‘There’s a lot of racism, a lot of hatred’: Far right gains predicted as Israel heads to the polls

The Knesset is Israel’s parliament. Israelis vote in national elections for parties, and those parties receive seats in the chamber. The number of seats each party wins determines which political groups can support or block a government. This makes elections central to choosing Israel’s political direction, especially on security, Palestinian rights, religion and democracy.

The article compares today’s election with Meir Kahane’s earlier Knesset career. Kahane won one seat four decades ago, but other legislators passed a law to stop him running again and refused to engage with his proposals. His political heirs, including Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Strength party, may now win significant representation.

The election is scheduled for 27 October. A poll predicted nine seats for Jewish Strength and eight for the Democrats, Labor’s successor. The result could produce a more rightwing Knesset, even if no single party controls the chamber.

Israel’s governing system depends on parliamentary support. A party or coalition must control at least 61 Knesset seats to form a government. Because parties win seats separately, coalition-building is usually essential. Falling below 61 means a bloc cannot govern alone and must find partners, change its alliances or face another political crisis.

The article does not give a precise seat forecast for Netanyahu’s whole coalition bloc. It says consistent polling places that bloc, which includes ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties, well below the 61-seat threshold. A Friday poll for Israel Hayom forecast nine seats for Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Strength party.

The same poll predicted eight seats for the Democrats, led by former general Yair Golan and described as the Labor party’s successor. These figures show the contrast between the far-right party’s rise and the weaker position of the former Labor tradition. The overall balance will depend on coalition partners.

Far-right and nationalist parties are gaining support within a broader rightward movement among Jewish citizens of Israel. The article links this shift to fear, racism and hatred, but especially to insecurity. Many young voters believe the conflict cannot be solved and that Israel will always be at war. That outlook makes military strength and territorial control more persuasive.

More than 500,000 Israelis became eligible to vote since 2022. A Channel 12 poll found that three-quarters of first-time Jewish voters describe themselves as rightwing or centre-right. Their political environment has been consistently rightwing, populist and ultra-nationalist. Democracy, universal values and human rights have received less attention in public debate.

The change matters because young voters are likely to increase the number of rightwing lawmakers. Ultra-Orthodox and nationalist religious communities are growing, but they represent only about a quarter of the electorate. The article therefore says demographics alone cannot explain the age gap. Political socialisation and security fears also shape it.

The Oslo process once represented a possible negotiated political solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Its collapse occurred before the youngest voters became adults, so they grew up as the prospect of an agreement appeared to fade. The article says many now think there is no solution and that permanent conflict is unavoidable. This helps explain their support for nationalist and military approaches.

The Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 reinforced that outlook. About 1,200 people were killed, most of them civilians. Militants also took 251 living hostages and dead bodies to Gaza, creating a two-year hostage crisis. The young people who vote for the first time were teenagers when the attacks happened.

The political consequence is a debate dominated by security and fear. Few politicians discuss peace, negotiations, concessions, Palestinian self-determination or Palestinian wellbeing. Even opposition figures offer limited challenges to the claim that security requires military domination and annexation. The article presents this as a lasting influence on the next government.

The 61-seat threshold is the central consequence of the forecast. Netanyahu’s current coalition includes ultra-Orthodox and far-right parties, but polling consistently puts the bloc below the number needed to govern. It would therefore need additional partners, persuade another party to defect or give way to a different coalition.

The opposition has a possible route to power through parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel. These are described as Arab parties inside the country. If opposition parties and those representatives together reached 61 seats, they could potentially support or form an alternative government. The mechanism is parliamentary arithmetic rather than a direct national majority vote.

That path remains uncertain. Most Jewish-led parties have ruled out such a coalition, although the article notes that similar promises were broken after past elections. The next government will therefore depend not only on election results, but also on whether parties maintain or abandon their pre-election alliance commitments.

Parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel could be crucial because neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the opposition may reach 61 seats alone. Their support could give an opposition alliance the parliamentary majority needed to form a government. They are therefore potential kingmakers, even though the article calls them Arab parties inside Israel.

The key mechanism is coalition arithmetic. A Jewish-led opposition would need to combine its seats with these parties’ seats. Yet most Jewish-led parties have publicly ruled out such cooperation. The article notes that similar promises have been broken after previous elections, so exclusion pledges are politically important but not necessarily permanent.

The rejection reflects the broader rightward shift. On Palestine, most parties offer little challenge to Netanyahu’s security framework, which emphasizes military domination and annexation. Cooperation with parties representing Palestinian citizens could therefore carry political costs for Jewish-led groups. Whether they change position may determine who can reach the 61-seat threshold.

The article does not explain the legal status of West Bank settlements, so this answer uses established international-law context. Israeli law can authorize, regulate or recognize some settlements through domestic institutions, while Israeli courts have also examined settlement-related questions. International law, by contrast, is generally understood to prohibit an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into occupied territory.

This creates a sharp legal and political divide. The Israeli government may present settlement expansion or annexation as a matter of domestic authority and security. International bodies and many states generally regard the settlements as inconsistent with the Fourth Geneva Convention and consider the West Bank occupied territory. The two legal frameworks therefore reach different conclusions.

The distinction matters because settlement policy affects negotiations, Palestinian self-determination and Israel’s international relations. In the article, far-right politics is linked to annexation of territory from Gaza to Syria and Lebanon, while peace and concessions receive little attention. Settlement legality thus becomes part of the wider struggle over Israel’s future borders and political identity.