CENTCOM chief cites reports Iran’s proxies holding back salaries to send money to IRGC

Iran-backed militias, often called proxies, are armed groups that receive support from Iran while operating in other countries. They can serve Iran’s regional goals without being formal units of the Iranian state. The reported money transfers matter because they suggest these groups may be helping Iran’s military establishment during a severe financial squeeze.

According to the cited reports, some militias are holding back salary payments and sending the money to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The key mechanism is therefore internal diversion: money intended for militia personnel is redirected to the organization that supports Iran’s military and regional networks. The source does not identify the militias or give a total amount.

This would provide the IRGC with another funding channel as sanctions and a reported U.S. blockade reduce Iran’s oil income. It could also create hardship or dissatisfaction among militia members who are not paid on time. The reports indicate financial pressure, but they do not establish how widespread the practice is or whether every Iran-backed militia is involved.

The IRGC is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a powerful military organization at the center of the reported transfers. CENTCOM is the U.S. Central Command, the American command responsible for military operations and security concerns in the Middle East region. The source identifies CENTCOM’s chief as the official discussing the reports.

In this account, the IRGC is the alleged recipient of money from Iran-backed militias. The militias reportedly withhold salary payments and send those funds back to the IRGC. CENTCOM’s chief provides the U.S. assessment that Iran’s reported blockade has cost $25 billion in oil revenue. The source does not describe a direct payment observed by CENTCOM.

These roles show two sides of the story. The IRGC is the Iranian institution allegedly receiving financial help, while CENTCOM is the U.S. institution presenting information about the transfers and economic pressure. The reports do not name the CENTCOM chief or provide independent details about the alleged transactions.

The reports identify a possible funding method, not a quantified transfer. They say Iran-backed militias are holding back salaries and sending money to the IRGC, but the supplied source gives no dollar figure, number of militias, duration, or share of salaries involved. There is also no figure for the IRGC’s overall budget or funding needs.

The clearest scale in the source is different: CENTCOM’s chief says a reported U.S. blockade cost Iran $25 billion in oil revenue. That number describes lost national oil income, not money transferred by militias. Comparing the two would therefore be misleading. One is a reported revenue loss; the other is an unmeasured alleged flow.

The current evidence supports only a cautious conclusion. Any withheld salaries could help the IRGC at the margin, particularly during financial pressure, but their significance cannot be calculated from the supplied facts. More detail about the groups, payment amounts, and Iran’s military budget would be needed to judge whether the transfers are minor or substantial.

Falling oil production and reduced revenue can leave Iran with less money for government operations, military institutions, and affiliated networks. The source links several pressures: a reported U.S. blockade, a $25 billion loss in oil revenue, and Iranian oil production falling below two million barrels per day. Those conditions help explain why additional funding sources would matter.

The reported mechanism is straightforward. Militias allegedly hold back salary payments and send the money to the IRGC. This shifts resources from personnel payments to Iran’s central military organization. The source also reports that Iran still ships some liquefied petroleum gas and jet fuel despite the blockade, showing that restrictions have not stopped every energy shipment.

The transfers may therefore be an emergency support measure, but the source does not state the proxies’ motives directly. It also does not say how long the practice has lasted or whether it has protected military operations. What is clear is that Iran faces tighter energy finances while the IRGC is reportedly receiving help from affiliated groups.

Oil, LPG, and jet fuel sales require buyers, transport, insurance, banking, and payment channels. Sanctions or a blockade can target one or more of those links, making transactions slower, riskier, or less profitable. The source reports that a U.S. blockade cost Iran $25 billion in oil revenue, showing the reported financial effect.

The mechanism is pressure on the transaction chain. If buyers or financial institutions fear penalties, they may avoid Iranian cargoes or demand discounts and indirect payment methods. The source does not detail which specific measures blocked which shipments. Reuters nevertheless reports that Iran shipped some LPG and jet fuel, meaning the restrictions did not stop all energy trade.

Iran’s energy exports therefore appear constrained rather than completely eliminated. Reduced sales and payment difficulties can weaken government revenue even when some cargoes still move. The supplied text does not state the exact sanctions rules, payment routes, shipment volumes, or whether the reported blockade was naval, financial, or both.

When oil income falls below a government’s financial needs, leaders generally have fewer resources for public spending, military budgets, and payments to affiliated groups. That can force choices among competing priorities. This broader economic relationship is established world knowledge; the supplied article text does not describe specific cuts, delays, or policy responses inside Iran.

The concrete figures in the source show the pressure. CENTCOM’s chief says the reported U.S. blockade cost Iran $25 billion in oil revenue. IranWire reports that oil production fell below two million barrels per day. At the same time, reports say Iran-backed militias are withholding salaries to send money to the IRGC, suggesting that military networks may seek alternative funding.

The likely implication is tighter competition for money across Iran’s state and affiliated networks, but the source does not confirm particular outcomes. It does not say whether government services were reduced, military operations changed, or proxy support weakened. Those effects would require evidence beyond the headlines provided.

Oil production is the starting point: Iran must extract energy, sell it abroad, and receive payment. Export revenue can then support government programs, military institutions, and affiliated networks. If production falls or buyers cannot pay normally, the government has less income available for those competing needs. The source reports production below two million barrels per day.

Sanctions and a reported blockade can interfere with exports, shipping, finance, and payment. That reduces the money earned from each barrel or prevents some sales altogether. CENTCOM’s chief says the reported blockade cost Iran $25 billion in oil revenue. Reuters also reports that Iran shipped some LPG and jet fuel, so restrictions appear to have reduced trade rather than ended every shipment.

The result is a tighter link between energy sales and political priorities. Lower revenue can increase pressure on Iran to find alternative funding, including reported transfers from proxy militias to the IRGC. The source does not provide a full budget or show exactly how spending changed.