Russian officer helped Ukraine kill over 300 troops by leaking military secrets: Report

Stupnikov turned privileged military access into targeting information for Ukraine. He supplied locations, radio frequencies, troop movements, commanders’ communications, surveillance feeds, and planned operations. This mattered because Ukrainian forces could identify where Russian soldiers gathered and when units intended to advance.

His first major operation came in February 2024. He photographed a training exercise, estimated troop numbers, and sent its exact coordinates. A missile barrage followed, killing 68 soldiers and wounding 60, including 10 officers among the dead. Later information helped target a brigade gathering, a hotel basement occupied by assault units, and a command post meeting.

The information also supported attacks beyond one battlefield position. Stupnikov disabled cameras monitoring Ukrainian territory and interfered with a drone controller. His actions repeatedly disrupted Russian operations, raised suspicions among commanders, and helped Ukraine attack senior officers and concentrated groups of troops. The article reports that his intelligence contributed to more than 300 Russian casualties overall.

A chief signals officer is a military specialist responsible for communications systems and related information flows. The article identifies Stupnikov as his battalion’s chief signals officer. In that position, he had access to the channels commanders used to communicate and to technical systems supporting battlefield coordination.

That access exposed more than messages. Stupnikov could obtain troop movements, commanders’ communications, surveillance feeds, radio frequencies, and battle plans. He also knew where Russian units were located and when they intended to advance. These details helped Ukrainian forces match targets with the right moment for an attack.

The position therefore created both information and disruption risks. Stupnikov passed sensitive details to Ukraine, disabled cameras, and tampered with a drone controller’s battery pack. The article shows why communications personnel can affect an entire unit: they may see operational information while also being able to interfere with systems used to observe territory and direct missions.

The clearest figures come from the February 2024 strike on a Russian training exercise. Stupnikov reported 68 Russian soldiers killed and 60 wounded. Ten of those killed were officers, including Colonel Gusein Musayev. This single attack therefore produced 128 reported casualties.

Other attacks added further losses. Ukrainian forces killed several Russian officers at a March brigade gathering. In May, they killed 20 soldiers, including a captain, in the basement of a former hotel. The article also mentions an attack on a brigade command post, but gives no casualty figure for it.

These described figures cannot be added into a complete total because some losses are not quantified and “several” is undefined. The article separately states that Stupnikov’s intelligence helped Kyiv kill more than 300 Russian soldiers overall. Thus, the exact named incidents establish at least 148 deaths and 60 wounded, while the broader reported total includes additional attacks and casualties not fully itemized.

Stupnikov’s intelligence produced repeated battlefield losses and damaged confidence inside the brigade. Russian commanders saw operations fail and suffered attacks on troop gatherings, a hotel basement, and a command post. The losses were serious enough that his commander wondered whether an infiltrator had entered the ranks.

His sabotage compounded the intelligence threat. He disabled cameras monitoring Ukrainian territory and tampered with a battery pack linked to a drone controller. The battery overheated and malfunctioned during a mission. These actions reduced Russia’s ability to observe Ukrainian territory and use equipment during operations.

The consequences reached the unit’s command structure and battlefield planning. Senior officers were killed at identified meetings, and Russian forces had to operate while suspecting that sensitive information was leaking. Stupnikov also accidentally revealed his own basement location in a map screenshot. A later strike hit the building, showing how the information danger could threaten the insider himself as well as the wider brigade.

In July 2024, Stupnikov was told to leave his weapons and reach an agreed location near Mykilske. He crossed no-man’s-land while navigating destroyed vehicles, craters, and suspected mines. A Ukrainian drone guided him, and Ukrainian troops followed his movement through thermal camera footage.

The crossing was tightly coordinated. Ukrainian forces waited on the far side and challenged him for the agreed password. He answered, “Peanut shop.” They searched him, blindfolded him, and took him to safety. The article does not describe further details of the route or the distance crossed.

Stupnikov also left behind a smartphone containing access codes to several communication channels. Those codes allowed Ukrainian forces to continue accessing live feeds from Russian drones and surveillance cameras. Afterward, he joined the Russian Volunteer Corps, a Ukrainian army unit made up of Russians opposed to Vladimir Putin’s rule, and now fights against Russian forces.

An ordinary battlefield opponent usually attacks from outside a military unit. An insider with communications and surveillance access can see information before it becomes visible to that opponent. That can reveal locations, movements, plans, command meetings, and the timing of an advance. The danger is therefore both immediate and wide-reaching.

Stupnikov showed this advantage in practice. He photographed a training exercise, estimated troop numbers, and sent exact coordinates. He shared radio frequencies, unit locations, planned operations, and commanders’ communications. He also identified a brigade gathering and a hotel basement where assault units were staying. Those details helped Ukraine choose targets and launch strikes.

The insider threat also included sabotage. Stupnikov disabled cameras and caused a drone controller’s battery pack to overheat and malfunction. His smartphone later contained access codes to communication channels, preserving access after his escape. The article’s events show that one trusted specialist can expose several systems while disrupting the unit’s ability to observe, coordinate, and protect itself.

Military communications security means protecting the systems and information used to coordinate forces. In this article, that includes radio frequencies, commanders’ communications, live surveillance feeds, unit locations, and operational plans. Keeping them secure matters because they reveal what a military unit sees, where it is, and what it intends to do.

Stupnikov exposed this weakness by passing Ukraine radio frequencies, Russian unit locations, and planned advances. He also provided access to communications, surveillance feeds, and battle plans. Ukraine could then identify troop gatherings and command meetings, choose targets, and time strikes. His smartphone later gave access codes to several channels and live feeds.

A breach can cause an operation to fail before troops move. Forces may be struck while gathered, commanders may be killed during meetings, and surveillance may be lost if cameras or drone systems are disrupted. The article shows that communications security is not only about hiding messages. It also protects movement, observation, planning, and the survival of the people using those systems.