Sahyog Portal could detect, remove child abuse material: Supreme Court

The Sahyog Portal is a Union government platform for handling reports and takedown notices involving online child sexual exploitation and abuse material, or CSEAM. Its importance comes from its potential to coordinate action across platforms instead of leaving each service to work alone.

At present, the portal mainly serves as a common routing platform. When someone reports an instance, it sends the report or notice through the system so the relevant intermediary can act. The Supreme Court said it currently acts on CSEAM only when each instance is reported.

The Court believes Sahyog could become the foundation of a national database containing verified hashes and URLs. That would allow platforms to identify known material across services. The proposed expansion would require safeguards, including human verification, audit records, correction of errors, user notices and grievance procedures.

The proposed database cannot rely on a single person’s judgment. The Supreme Court directed that every entry undergo multiple levels of verification before being added. At least three trained human analysts must independently confirm that the material constitutes child sexual exploitation and abuse material, or CSEAM.

This could mean that a reported image, video or link is reviewed separately by three qualified analysts. Their agreement would support adding its digital fingerprint and URL to the shared system, without placing the material itself in the database. The article does not specify how analysts would be selected or trained beyond requiring training.

The requirement reflects the risks of a shared system. A mistaken entry could trigger removal across several platforms. The Court also called for audit records and correction of erroneous entries, connecting human review with continuing accountability.

A digital hash is a mathematical fingerprint generated from digital material. A URL is the web address pointing to online content or a location. In the proposed system, these identifiers would describe known CSEAM without reproducing the material itself.

When a platform checks uploaded or circulating content against a verified hash-and-URL list, a matching fingerprint or address can signal that the material is already known. The platform could then remove the matching content promptly. The Supreme Court specifically said the database should store only digital identifiers and URLs, not the material itself.

This shared approach could help identify the same known material on multiple services. It would not depend solely on a fresh complaint at every platform. However, the Court required verification, audit records and correction of errors, because an incorrect identifier could lead to an unjustified removal.

When content matches a verified database entry, an online intermediary must promptly remove it. The platform must also give the user a notice explaining why the content was removed. The order therefore combines rapid removal with an explanation for the affected user.

The reporting deadline depends on how the removal happened. Material of unknown origin removed after a complaint must be reported to Indian law enforcement within two hours of resolving that complaint. Platforms must also report removals made through their own detection systems, or following a court or government direction, within two hours of removal.

The required recipients include the Special Juvenile Police Unit and local police. The Court said platforms should not merely report CSEAM to foreign organisations. Removals based on a database match must also appear in consolidated weekly reports, although the article gives no separate two-hour deadline for those reports.

Under the current fragmented system, deleting abusive material on one platform does not guarantee that it disappears from other platforms. The Supreme Court said this allows CSEAM to continue circulating across the internet, even after one service has acted.

For example, a platform might remove a reported video from its own service while an identical copy remains available on another social network or website. Each service may have its own complaint process and detection tools, so the second platform may not know that the material was already identified elsewhere.

The Court’s proposed shared hash-and-URL database is intended to address that gap. Once material is verified, platforms could compare content with the common identifiers and remove known matches. This would create a coordinated response, while verification and correction procedures would help limit mistaken removals.

The current system relies heavily on individual complaints and detection mechanisms maintained separately by platforms. That arrangement can require the same material to be reported or discovered repeatedly. Removing it from one service does not ensure that other services identify it.

A national hash-and-URL database would give participating platforms a common reference list. After multiple trained analysts verify an entry, platforms could compare content with its digital fingerprint or URL. A match would prompt removal, and the platform would include the action in the required reporting system.

The Supreme Court described Sahyog as a possible foundation because it has already onboarded many intermediaries. The proposed model could therefore spread verified information across platforms more consistently. It would still need safeguards, including human confirmation, audit trails, error correction, notices and accessible complaints, so coordination does not create unchecked takedowns.

A shared database could affect content on many platforms at once, so mistakes could spread quickly. The Supreme Court therefore called for multiple human checks, audit records, correction of errors, notices explaining removals and an accessible grievance process. These measures create a record, inform users and provide a way to challenge an incorrect decision.

The order also requires a distinct CSEAM complaint category reachable within two steps from the relevant content, profile, group or link. Grievance officers must receive regular training, including on material that may not look explicit. These procedures support careful enforcement while addressing the risk of wrongful takedowns.

The safeguards matter because Sahyog’s constitutional validity is being challenged, including by X Corp and Kunal Kamra. The proceedings concern the portal, Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act and online freedom of speech. The Court also directed the government to frame guidelines and amend law or rules where necessary.