SC bars online platforms from hosting subscription-based sexual content

The Supreme Court directed every online intermediary to ensure that child sexual exploitation and abuse material, or any other material likely to harm children, cannot be offered, hosted, uploaded, promoted, or circulated through a paywall or subscription. The order applies whether the platform is involved directly or indirectly. It matters because paid access can create revenue from abusive material and make harmful content harder to detect.

The Court specifically included indirect links and algorithmic promotion. A platform could therefore breach its duties even if the material is not openly displayed on its own main pages. The Court said such links were being shared to bypass legal protections under Sections 15 and 67B of the POCSO Act and the IT Act.

The Bench said social media intermediaries had repeatedly failed to follow directions issued in 2024. It directed stronger safeguards and asked the Centre to consider exemplary fines. Revenue earned from prohibited material through a paywall or subscription should also be forfeited and disgorged.

CSEAM stands for Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material. It refers to visual or other material involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children. The Supreme Court used this term while directing intermediaries to prevent such material from being offered, hosted, uploaded, promoted, or circulated.

The term is considered more accurate than “child pornography” because children cannot meaningfully consent to sexual exploitation. “Pornography” can suggest consensual adult sexual expression or entertainment. “CSEAM” keeps attention on the underlying abuse, the harmed child, and the need for protection, reporting, and removal. This explanation comes from established terminology; the article itself uses CSEAM but does not explain the naming choice.

The distinction matters in enforcement. Treating the material as abuse discourages viewing, trading, or monetising it. The Court also linked the issue to Sections 15 and 67B, which provide special legal protections for children in cyberspace.

Harmful material can circulate without appearing as a plainly visible public post. A paywall or subscription can place it behind restricted access while still allowing an intermediary to earn revenue. Indirect links can lead users from ordinary-looking posts or profiles to prohibited material hosted elsewhere. This makes enforcement more difficult and can conceal the full path of circulation.

Recommendation algorithms can amplify the problem by suggesting accounts, posts, groups, or links based on user activity. The Court said social media algorithms were promoting and sharing indirect links to bypass the special protections in Sections 15 and 67B. A user may therefore reach harmful material through a chain of recommendations rather than a direct search.

The Court found that existing safeguards had not produced meaningful progress. It ordered a framework for safer platforms and directed the Centre to consider exemplary fines. It also said revenue from prohibited material accessed through paywalls or subscriptions should be forfeited.

The article says Sections 15 of the POCSO Act and 67B of the Information Technology Act are special penal provisions designed to protect children in cyberspace. Together, they address the handling and circulation of sexually explicit material involving children. The Court cited them while warning that indirect links and algorithmic promotion were being used to bypass legal safeguards.

In general legal terms, Section 15 of POCSO addresses storing or possessing child sexual abuse material, including situations involving intent to share, transmit, display, or commercially exploit it. Section 67B of the IT Act covers publishing, transmitting, seeking, browsing, downloading, advertising, promoting, exchanging, or distributing material depicting children in sexually explicit conduct. Exact liability depends on the statutory wording and facts.

The article does not list every duty or exception in these provisions. It says the Court expects intermediaries and other stakeholders to detect, remove, and report CSEAM while following the IT Act and IT Rules’ due-diligence requirements.

The Supreme Court directed the Centre to consider a framework for exemplary monetary fines when intermediaries breach duties under the IT Act and IT Rules. The Court said the penalty should reflect the gravity, duration, and recurrence of the default. It also said the size and turnover of the intermediary must be considered.

In practice, a serious breach involving harmful material could draw a stronger penalty than a minor or short-lived failure. A violation continuing for a long period could cost more than an isolated lapse. Repeated failures could increase the amount further. A large platform with substantial turnover could face a larger fine than a small intermediary for comparable conduct, because the penalty should be meaningful at that scale.

The Court added a separate financial consequence for prohibited material sold through a paywall or subscription. Revenue derived from that content should be forfeited and disgorged. The article does not state fixed amounts or a final formula.

If CSEAM is not detected and removed, it can continue circulating online. The Supreme Court said this may embolden people who seek such material. Children can face continuing risks when platforms fail to act, especially where harmful content is promoted, linked, or monetised. The Court said there could be no space for non-consensual, sexually exploitative, and abusive material online.

The Court also rejected blanket internet restrictions as a solution. It said children do not stop using the internet when rules prohibit them from doing so. Instead, they may move to other platforms and websites that are unregulated and even less safe. Blocking access to regulated social media would therefore not necessarily reduce the incidents discussed by the Court.

The forward path is stronger protection, not simple exclusion. The Court called for earnest action by regulators and intermediaries, including detection, removal, hash matching, URL listing, reporting, and a workable framework that protects both children’s safety and freedom.

Perceptual hash matching gives a file a digital fingerprint based on its visual features. Unlike an ordinary exact-file match, it can help recognise copies that have been resized, compressed, or slightly altered. A platform can compare new uploads with hashes of previously identified abusive files and remove likely matches, subject to verification and due diligence.

URL listing works differently. It records web addresses associated with prohibited material. Platforms can check posts, messages, profiles, or links against those addresses and block or remove matches. Used together, the tools can identify repeated circulation at scale instead of waiting for people to discover every copy manually. These technical details are established background; the article names the tools but does not explain how they work.

The Court directed the Centre to frame guidelines or SOPs for significant social media intermediaries. It also ordered creation of a National Hash & URL List Database solely for detecting and removing CSEAM. Unknown-origin material still requires proper verification and due diligence.