'Internet access is fundamental right': SC suggests ‘child mode’ for social media accounts

The Supreme Court held that every individual has a fundamental right to access and use the internet. This includes children of every age. The court connected the right to Article 21 and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The ruling matters because it treats online access as important to liberty, expression, information, and personal development.

The bench said children have the right to know, receive, and share information. It rejected the idea that children’s safety requires removing their online freedom. Instead, it said both interests deserve protection. The court compared denying children internet access altogether to denying that they have a conscience or freedom of speech worth protecting.

The ruling does not ignore online risks. The court acknowledged that children face dangers on current platforms. It suggested stronger safeguards, including child mode on social media, while directing platforms to improve the detection and removal of child sexual exploitation and abuse material. The approach favours safer access over blanket exclusion.

A child mode account is generally a social-media setting designed for younger users. It can limit contact with unknown people, filter unsuitable material, reduce risky features, and provide stronger privacy controls. These features can help children use online services while reducing exposure to harmful content and unwanted interactions. The article does not list specific technical functions.

The Supreme Court suggested child mode as one way to strengthen online safety. Its central idea was to change the platform experience for children, rather than remove children from the internet. Such a system could separate age-appropriate access from the broader risks of ordinary accounts. It would place more responsibility on platforms to design safer services.

The proposal reflects the court’s broader balance. Children retain access to learning, information, communication, and expression. At the same time, platforms would need stronger safeguards against abuse and exploitation. The article presents child mode as a suggested measure, not as a detailed rule with fixed technical requirements.

Child sexual exploitation and abuse material, or CSEAM, refers to digital material connected with the sexual exploitation or abuse of children. Such material can cause continuing harm when it is created, shared, or kept online. The court addressed CSEAM while considering how children’s safety could be protected without taking away their internet rights.

The bench directed social-media platforms and other online services to strengthen mechanisms for detecting and removing CSEAM. Detection aims to identify harmful material on services. Removal aims to stop it from remaining available or circulating online. The article does not provide technical details about the systems, timelines, or penalties involved.

The directions place responsibility on online platforms rather than treating children’s access as the problem. The court acknowledged that current internet services create safety risks. Its approach was to improve platform safeguards while preserving children’s ability to learn, communicate, receive information, and express themselves online.

The Supreme Court rejected complete internet blocking as the main safety solution because it would remove important rights along with the risks. The court said children’s freedom of speech includes the right to know, receive, and share information. Internet access therefore matters not only for entertainment, but also for education, communication, and personal expression.

The court used a direct comparison: restricting children because platforms failed to detect and remove harmful material would be “mistaking the victim for the problem.” The responsibility should instead fall on services that host or distribute online material. Stronger detection, removal, and child-focused safeguards address the source of the danger more directly.

The ruling recognises that online platforms can be unsafe for children. However, it says safety and freedom are not opposites. Measures such as child mode could reduce risks while preserving access. This creates a model based on safer participation, rather than excluding all children from the internet because some online services have failed to protect them.

The court described the internet as a marketplace of ideas, creative expression, and information. Its value extends beyond online content. It also creates opportunities to learn, communicate, discover information, and express views. These functions explain why children’s internet access was treated as a constitutional concern rather than a minor convenience.

The bench noted that children in remote areas may depend on the internet as their only source of learning and information. It also highlighted children with special needs. For them, online platforms may be the only place to find companionship with people facing similar circumstances. These examples show how access can affect education, inclusion, and social connection.

The court did not deny that online spaces create safety risks. Instead, it supported safeguards that preserve useful access. Child mode and stronger systems for removing abusive material could help platforms serve children more safely. The broader implication is that protection should account for children’s different circumstances, including distance, disability, and their need to communicate and participate.

The Supreme Court built on two earlier decisions. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, decided in 2020, the court held that speech and expression, and trade or business through the internet, are constitutionally protected. However, it did not decide whether access to the internet itself was a fundamental right.

The present bench addressed that unanswered question. It held that the right to access and use the internet is fundamental under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a). Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression. Article 21 was also central to the court’s recognition of digital access.

The bench also referred to Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India, a 2025 judgment. That case recognised the right to digital access as a fundamental right under Article 21. Together, these decisions show a developing constitutional approach: online expression, digital access, and internet use are increasingly treated as connected rights.

A fundamental right is a basic constitutional protection that supports individual freedom and dignity. In this case, the court connected internet access with Article 21 and freedom of speech and expression with Article 19(1)(a). These protections support privacy, communication, information, and participation in public life. Rights are powerful, but they operate within a constitutional framework.

Rights can overlap or pull in different directions. A child’s freedom to access information may meet safety concerns involving harmful material. Privacy may also require limits on monitoring, while safety may require some protective systems. Balancing means seeking measures that address a real danger without restricting more freedom than necessary. The court’s suggested child mode illustrates this approach.

The ruling’s principle is that children should receive both safety and freedom. Platforms should detect and remove CSEAM and develop stronger safeguards. Children should not be excluded because online services have failed. The article does not set out a complete test for every conflict, but it presents targeted protection instead of blanket restrictions as the guiding approach.