Houthis Attacks: Egypt’s Sisi Asks Parliament To Authorise Support For Saudi Arabia

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi wants Egypt’s parliament to authorize military support for Saudi Arabia if the kingdom asks for help. The proposed support concerns defending Saudi territory and security against attacks by Yemen’s Houthis. Sisi said Egypt would not be standing by while Saudi Arabia was harmed or threatened.

The authorization would cover defensive action, not an offensive campaign. Sisi said he was “not talking about fighting anyone or attacking anyone.” Egypt joined the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, but its role has mainly involved protecting Red Sea shipping rather than frontline combat.

Parliament was scheduled to hold an emergency session on Sunday. No deployment was announced, and the condition remains important: Saudi Arabia must request assistance. The vote could give Egypt’s government legal and political authority to respond while preserving its stated focus on defence and maritime security.

The Houthis are an Iran-backed force in Yemen. They are fighting Yemen’s internationally recognised government, while Saudi Arabia leads a coalition supporting that government. This makes the conflict a direct security issue for Saudi Arabia and its regional allies, including Egypt.

The article gives concrete examples of the fighting’s effects. Since Yemen’s war reignited in July, Houthi attacks have targeted Saudi energy facilities and Riyadh’s international airport. An attack there killed 13 people last week. The Houthis have also blockaded the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, threatening an important shipping route.

The article does not set out the Houthis’ broader political goals or the precise reasons the war reignited. It does show the immediate stakes: Saudi territory, energy exports, airports, and sea traffic are vulnerable. Those risks prompted Sisi to seek parliamentary authority for possible defensive support if Riyadh asks.

The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is a narrow, strategically important waterway used by ships entering or leaving the Red Sea. The article calls it a maritime chokepoint. Its importance has increased because Saudi Arabia is relying more heavily on Red Sea routes to export oil.

The Houthis have blockaded the strait while attacking commercial vessels and Saudi targets. This can disrupt shipping through a concentrated passage rather than across an entire sea. The Red Sea also connects with the Suez Canal, so instability there can affect Egypt’s trade income and the movement of goods between major markets.

The risks extend beyond the countries at war. Saudi Arabia could face trouble moving energy exports, while Egypt could lose more Suez Canal revenue. International shipping may need to avoid the route or face greater danger. The article presents secure Red Sea navigation as a shared priority for Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said Egypt’s Suez Canal lost about $11 billion in revenues since the Houthis began attacking commercial vessels. The attacks followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. The figure measures lost canal income, not necessarily the total economic cost to Egypt.

The mechanism is straightforward. Houthi attacks and threats can disrupt commercial traffic through the Red Sea. Fewer ships using the route can mean less revenue for the Suez Canal, which the article describes as a key source of foreign currency for Egypt. The danger is therefore both military and economic.

The reported loss could grow if attacks or blockades continue, although the article gives no forecast. Egypt is seeking secure navigation in the Red Sea and is considering possible defensive support for Saudi Arabia. Protecting the route matters directly to Cairo’s finances as well as to regional security.

If attacks or blockades continue, Saudi Arabia could face greater difficulty exporting oil through Red Sea routes. The article says the conflict threatens Saudi security and energy exports. It also warns that disruption could further reduce Egypt’s Suez Canal revenues, already reported to have fallen by about $11 billion.

The key mechanism is interference with shipping. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and the blockade of Bab al-Mandeb can make ships avoid or struggle to use the Red Sea. That affects Saudi oil shipments and the wider flow of goods. Egypt depends on canal traffic for foreign currency, so fewer vessels can weaken an important income stream.

International shipping could become less secure and less efficient if the route remains disrupted. The article does not specify alternative routes, costs, or a timeline. It does show why Egypt and Saudi Arabia called for free, secure Red Sea navigation and why Cairo is considering defensive support.

The article does not name another route that Saudi Arabia can use to export its oil. Instead, it says the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran forced Saudi Arabia to rely on Red Sea routes. That makes the Red Sea especially important to Saudi energy shipments.

The mechanism is a shift in dependence. When Hormuz was closed, Saudi exports had to use the Red Sea more heavily. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait then became a critical passage for that traffic. A Houthi blockade or attack can therefore threaten a route that Saudi Arabia increasingly needs, while also putting wider shipping at risk.

The article gives no details about pipelines, alternative ports, or other export corridors. It therefore cannot establish how much oil Saudi Arabia could move elsewhere. It does establish that the closure of Hormuz narrowed Saudi Arabia’s practical options and raised the consequences of Red Sea disruption.

A president may need parliamentary approval before sending forces abroad so elected lawmakers can review the mission, its purpose, and its risks. Such approval can provide legal authority and public accountability for military action. The article specifically says any Egyptian deployment would require parliamentary approval.

Sisi asked lawmakers to convene urgently and authorize support if Saudi Arabia requested it. He also limited the stated purpose to defence, saying Egypt would not be attacking anyone. Parliament’s role would therefore be to approve or withhold authority before Egyptian forces were deployed in support of Saudi security.

This reveals a system in which civilian institutions oversee the armed forces. It does not mean parliament directs battlefield operations. It means the executive must obtain authorization for this kind of foreign military action. The emergency session would show whether Egypt’s elected legislature accepts the proposed defensive commitment.