front. It creates pressure across the whole tri-border region.

Violence has also widened geographically. Fighting once concentrated in Mali and Burkina Faso has spread into western Niger and northwestern Nigeria. ISSP's reach through Niger toward Nigeria may facilitate movement of fighters, equipment and expertise with ISWAP, extending the threat beyond the original battlefield.

The article presents insurgent power as tied to local access and mobility. JNIM seeks local roots and alliances with communities, while both factions compete for recruitment pools. Control of territory and routes gives them access to the same populations and border spaces where governments have struggled to contain them.

A clear example is ISSP's expansion from Menaka in Mali into Niger's Tahoua, Dosso and Maradi regions. Reaching the Nigerian border can help connect it with ISWAP in the Lake Chad basin. The article says this facilitates the transfer of fighters, equipment and expertise. Cross-border links can therefore reinforce an armed group's presence.

The two groups also use different approaches to maintain influence. JNIM emphasizes community alliances, while Islamic State imposes a harder authority and attacks civilians who reject it. The article does not describe a general model beyond these cases. It shows that recruitment, local relationships, territorial control and movement help sustain their power.