Eisenkot aims to out-hawk Netanyahu ahead of elections

Eisenkot’s central promise is a timetable: he says Hamas’s military wing would be destroyed within 18 months if he became prime minister. That pledge matters because security policy dominates this election, and candidates are competing to look strongest after years of conflict.

He says Hamas could be defeated through Donald Trump’s framework for disarming the group or through Israel’s military and operational capabilities. Eisenkot also attacked Netanyahu for speaking in favor of two states and for failing to destroy Hamas and Iran. Netanyahu’s Likud party responded by questioning whether Eisenkot could act without Arab coalition partners.

Both men support continued confrontation with Iran, including possible attacks on its nuclear capability. Their main foreign-policy differences are therefore limited. Eisenkot’s sharper language is chiefly a political effort to out-hawk Netanyahu, while domestic disputes focus more on corruption and ultra-Orthodox conscription.

The Knesset is Israel’s national legislature, with 120 seats. Israelis vote for parties, and those parties receive seats according to their electoral support. The Knesset matters because a prime minister needs enough political backing there to pass laws, approve budgets, and sustain a government.

A party does not automatically govern simply because it wins the most seats. It must normally assemble a coalition of parties that together control at least 61 seats. In this election, Eisenkot’s and Netanyahu’s parties are each expected to win just over 20 seats, far short of that threshold.

That arithmetic makes coalition negotiations central. Arab parties are expected to win about 13 seats, but both leading candidates are skeptical of working with them. The article therefore presents the Knesset not only as a legislature, but also as the arena where competing blocs must find partners or risk being unable to govern.

The election is likely to produce a fragmented Knesset. Eisenkot’s party and Netanyahu’s Likud party are each expected to win just over 20 seats, according to the article. That is a strong showing for either party, but it is nowhere near enough to control the legislature.

Because the Knesset has 120 seats, a governing majority requires 61. The key mechanism is coalition-building: parties combine their seats and political support until they reach that number. A party that wins the most seats still needs partners if it falls below 61.

This gap explains why the election’s outcome remains uncertain. Arab parties are expected to win 13 seats, while other parties may also be needed to assemble a bloc. Yet both leading candidates are doubtful about relying on Arab parties, making it unclear whether either can reach a majority and form a government.

A coalition government forms when no single party has enough seats to govern alone. Several parties agree to support one leadership team, usually through shared policy commitments and control of ministries. In Israel, the coalition must command at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats.

The article gives a clear example of the problem. Eisenkot’s and Netanyahu’s parties each expect just over 20 seats, while Arab parties are expected to win 13. Neither leading party can reach 61 without partners. Their skepticism toward Arab parties narrows the possible combinations.

If no candidate assembles a majority, the immediate result is political uncertainty. The article says neither side may be able to form a majority coalition. That could leave negotiations unresolved and make it difficult to establish a stable government, especially because the candidates broadly agree on foreign policy but remain divided over potential coalition partners.

Arab parties could become decisive because Israel’s leading parties are far short of a majority. Eisenkot’s and Netanyahu’s parties are each expected to win just over 20 seats, while Arab parties are projected to win about 13. Those seats could help determine which bloc reaches the 61-seat threshold.

The mechanism is coalition arithmetic. A candidate cannot govern with only his own party. He needs partners willing to support a government. The article’s example is Mansour Abbas’ Raam party, which joined the 2021 government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. That made an Arab party part of an Israeli governing coalition for the first time.

Yet both leading candidates are skeptical of relying on Arab parties, and Likud openly questioned how Eisenkot could defeat Hamas without their permission. After three years of bitter war, the article says there is little reason to expect the same arrangement again, leaving Arab parties influential but politically difficult partners.

The 2021 coalition led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid was historically unusual. Mansour Abbas’ Raam party became the first Arab party ever to join an Israeli government. It showed that an Arab party could help create a governing majority despite Israel’s political divisions.

That history matters because the current numbers may again make Arab parties important. Eisenkot’s and Netanyahu’s parties each expect just over 20 seats, while Arab parties are expected to win 13. Since 61 seats are needed for a majority, Arab support could potentially help a candidate assemble a coalition.

The political environment is now less favorable. The article describes three years of bitter war and says both leading candidates are skeptical of working with Arab parties. It therefore treats a repeat of the 2021 arrangement as unlikely, leaving open the possibility that no side can form a majority government.

The two-state solution means creating separate Israeli and Palestinian states. In the article, it represents a diplomatic vision tied to permanent peace. Preventive war means attacking before an enemy’s threat fully develops, with the goal of gaining a major advantage at the outset. It represents security through force and preemption.

The contrast appears in the candidates’ attacks. Eisenkot criticized Netanyahu for speaking in favor of two states, while Netanyahu accused Eisenkot of establishing a Palestinian state. At the same time, both support continued conflict with Iran, and Eisenkot says Israel must do everything, including attacking Iran, to destroy its nuclear capability.

The article connects this language to Israel’s “new” national security concept. Tamir Hayman says actions since October 7 reject permanent peace with Arab states and favor preventive war. He also describes stronger emphasis on Israel’s Jewish character, skepticism toward the United States, and settlements as part of defense.