Ukraine's bruising week at the hands of Trump and Putin

The immediate trigger was Ukraine’s refusal to halt attacks on Russian oil refineries. Donald Trump objected to that decision, creating the worst clash with Volodymyr Zelensky since their notorious Oval Office confrontation 18 months earlier. This time, the dispute affected Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities.

The White House withheld intelligence about imminent Russian ballistic-missile attacks. It also impeded Ukraine’s access to Starshield, a satellite system used by its defence interceptor drones. Without the normal support, those drones could fly at only 70kmh. Russia’s jet-powered Shahed drones travel at about 400kmh, so the Ukrainian interceptors could not keep up.

The political disagreement therefore produced a direct military consequence. Russia has sent waves of drones since the summer, and more than 150 civilians were killed in the 10 days described. The episode also unfolded as Ukraine faced growing economic damage and a serious shortage of money for its 2027 defence needs.

Ukraine’s drone interception system depends on both information and communications. US intelligence could warn Ukrainian forces about imminent Russian ballistic-missile attacks. Starshield access supported the satellite connection used by defence interceptor drones. Removing either advantage made it harder to find, guide and engage incoming threats.

The article gives a stark mechanical example. Ukrainian interceptor drones could fly at only 70kmh after access was impeded. Russia’s jet-powered Shahed drones travel at roughly 400kmh. An interceptor moving far more slowly is unlikely to catch or reach its target, especially when attacks arrive in large waves.

The result was more than a technical setback. Russia had been sending repeated drone attacks since the summer, while the death toll rose above 150 civilians in 10 days. A Russian drone also struck a Kharkiv flea market during the Brussels summit, killing two people.

Russia’s campaign is weakening Ukraine’s economy by targeting the networks businesses need to function. Attacks have hit passenger trains, petrol stations, grain silos, storage depots, substations, shipping, mobile networks and data centres. Energy damage disrupts power, while strikes on logistics and storage make it harder to move or preserve goods.

The effects are visible in major industries. Grain and oilseed exports fell 30% in a year because more grain must travel by expensive truck. Ukraine once had 12 metallurgical and steel-making plants; only one now operates, and it may close. Finance minister Sergii Marchenko said Russia was destroying logistics, retail storage, fuel stations and mobile operators in sequence.

This damage also reduces government income. Marchenko reported underperformance in tax and customs collections for the first time since 2022. September’s expected shortfall was about €400 million, potentially reaching several billion by year-end, just as defence costs rise.

Ukraine’s finance ministry says defence alone will require €70 billion in 2027. Of that total, €40 billion remains unfunded. This is not simply a budget-planning problem: the shortfall arrives while Ukraine is fighting an intensified Russian air campaign and paying for more expensive protection.

Russia’s attacks are also making it harder for Ukraine to raise money itself. Grain and oilseed exports have fallen 30%, while damage to logistics, storage, fuel stations, factories, mobile networks and energy infrastructure disrupts economic activity. Finance minister Sergii Marchenko said tax and customs collections underperformed by about €400 million in September, with the annual gap potentially reaching several billion.

Existing support is therefore no longer enough. EU leaders agreed a €90 billion loan last December for two years of budgetary and military needs, but Ukraine now says its requirements have grown. The European Commission is assessing the financial needs, while further EU, G7 and possibly Russian-asset-backed support remains under discussion.

European financial support is essential because Ukraine is losing income while paying for defence. Russian attacks have damaged transport, exports, factories, energy systems and communications. Ukraine’s finance minister also reported weakening tax and customs collections. External money therefore helps cover both budgetary needs and the cost of resisting Russia’s war of attrition.

The scale is large. EU leaders agreed a €90 billion loan for two years of budgetary and military needs, but Ukraine says it needs €70 billion for defence in 2027, with €40 billion still unfunded. Estonia’s prime minister Kristen Michal said European assistance must continue and called it the “alpha and omega” of a war of attrition.

The political danger is that mass bombing increases Europe’s financial burden. In countries where living costs are high, voters may resent spending on Ukraine. The article warns that 2027 elections could bring more eurosceptic, Russian-sympathetic parties to power, including forces calling for Ukraine to be abandoned.

Immobilised Russian central-bank assets are funds belonging to Russia’s central bank that were blocked after the February 2022 invasion. They remain held in financial institutions, but Russia cannot freely move or use them. Immobilisation is therefore a restriction on access, not necessarily the same as permanent confiscation.

The article gives the main location and scale. Some €210 billion in Russian central-bank assets was immobilised just days after the invasion. Around €185 billion of that amount is held at Euroclear, the Belgian securities depository. This makes Euroclear the central location in the debate over whether the assets could help Ukraine.

The assets returned to discussion because Ukraine faces a major financing hole. Its finance ministry says €40 billion of its €70 billion 2027 defence requirement is unfunded. The article indicates that immobilised Russian assets were being reconsidered as a possible source of support, but the supplied text ends before explaining the proposed mechanism.

The article identifies the frozen assets but does not explain why seizure is difficult. As established legal background, foreign central-bank property is generally protected by sovereign-immunity rules, and outright confiscation can face domestic, international and property-law challenges. Governments must also consider precedent and possible legal claims. Immobilised means access is blocked, not that ownership has automatically changed.

These financial terms describe different arrangements. A loan is money provided with an obligation to repay it. Collateral is an asset pledged to secure that repayment if the borrower defaults. Legal liability is responsibility imposed for a loss or unlawful act. War reparations are compensation sought from an aggressor for damage caused by war, usually through a legal or political settlement.

That distinction matters for Ukraine’s funding debate. Using assets as collateral or relying on their income is different from confiscating the assets themselves. The article says around €210 billion was immobilised, with about €185 billion at Euroclear, but it does not state which legal mechanism European governments will choose.