2023 Mumbai jet crash: Probe flags pilot error, unstabilised approach, training gaps

The VSR Ventures Learjet 45XR was flying from Visakhapatnam to Mumbai on September 14, 2023. It was cleared to land on Runway 27 at 11:31 UTC. Heavy rain and reduced visibility made the approach difficult. The crew continued even though the aircraft was not properly aligned or stabilised.

The aircraft first moved left of the runway, then drifted continuously right. About 40 seconds after autopilot disconnection, the stick shaker activated, followed by a stall warning. EGPWS alerts then sounded. The aircraft crash-landed near Taxiways W and N, skidded across an unpaved area, and stopped near Taxiways U and N.

A fire started after the crash, and the wings separated from the fuselage. The nose section was damaged. Fire tenders extinguished the fire, while all eight occupants were evacuated and taken to a nearby hospital. Everyone sustained injuries. The AAIB later blamed the continued unstabilised approach and inappropriate handling.

An unstabilised approach occurs when an aircraft is not consistently under control or properly prepared for landing. Key conditions include suitable alignment, speed, descent path and aircraft configuration. If these conditions are not met, standard procedures normally require the crew to abandon the landing and go around. Continuing increases workload and reduces recovery time.

In Mumbai, the Learjet initially deviated left of the runway and then drifted right. The crew had already disconnected the autopilot when the stick shaker activated, followed by a stall warning. EGPWS alerts came next. The aircraft eventually stalled at low altitude and did not recover before crash-landing.

The AAIB identified the decision to continue the unstabilised approach in marginal weather as a probable cause. It also cited inappropriate aircraft handling, poor airspeed monitoring and a delayed go-around call. The finding matters because it links an unsafe approach decision to the final loss of control.

The aircraft carried eight people on the non-scheduled passenger flight. The group included two crew members and six passengers. The number matters because the crash involved everyone aboard, yet the article reports that all occupants survived the immediate accident with injuries.

After the crash landing, the Learjet skidded across an unpaved area and stopped near the intersection of Taxiway U and Taxiway N, close to stand C80. A fire broke out, and fire tenders rushed to the aircraft. The wings detached from the fuselage, while the nose section was damaged.

All eight occupants were evacuated from the aircraft. They were then taken to a nearby hospital for treatment. The article does not provide details about the severity of their injuries or how long they remained in care. It does establish that nobody aboard was reported killed in this September 2023 Mumbai accident.

Landing safely depends on the crew maintaining control, position and speed while judging the runway environment. Heavy rain and reduced visibility make outside visual references less reliable. A high tailwind can also make the approach more demanding. Together, these conditions leave less margin when the aircraft is already misaligned or unstable.

The Learjet first deviated left, then drifted right during its approach to Runway 27. The crew continued instead of abandoning the landing. About 40 seconds after autopilot disconnection, the stick shaker and stall warning activated. EGPWS alerts followed before the aircraft crash-landed. The crew did not recover from the low-altitude stall.

The AAIB called the weather marginal and said it impaired visual cues. It also identified a high tailwind component as a contributing factor. These conditions did not act alone. They combined with poor airspeed monitoring, inappropriate handling and the delayed decision by the pilot monitoring to call for a go-around.

The AAIB concluded that the crew’s decision to continue an unstabilised approach in marginal weather was the probable cause. It also identified inappropriate handling of the aircraft. Together, these factors led to an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. The aircraft did not recover before reaching the ground.

The report listed several contributing factors. The crew failed to monitor airspeed against a rising low-speed cue. The pilot monitoring delayed calling for a go-around. Heavy rain and reduced visibility weakened visual cues, while a high tailwind added difficulty. The AAIB also noted the crew’s apparent commitment to landing before a restricted time at Mumbai airport.

The findings point to several safety weaknesses rather than one isolated event. They include non-adherence to standard operating procedures and ineffective approach monitoring. In response, the AAIB made 10 recommendations covering pilot training, operating procedures, maintenance records, air traffic control practices and regulatory oversight.

A stick shaker is a cockpit warning that physically shakes the control column when the aircraft approaches an aerodynamic stall. A stall warning alerts the crew that the wings may no longer produce enough lift. An EGPWS alert warns that the aircraft may be dangerously close to terrain or another ground hazard. Each signal demands immediate attention.

During the Mumbai approach, the autopilot had been disconnected for about 40 seconds when the stick shaker activated. A stall warning followed. EGPWS alerts were then generated before the Learjet crash-landed. The sequence showed that the aircraft was losing safe flight margins while close to the ground.

These systems are safety barriers, but they do not replace pilot action. The AAIB found that the crew failed to monitor airspeed against a rising low-speed cue and did not recover from the stall. It also cited a delayed go-around call. The warnings indicated danger, but the approach continued until recovery was no longer achieved.

Standard operating procedures give crews a shared method for configuring, monitoring and flying an approach. A go-around is the planned escape when an approach is unsafe or unstable. Simulator training lets pilots practise rare emergencies, including stall recovery, without real-world risk. Regulatory oversight checks operators, manuals, records and training against required standards.

At Mumbai, the barriers did not work together. The crew did not follow all SOP expectations, continued an unstabilised approach, and the pilot monitoring delayed the go-around call. The AAIB also found that the crew did not recover from a low-altitude stall. Its recommendations therefore included better challenge-and-response checklists and simulator practice for full stalls or stall warnings in several flight configurations.

The regulator was asked to verify operator manuals, review recurrent training and examine fixed-wing pilot training records. VSR Ventures was told to improve procedures and records. The Airports Authority of India was asked to reinforce aircraft separation practices. These actions aim to prevent one missed safeguard from becoming a crash.