AAIB blames crew for 2023 Mumbai Learjet crash; finds lapses at VSR Ventures, operator in Ajit Pawar crash

A VSR Ventures Learjet 45XR, registered VT-DBL, crashed while landing at Mumbai airport on runway 27. The flight had come from Visakhapatnam as a non-scheduled service. The accident happened in marginal weather, with rain affecting the crew’s visual references.

The crew continued an approach that was not stable enough for a safe landing. The aircraft had a high tailwind, and the pilots did not properly monitor airspeed against a rising low-speed cue. The monitoring pilot also warned about the need to go around too late.

The AAIB concluded that the aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall at low altitude and did not recover. Both engines were operating normally, so aircraft serviceability was not a contributing factor. The report also highlighted crew decisions and operating weaknesses at VSR Ventures.

Eight people were aboard VSR Ventures’ Learjet 45XR when it crashed at Mumbai airport. The accident occurred during landing on runway 27, after a non-scheduled flight from Visakhapatnam. The aircraft was registered VT-DBL.

The article reports that all eight people on board were seriously injured. It does not provide their names or describe individual injuries. The crash followed an unstable approach in poor and marginal weather conditions, rather than an engine failure or another aircraft-serviceability problem.

The AAIB linked the outcome to crew decisions, including continuing the approach and failing to recover from a low-altitude aerodynamic stall. The findings also exposed weaknesses in VSR Ventures’ training, records, and internal audits. The investigation recommended stronger oversight and more complete pilot training records.

The AAIB identified the probable cause as the flight crew’s decision to continue an un-stabilized approach under marginal weather conditions. It also cited inappropriate aircraft handling. Together, these factors led to an aerodynamic stall close to the ground.

Several details supported that conclusion. The crew did not monitor airspeed against a rising low-speed cue, and the monitoring pilot called for a go-around late. Rain reduced visual cues, while a high tailwind added difficulty. The crew also showed undue commitment to landing before Mumbai restrictions took effect.

The report found that both engines were working normally and that aircraft serviceability did not cause the accident. Its recommendations focus on mandatory training, stall recovery, assertive monitoring pilots, and requiring pilots to go around whenever an approach is not stabilised.

An unstable approach is an approach in which key conditions, such as speed, path, alignment, configuration, or descent, are not properly controlled. The article does not give a formal definition, but it shows why the idea matters: the Mumbai crew continued despite poor weather, a high tailwind, and airspeed concerns.

A go-around means abandoning the landing attempt and climbing away to try again or divert. It creates time and altitude to correct speed, configuration, weather, or alignment problems. At Mumbai, the monitoring pilot was late in calling for a go-around, while the crew remained committed to landing before restrictions took effect.

The AAIB specifically recommended that non-scheduled and general aviation operators require pilots to go around whenever an approach is not stabilised. It also called for stronger crew resource management, so monitoring pilots assertively identify deviations and demand safer action.

Poor weather reduced the crew’s visual information during the approach. Rain impaired visual cues, making it harder to judge the runway and aircraft position. A high tailwind added to the landing challenge and could increase the aircraft’s required speed over the ground.

At the same time, the crew did not monitor airspeed against a rising low-speed cue. This meant an important warning sign was not acted on effectively. The monitoring pilot also called for a go-around late. The crew’s undue commitment to landing made these problems more dangerous.

The AAIB concluded that inappropriate handling during the continued approach led to an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. The aircraft did not recover. The report therefore called for assertive monitoring pilots, stronger crew resource management, mandatory go-arounds for unstable approaches, and recurrent stall-recovery training.

Investigators found that some Learjet pilots did not complete skill checks on critical emergency items in full during the one-year recurrent-training cycle. This included simulator exercises. The company also failed to maintain technical and airframe logbooks properly, and its internal audits were not carried out diligently.

These weaknesses mattered because training records and audits help show whether pilots can handle emergencies and whether operators are following required procedures. The DGCA’s audit and surveillance reports reviewed by investigators did not contain the findings that emerged during the probe. This indicated that regulatory oversight had not detected all the problems.

The AAIB recommended a one-time DGCA check of fixed-wing pilot training records, especially in non-scheduled and general aviation organizations. It also called for stall-recovery training, complete mandatory exercises, better maintenance records, compliant manuals, and more effective internal-audit checks.

An aerodynamic stall happens when a wing exceeds its critical angle of attack and loses lift. It is not the same as an engine stopping. In this accident, the AAIB said both engines were working normally, but the aircraft stalled during inappropriate handling of the approach.

A stall close to the ground is dangerous because recovery normally requires prompt control inputs, suitable speed, and enough altitude. A pilot may need to lower the nose and regain energy before climbing. Near a runway, there may be too little height or time to complete those actions safely. Poor visibility and a high tailwind can make recognition and recovery harder.

The Mumbai Learjet entered a low-altitude stall and did not recover. The AAIB recommended adding stall recovery in landing configuration to recurrent training. It also urged stronger monitoring, assertive go-around decisions, and completion of all critical emergency exercises.