Chinese-made cars rented by Norwegian military automatically recorded and stored video footage during military exercises

During a Norwegian military exercise in Oslo, rented cars recorded soldiers without their knowledge. The footage showed troops entering and leaving vehicles, moving around, and typing security codes while facing the cameras. The recordings were stored inside the cars.

Soldiers found the clips by chance while browsing the vehicle menus. They had been bored, and nobody had been reviewing the recordings. After discovering them, military personnel deleted the files. The cars had apparently kept recording because standard dashcams were left switched on.

The military did not immediately remove every vehicle. It had very few alternative cars available, so the rented vehicles remained in use for the rest of the exercise. The incident raised security and privacy concerns, but no evidence showed that any recording left the cars or reached an outside party.

A dashcam is a small vehicle-mounted camera designed to capture video while a car is operating or the camera remains powered. Depending on its position and viewing angle, it can record the road, passengers, or people entering and leaving the vehicle. The article identifies these cameras as standard dashcams.

Here, soldiers had mistakenly left the cameras switched on. The devices continued capturing scenes during the military exercise, including movements and security codes typed in front of the lens. The recordings accumulated in the cars, and soldiers later found them through the vehicle menus.

This is local recording, not proof of remote surveillance. The footage remained inside the vehicles unless someone copied or transmitted it. The article reports no evidence that any recording left the cars. The immediate problem was an unnoticed camera setting that preserved sensitive video, rather than a demonstrated outside connection.

The recordings captured more than ordinary driving scenes. They showed troops getting into and out of the cars, their movements and locations, and security codes typed while soldiers faced the camera. That combination made the footage sensitive because it linked people, places, and access information.

The cars came from First Rent A Car Norway AS, a Hertz-branded rental operator. The article does not identify the brands of most vehicles involved. It confirms only two Chinese-made Deepals among the rented cars used during the exercise.

The broader ownership connection increased public attention, but it does not establish what happened to the footage. Volvo Cars controls the rental operator, while about 79% of Volvo Cars is controlled by Geely’s Swedish holding arm. That arm is entirely controlled by China-based Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. No evidence connects that ownership chain to the recordings leaving the cars.

Video of military personnel can expose routines, locations, and movements. That information may reveal how people enter, leave, or operate around protected sites. The risk becomes more serious when the same footage shows soldiers typing access codes for restricted areas.

A person who obtained the recordings could potentially learn those codes and use them to attempt unauthorized entry. The article describes this as a serious breach of routine security, regardless of the car owner’s nationality. The camera did not need to record secret plans to create a problem; ordinary movements combined with access details were already sensitive.

In this case, the recordings were found inside the cars and then deleted by military personnel. No evidence showed that the files were transmitted or accessed by outsiders. The incident still demonstrates why cameras should be checked, switched off when unnecessary, and kept away from sensitive activity.

The Norwegian military discovered that recordings were stored inside the rented cars, creating privacy and security concerns. Under normal circumstances, the discovery might have led to an immediate vehicle replacement or withdrawal. The exercise, however, created a practical limitation.

The military had very few alternative cars available. Because it lacked enough substitutes, personnel continued using the vehicles for the rest of the exercise after deleting the recordings. This decision did not mean the footage was considered harmless; it reflected the shortage of available transport.

The continued use also meant the underlying risk could not be removed simply by finding the files. The article does not describe a broader technical fix or a later vehicle replacement. It establishes only that the recordings were deleted and the cars stayed in military use during the remaining exercise period.

First Rent A Car Norway AS supplied the vehicles for errands, exercises, and operational missions. It is a Hertz-branded rental operator. Volvo Cars gained complete control of the company, so the rental fleet became connected to Volvo’s corporate ownership structure.

The chain continues through Geely. About 79% of Volvo Cars is controlled by Geely’s Swedish holding arm, and that arm is entirely controlled by China-based Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. The article confirms only two Chinese-made Deepals among the rented vehicles, while the other brands are unnamed.

That ownership made the recordings more sensitive because Norway is concerned about Chinese intelligence and security agencies operating in the country. Norway’s Police Security Service says those agencies have greater capacity for operations there. However, ownership alone proves nothing, and no evidence links Geely or the rental company to the dashcams or to any footage leaving the cars.

Locally stored data remains on a device’s internal memory or removable storage. A remote server is a separate computer or service that receives data through a network. Transmitted footage can potentially be accessed from elsewhere, while local footage generally requires physical or direct device access.

The dashcams in the rented cars accumulated recordings inside the vehicles. Soldiers later browsed the vehicle menus, found the clips, and deleted them. The article does not report a network connection, upload, or outside review of the files. It therefore describes stored footage, not demonstrated remote surveillance.

That distinction matters when assessing the incident. Local storage still exposed sensitive video to anyone who could access the cars or their systems. But the absence of evidence that recordings left the vehicles limits what can be concluded. The article treats a settings lapse by soldiers as more defensible than deliberate spying, while leaving the security failure itself significant.