Japan taps foreign tech to plug defence gaps as China’s power grows. Will it pay off?

Japan is bringing in overseas technology, expertise, and production capacity to close urgent defence gaps. The effort covers drones, fighter design, missiles, artificial intelligence, command systems, and maintenance. It reflects Tokyo’s concern that domestic industry cannot deliver every capability quickly enough, especially as China’s military power grows.

One immediate example is Ukraine’s SkyFall, whose combat-tested P1-SUN family intercepts reconnaissance and attack drones. Japan also fast-tracked Terra Drone’s Terra B1 interceptor and has partnered with Ukrainian manufacturers. Edgewing, a Japanese-British-Italian fighter venture, plans a Japanese design centre. Thales may establish Japan’s first foreign-run military maintenance facility.

The approach combines imports with domestic development. Experts say this can provide battlefield experience, share costs, and expand production and repair capacity. Companies including Anduril, Palantir, and General Atomics are helping address gaps. Japan is also considering low-cost stand-off missiles, while developing its own alternatives over the longer term.

Interceptor drones are unmanned aircraft designed to detect and stop other unmanned aerial systems. Their targets can include reconnaissance drones, which gather information, and attack drones, which threaten people or equipment. They matter because defending against drones requires a fast and affordable response to repeated aerial threats.

Japan has signed a contract with Ukrainian start-up SkyFall for its P1-SUN interceptor family, although Tokyo has not disclosed the exact model. Ukraine’s systems are described as combat-tested. Japan has also rapidly procured the Terra B1 interceptor from Japanese company Terra Drone, which invested in two Ukrainian drone makers.

The immediate goal is to close a capability gap. Hirohito Ogi said Japanese manufacturers have technical expertise but lack real-world battlefield experience. Japan therefore wants foreign systems now while building domestic alternatives later. Some overlap is acceptable, because it prevents a dangerous gap during the transition.

The article does not provide exact troop numbers, fleet totals, or industrial production figures for Japan and China. It does, however, describe China’s military power and activities as Japan’s greatest strategic challenge. Defence expert Yoshihiro Inaba says China has a growing quantitative advantage, especially in highly capable but expensive surface combatants.

The industrial gap is also presented qualitatively. Japan’s 2026 defence white paper identifies limited production volumes and companies leaving the defence sector. These weaknesses could slow the manufacture, repair, and replacement of equipment. Japan’s domestic industry has expertise, but experts say it lacks some battlefield experience and capacity.

Japan’s response is to combine domestic weapons with foreign systems and partners. Inaba points to larger inventories of lower-cost cruise missiles, supported by surveillance and command systems. Foreign cooperation could add technology, production capacity, maintenance skills, and shared development costs, helping Japan narrow parts of the gap without waiting for every domestic programme.

Japan has long bought foreign weapons, mainly from the United States. It is now widening cooperation because urgent capability gaps, rising development costs, and domestic production constraints cannot be addressed through one traditional relationship alone. Tokyo also wants advanced technology and shorter development timelines as China’s military power grows.

The new partners bring different strengths. Ukrainian firms offer combat-tested drone technology and battlefield experience. European countries are seen as promising partners for joint development and technology sharing. Edgewing combines Japanese, British, and Italian companies on a next-generation fighter. Thales could add foreign-run maintenance capacity, while companies such as Anduril, Palantir, and General Atomics address other gaps.

This does not mean Japan is abandoning the United States. Instead, Tokyo is adding partners for research, licensed production, development, and maintenance. Celine Pajon argues that such cooperation could reduce dependence on US technology while strengthening Japan’s domestic defence industry and strategic autonomy.

Foreign technology and joint production could shorten the time between identifying a threat and fielding a response. They could also provide skills Japan’s industry lacks, particularly combat experience, advanced artificial intelligence, and low-cost uncrewed weapons. This matters because Japan’s defence programme calls for faster development of urgently needed equipment.

The mechanism is a two-phase approach. Japan can acquire foreign systems immediately while developing domestic replacements over time. Licensed production and joint development can share costs and expertise. Partnerships may also expand factory output and maintenance capacity. For example, Japan is combining Ukrainian interceptor drones with its own Terra B1 programme and exploring foreign support for low-cost missiles.

The result could be greater resilience in a regional conflict involving China. Japan might field larger inventories, repair equipment more effectively, and sustain operations for longer. However, the article presents these as potential benefits. It also makes clear that domestic production and maintenance gaps remain unresolved.

Acquiring weapons quickly solves an immediate equipment shortage, but prolonged war creates a continuing demand for production and maintenance. Weapons may need repairs, replacement parts, software support, trained technicians, and eventual replacement. A country must also keep factories operating and supply lines reliable while demand rises.

The article points to Japan’s limited production volumes and companies withdrawing from the defence sector. Those weaknesses can make it harder to replace losses or maintain equipment at scale. It also identifies gaps in maintenance capability, uncrewed weapons, missiles, and artificial intelligence. Combat-tested foreign systems may arrive faster than Japan can build them domestically.

Foreign partnerships could help by adding production capacity, licensed manufacturing, and maintenance expertise. Thales is reportedly considering a facility serving Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force. Joint development may spread costs and skills. Still, Japan’s longer-term answer depends on strengthening its own industrial base rather than relying only on rapid purchases.

Strategic autonomy is a country’s ability to protect its interests and make defence decisions without excessive dependence on another power. In practice, it requires more than owning weapons. A country needs domestic skills, factories, research, maintenance, and replacement capacity so outside suppliers cannot easily determine what it can field or sustain.

Celine Pajon linked a stronger Japanese defence industry to strategic autonomy. Her study argued that foreign partnerships could ease Japan’s development costs, production constraints, and dependence on US technology. Joint development and technology sharing can therefore support autonomy rather than contradict it, if they strengthen Japan’s own capabilities.

Japan’s current position is mixed. It has technical expertise, but its defence-industrial base faces limited production volumes and companies leaving the sector. Tokyo is responding through foreign systems, licensed production, international research, and domestic alternatives. The goal is to gain urgent capabilities now while building a more resilient national industry for future security demands.