Turkey and Morocco Lead Fuel Supplies to Russia as Seaborne Imports Fall 44%

Russia’s seaborne fuel imports fell sharply in September, yet the country still received 234,000 metric tons. That was 44% below August’s record of 416,000 tons. September remained the second-highest month in CREA’s data since January 2022. The figures cover ships, not Russia’s full fuel supply.

Turkey was the largest supplier. Four cargoes loaded at Mersin carried 130,000 tons worth €94 million. Three contained gasoline and one contained diesel. Morocco ranked second, sending 96,000 tons of gasoline from Tangier’s Horizon terminal to St. Petersburg and Murmansk.

Together, Turkey and Morocco supplied 226,000 tons, or nearly all of September’s total. Turkey accounted for 55%, while Morocco contributed about 41% based on the reported volumes. India sent nothing that month, and South Korean deliveries fell to 8,000 tons.

Russia’s imports dropped from 416,000 metric tons in August to 234,000 tons in September. That is a reduction of 182,000 tons, matching the reported 44% decline. Even after the fall, September was the second-highest month in CREA’s dataset, which begins in January 2022.

Turkey supplied 130,000 tons, equal to 55% of September’s total. The cargoes were loaded at Mersin and included three shipments of gasoline and one of diesel. Morocco supplied another 96,000 tons, all in three gasoline cargoes loaded at Tangier.

The two countries supplied 226,000 tons combined. That represents roughly 97% of Russia’s 234,000-ton September total. Morocco’s share is about 41%, calculated from the reported volume. The remaining suppliers contributed only about 8,000 tons, including South Korea’s deliveries.

Seaborne oil products are refined fuels moved by sea. In this article, they include gasoline and diesel shipped in cargoes to Russian ports. Tracking these shipments helps show Russia’s overseas fuel inflows, but it does not capture every part of the domestic supply system.

The loading port identifies where a cargo began its voyage. It does not prove that the fuel was refined there. For example, Mersin was the Turkish loading port for 130,000 tons sent to Russia, but CREA noted that the port alone cannot establish where the cargoes were refined. The same caution applies to other shipments.

This distinction matters because Turkey supplied 55% of September’s imports, while Russia supplied 89% of Mersin’s seaborne oil-product imports in the first half of 2026. Some fuel may have returned to Russia, but the shipping data cannot prove its refining origin or fully describe Russia’s domestic production.

Crude oil and finished fuel are different products. Oil must be refined into gasoline, diesel, and other usable fuels before consumers can use it. A country can produce substantial crude while still importing refined products if its available refining output does not meet demand. This general distinction helps explain why Russia imported fuel despite producing oil.

The article directly links the shipments to Russia’s domestic shortages. Turkey sent gasoline and diesel, while Morocco sent gasoline. CREA also warned that the shipping figures do not establish that Russia’s domestic refining capacity has recovered. The data therefore show outside supply, not the full condition of Russian refineries.

Imports can help fill gaps in domestic availability, but they do not prove how large those gaps are. September’s lower total also cannot show how much additional diesel Russia can produce or export. It only confirms that seaborne arrivals declined from August’s record.

India’s shipments stopped in September. Russia received no seaborne oil products from India that month, compared with 160,000 tons in August. A 40,000-ton cargo did arrive from India in early October, showing that the pause was not necessarily permanent.

South Korean deliveries also shrank sharply. They fell from 95,000 tons in August to just 8,000 tons in September. CREA reported that no South Korean cargo had arrived in October as of October 13. The report linked this slowdown to threatened legal action against South Korean exporters.

The legal threat appears to have affected the pace of shipments, but the article does not provide a final legal ruling. Seoul later said the shipments were not prohibited while investigating the trade. These changes shifted Russia’s September supply toward Turkey and Morocco, which together provided nearly all reported imports.

The decline is clear in the shipping data: Russia received 234,000 metric tons in September, down from 416,000 in August. That indicates a smaller seaborne inflow. September was still the second-highest month in CREA’s data, so the fall did not erase the broader increase seen in the dataset.

The figures cannot show why the total fell or how Russia’s domestic system performed. CREA specifically said the shipments do not establish that domestic refining capacity has recovered. A drop in imports could reflect changes in suppliers, legal pressure, timing, or other conditions, but the article does not identify one definitive cause for the overall decline.

The same limitation applies to exports. September’s lower import total does not establish how much extra diesel Russia can produce or export. The article also notes Washington’s October 9 agreement to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports, while European governments objected.

Sanctions can distinguish between the source of crude and the country where finished products are refined. A refinery in India, Turkey, or Brunei may process Russian crude into oil products. Those products can then be exported from the refining country to buyers in countries that ban direct imports of Russian fuel.

The article identified seven September shipments to EU ports from refineries processing Russian crude. Six came from India and one from Turkey. Italy received three, Romania two, and Spain and Cyprus one each. The EU ban on products made from Russian oil took effect on January 21, 2026.

This route does not automatically prove a violation or prove that every cargo contained Russian-derived fuel. CREA said the shipments require scrutiny under EU guidance. It estimated that €295 million of September exports from relevant refineries were refined from Russian crude, among €1 billion sent to sanctioning countries.