Challengers ask court to pause agreement between Texas and the DOJ on deportation proceedings

The Supreme Court request targets an agreement between Texas and the Department of Justice. A federal judge entered it as a consent judgment after Texas challenged the rule. The challengers want that judgment paused while their appeal continues. They argue the agreement improperly eliminated a regulation created through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The rule would return if the challengers prevail temporarily. It allows immigration judges to use administrative closure. That means they can suspend some deportation proceedings without permanently deciding the case. The article gives crime victims and witnesses seeking immigration relief, such as asylum, as examples.

The 5th Circuit already refused to block the judgment. The cities and Centro Legal de la Raza then asked the Supreme Court to intervene. Their broader concern is that an agency might avoid formal repeal procedures by agreeing to court-ordered relief instead of defending its regulation.

Administrative closure is a case-management tool at the center of the dispute. It allows an immigration judge to suspend some deportation proceedings temporarily. The judge does not use it to grant asylum or permanently cancel the case. Instead, the proceeding is placed on hold while another immigration matter develops.

For example, a crime victim or witness may be seeking immigration relief. The rule can let the immigration judge pause that person’s deportation proceeding during the process. The article also identifies asylum seekers as people who may benefit. This pause can prevent the deportation case from moving ahead while related relief is being considered.

The EOIR adopted the regulation in 2024 through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Texas later argued that the EOIR lacked authority to adopt it. Judge Reed O’Connor struck down the rule, and the Supreme Court request seeks its temporary return during the appeal.

Three cities are involved: Baltimore, New Haven, and Columbus. One named legal-services organization, Centro Legal de la Raza, joined them in trying to defend the rule. One state, Texas, brought the lawsuit. The Department of Justice is also a central party because it entered the challenged agreement with Texas.

The case has reached three federal court levels. It began in the Northern District of Texas, specifically the Wichita Falls division. The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals later rejected the challengers’ request to block the judgment. The challengers then brought their request to the Supreme Court.

The conflict therefore includes a trial court, an appeals court, and the nation’s highest court. It also involves local governments, an immigrant-services group, Texas, and the federal government. The Supreme Court’s intervention would affect the rule while the lower-court appeal continues.

The rule gives immigration judges a way to suspend some deportation proceedings temporarily. Without it, the article indicates that those proceedings cannot be paused under this rule. Cases involving people seeking related immigration relief may therefore continue while their requests are pending.

The article specifically identifies crime victims and witnesses seeking immigration relief, such as asylum. Administrative closure can hold their deportation cases while they pursue that relief. The rule also matters directly to asylum seekers. Its purpose is not described as deciding whether someone qualifies, but as temporarily stopping the deportation proceeding.

The immediate legal reality is uncertain because the rule was struck down through the consent judgment. The cities and Centro Legal de la Raza asked the Supreme Court to restore it during their appeal. If the Court grants that request, judges could again use the temporary pause while the litigation proceeds.

Standing asks whether a party has the legal right to bring a case. The cities and Centro Legal de la Raza sought to join the lawsuit to defend administrative closure. Before they could do that, they had to establish standing. Judge Reed O’Connor rejected their request because he found they had not shown the required legal interest.

The cities argued that eliminating the rule would cost them money. Their theory was that taxpayers in their communities are likely to be deported. If those taxpayers were deported, the cities contended, they could face financial consequences. O’Connor rejected that contention and denied intervention.

That ruling prevented the cities and the organization from defending the regulation in the district court. They appealed and asked the 5th Circuit to block the consent judgment, but it refused. They then asked the Supreme Court to intervene while their appeal continues.

A consent judgment is a final court judgment based on an agreement between the parties. Here, Texas and the Department of Justice jointly asked Judge Reed O’Connor to enter judgment for Texas. The federal government also asked him to eliminate the rule and bar the EOIR from adopting a similar rule later.

The timing drives the challengers’ accusation. Texas filed its lawsuit in the Wichita Falls division, and within hours the state and DOJ filed their joint motion. O’Connor granted their requests. The challengers describe that process as “egregious collusion” because the government agreed to nationwide relief instead of defending its own regulation.

Joshua Salzman called the judgment “indefensible.” He warned that agencies could advertise unwillingness to defend disfavored rules and then accept nationwide relief. The challengers say that tactic could bypass the administrative law requirement for notice-and-comment repeal.

Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the process the EOIR used to adopt the administrative-closure regulation in 2024. The article identifies it as a federal law requirement governing administrative agencies. In practical terms, the process gives the public an opportunity to comment before the agency adopts a rule.

The dispute concerns what must happen when an agency wants to remove such a regulation. The challengers argue that a rule adopted through notice and comment may be rescinded only through notice and comment. They say the DOJ instead agreed with Texas to obtain a court judgment throwing the rule out.

That distinction matters beyond this immigration case. Salzman warned that agencies could avoid the administrative process by refusing to defend a disfavored rule and accepting nationwide relief. The Supreme Court had previously agreed to consider a related intervention question but dismissed that case without deciding it. The current request renews that issue.