Ukraine advances in occupied Donetsk as Trump hands Putin diesel deal

Ukraine’s Third Army Corps reclaimed another 100sq km of occupied territory in Donetsk during the fourth phase of Operation Vivaldi. The operation has targeted Russian advances near Lyman and helped disrupt efforts to surround Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

The gain came during a week of severe tension with Washington. On October 9, Trump invited Russia to sell 1.8 million tonnes of diesel to global markets before year’s end. He said the move would help reduce transport prices. It effectively reversed the Lindsey Graham Act, which allowed secondary sanctions against countries buying Russian oil.

The developments pulled in opposite directions. Ukraine made battlefield progress, but feared losing American intelligence and satellite support. Russia continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including Kyiv’s Thermal Power Plant number 4. Meanwhile, the diesel decision weakened the pressure that new sanctions could have placed on Russia.

Since Operation Vivaldi began in August, Ukraine’s Third Army Corps said it had retaken 275sq km in eastern Donetsk. It also reported recapturing 16 settlements. The figures combine the operation’s earlier phases with the additional 100sq km recovered in its fourth phase.

The campaign was designed to push back Russian forces trying to seize Lyman. Farther south, another Ukrainian counteroffensive challenged Russia’s attempted takeover of Dobropillya. Ukraine viewed both efforts as countering a larger Russian pincer movement aimed at the fortress cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

The reported gains changed the wider balance in the article’s account. Ukraine said Russia’s total territorial gains for the year were now close to nil. Ukrainian counterattacks also drew Russian units away from the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk fronts, reducing daily attacks and slowing Russian advances in that area.

Starshield is the military element of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite network. The article says it is owned and controlled by the US government, with limits decided by the US military and ultimately the president. That makes access important to Ukraine’s battlefield operations.

For air defence, Starshield helps Ukraine navigate interceptors toward incoming drones and missiles. Ukraine also uses satellite services to support attacks on Russian supply lines. Its forces have struck fuel trucks, bridges, ammunition warehouses, air defences, command posts and logistics facilities. In September, Ukraine reported hitting 40 command posts and 50 logistics facilities.

A prolonged outage could therefore damage both defence and offence. Ukraine intercepted more than 4,700 drones and missiles in September. Starshield services reportedly began returning to normal on October 15, but the disruption showed how strongly satellite access can affect the battlefield without troops directly entering combat.

When Ukraine’s satellite navigation access was restricted, Starshield capped its use at 160 km/h. Ukraine then lost sight of interceptors traveling faster than that speed. This weakened its ability to guide defensive aircraft or systems against fast-moving Russian drones.

The danger was greatest from jet-powered Geran-4 drones. They can fly faster than 500 km/h, far beyond the imposed limit. Zelenskyy said six in ten Russian drones were now jet-powered. Without reliable navigation, Ukrainian interceptors could not consistently track or reach those targets.

The restriction came during an intense Russian barrage. Over 24 hours, Russia launched 850 drones and 39 missiles against 30 energy targets in 19 regions. Ukraine’s Defence Ministry sources said Starshield services began returning to normal on October 15. The episode showed how a satellite-service disruption could seriously weaken Ukraine’s air defences.

Sloviansk and Kramatorsk matter because Ukraine viewed them as fortress cities threatened by a Russian effort to surround them. Russia’s push involved attacks toward Lyman in the east and Dobropillya farther south. Together, those directions could support a pincer movement around the two cities.

Ukraine responded with counteroffensives in both areas. Operation Vivaldi pushed back Russian forces near Lyman, while a separate operation challenged Russia’s attempted takeover of Dobropillya. These actions forced Russian units to move away from positions directly facing Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

The immediate result was a slowdown in Russian attacks. In the Sloviansk direction, average daily attacks fell from 14 in August to five in September and three in October so far. In the Kramatorsk direction, they fell from three to one, then to 0.3 per day. This reduced pressure and helped protect the cities’ approaches.

The United States can influence combat without sending troops by controlling information, technology and economic pressure. Intelligence can warn Ukraine about incoming missiles. Satellite services can help navigate interceptors and support attacks on Russian logistics. Sanctions can also affect Russia’s ability to sell oil and finance its war.

The article gives several examples. Ukraine said partners did not share intelligence about five ballistic missiles heading toward Kyiv on October 13. Starshield later limited navigation above 160 km/h, making it harder to stop fast Geran-4 drones. Trump also invited Russia to export diesel, weakening a newly signed sanctions framework.

These tools can change battlefield results quickly. Intelligence and satellite access affect whether Ukraine can detect, guide and strike. Sanctions affect Russia’s wider economy. The article says Starshield services began returning to normal on October 15, but the week showed that American decisions can strengthen or hobble Ukraine without direct US combat involvement.

Oil sanctions are economic restrictions designed to limit Russia’s ability to sell petroleum and earn revenue. Secondary sanctions go further: they allow the sanctioning country to punish other countries or companies that continue buying Russian oil. The article says the Lindsey Graham Act gave Trump that power.

The mechanism is straightforward. Restricting Russian fuel sales can reduce access to customers and revenue, while threatening buyers can make them avoid those transactions. Less revenue could weaken Russia’s wider war effort. But tighter supply can also raise fuel and transport prices. Trump invited Russia to sell 1.8 million tonnes of diesel globally by year’s end to help lower transport prices.

That decision effectively reversed the new sanctions law’s pressure. More Russian diesel on global markets could reduce transport costs, but it could also preserve Russia’s access to fuel buyers and income. The article does not quantify the effect on Russia’s war finances.