US and Iran both claim control of Strait of Hormuz amid attacks on vessels

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway linking the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and wider sea routes. Before the war, roughly a fifth of global oil and natural gas flows passed through it. That makes safe passage important for energy markets and economies far beyond the region.

Ships are being attacked because the United States and Iran are competing to control movement through the strait. The IRGC says some vessels struck naval mines and warns ships to coordinate with Iran. The United States says vessels were hit by projectiles instead and claims it controls the waterway with regional partners.

The attacks have made passage less predictable. At least 12 ships were confirmed attacked in one week, though UKMTO believes the real number is higher. Oil flows fell to 11.6 million barrels per day, about 68 percent of the pre-war level. More attacks could further reduce traffic and raise energy prices.

The most striking figure is the US military’s claim that 400 ships and 100 million barrels of oil moved through the Strait of Hormuz during the reported week. CENTCOM used those numbers to argue that the waterway remained open despite Iranian attacks. The claim differs from other traffic measures in the report.

UKMTO recorded 125 outbound transits and 129 inbound transits over seven days. These figures count reported movements in each direction, while the US figure describes total ships moving through the strait. Oil flows, meanwhile, averaged 11.6 million barrels per day during the seven days ending October 13.

The numbers show heavy traffic, but also uncertainty. UKMTO said many attacked vessels refused to report incidents, so the true attack total is unknown. Oil traffic was only 68 percent of the 17.1 million-barrel-per-day pre-war baseline, suggesting that passage continued but was significantly reduced.

The disagreement is partly about control and partly about credibility. The United States wants to show that its naval campaign keeps a vital waterway open. Iran wants to demonstrate that American forces cannot guarantee safe passage and that Tehran still has leverage over shipping.

The two sides also describe attacks differently. Iran’s IRGC says vessels are striking naval mines, including a supertanker that allegedly caught fire on an unauthorized route. CENTCOM says it cleared the strait of mines and that ships were hit by projectiles. The report also describes an RPG fired from a small boat at a tanker.

Neither side provides a complete, independently verified picture. UKMTO says many vessels did not report attacks, while Iran has not released exact traffic or attack figures. The competing claims therefore shape market expectations and political perceptions, even as ships continue moving through the waterway.

When attacks reduce tanker traffic through Hormuz, buyers fear that less oil and gas will reach world markets. Traders often respond before an actual shortage appears, bidding up prices to reflect greater risk, insurance costs, delays, and the possibility of further disruption.

The article gives a clear example. Brent crude touched $110 a barrel, its highest level since May, while oil flows through Hormuz averaged 11.6 million barrels per day. That was about 68 percent of the 17.1 million-barrel-per-day pre-war baseline. Volumes also oscillated from week to week as attacks increased.

If the disruption persists, refiners and importers may compete more intensely for available cargoes. Higher transport and security costs can pass through to fuel and other products. The effects could spread beyond the strait because it previously carried roughly a fifth of global oil and natural gas flows.

When a chokepoint becomes dangerous, governments and companies can reduce dependence on one passage. They may reroute ships around longer sea routes, use land pipelines where capacity exists, release emergency stockpiles, or delay and consolidate cargoes. These choices usually cost more and take longer.

The article gives one concrete method already being used. The United States has increased energy transits through the strait and nearby waterways through a shuttle system coordinated with Arab powers. Security coordination can keep vessels moving in organized groups and may reduce exposure to attacks. The report also notes that traffic has varied week by week.

No alternative fully replaces Hormuz quickly. Longer routes consume more time and fuel, while pipelines and stockpiles have limited capacity. The article says the Houthis have also captured the Bab al-Mandeb strait, showing that nearby routes can face danger too. Companies therefore need several overlapping options.

A large naval presence does not make a narrow waterway risk-free. Iran can threaten shipping through relatively low-cost methods, including mines, projectiles, and attacks launched from small boats. Narrow waters also make ships easier to monitor, delay, or intimidate than vessels in open ocean.

The article describes several examples. The IRGC reported vessels hitting mines and said one supertanker caught fire on an unauthorized route. UKMTO separately reported a tanker struck by an RPG fired from a small boat. CENTCOM rejected the mine explanation for recent incidents and said ships were hit by projectiles.

US and partner forces can escort traffic, clear mines, and deter some attacks, but protection is not absolute. Vessels may avoid reporting incidents, and conflicting accounts make the real threat hard to measure. Iran can therefore impose economic and psychological costs even without stopping every ship or defeating the larger naval force.

Chokepoints matter because many ships and huge volumes of energy pass through limited space. A disruption in one narrow route can delay cargoes, force expensive detours, and make buyers compete for fewer available supplies. The economic impact can reach countries far from the conflict.

Hormuz shows the mechanism clearly. Before the war, the strait handled roughly a fifth of global oil and natural gas flows. During the reported week, oil movement fell to 11.6 million barrels per day, or about 68 percent of the pre-war baseline. Brent crude then touched $110 a barrel.

The danger is not only physical closure. Repeated attacks can make shipowners, crews, insurers, and traders more cautious. Traffic may continue, but at higher cost and with greater uncertainty. The article’s figures show why governments use naval forces and shuttle systems to preserve passage through such routes.