"Remove him from office." Szejna wants the Constitutional Tribunal president's immunity lifted

Arkadiusz Szejna is calling for the lifting of Bogdan Święczkowski’s immunity. He also wants Święczkowski removed from the Constitutional Tribunal. Immunity protects a judge from certain criminal proceedings or detention without an approved legal procedure. Removing it would not itself prove wrongdoing. It would allow the relevant authorities to pursue proceedings under ordinary legal rules, subject to the Tribunal’s statutory safeguards.

The article’s headline presents Szejna’s demand directly: “Usunąć go ze stanowiska.” Another headline describes the goal as removing Święczkowski from the Tribunal. Święczkowski is identified as the Tribunal’s president. Thus, the proposal concerns both personal legal protection and his position at the institution’s top.

The demand is only a political call unless the competent bodies follow the formal procedure. Lifting immunity and ending a judge’s mandate require separate legal steps. The dispute could therefore move from public statements into institutional proceedings, where the Tribunal, parliament, prosecutors, or the president may have defined roles under applicable law.

Arkadiusz Szejna is a Polish politician who serves as a deputy minister of foreign affairs and is associated with the governing parliamentary camp. Bogdan Święczkowski is a Polish lawyer and judge who serves as president of the Constitutional Tribunal. Their roles place them on opposite sides of a dispute involving the court’s leadership and judicial immunity.

The source headlines identify Szejna as the person demanding action. They identify Święczkowski as the Tribunal’s president and describe calls to remove him from the institution. The headlines do not provide a detailed biography or explain Szejna’s ministerial responsibilities. Those role descriptions come from established public information, not from the supplied headlines.

The distinction matters because Szejna is making a political demand, while Święczkowski holds a judicial leadership position. A public statement cannot by itself lift immunity or end a judge’s mandate. Any such result would require the competent authorities to apply Poland’s constitutional and statutory procedures.

Immunity is a legal safeguard attached to certain public offices, including judges. It is designed to prevent criminal proceedings or detention from being used casually to pressure an official. Immunity does not mean the person is above the law. It means that an independent body must first decide whether the protection can be set aside.

For a Constitutional Tribunal judge, lifting immunity generally requires an authorized request and a decision by the competent Tribunal body. If consent is granted, prosecutors can pursue criminal liability, and detention can become possible where the ordinary legal conditions are met. The decision does not establish guilt. A court would still need to determine responsibility in a separate case.

In this dispute, Szejna is calling for Święczkowski’s immunity to be lifted. That is a request to begin the formal legal route, not an automatic punishment. The outcome would depend on the evidence, the request’s legal basis, and the institution empowered to decide.

The Constitutional Tribunal is Poland’s constitutional court. Its central task is to assess whether statutes and other legal rules comply with the Constitution. It also decides certain constitutional disputes and questions concerning the legal system. This role matters because constitutional review can invalidate rules that conflict with the country’s highest law.

The president of the Tribunal is its institutional leader. The president represents the court externally, organizes its administration, assigns or coordinates work within the framework of the law, and helps ensure that hearings and decisions can proceed. The president remains a judge and is subject to judicial rules, including immunity.

The supplied headlines identify Bogdan Święczkowski as the Tribunal’s president and report demands for his removal. That makes the controversy significant beyond one officeholder. Conflict over the leader can affect public confidence, the court’s daily organization, and the perceived independence of constitutional review.

Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal is composed of 15 judges. They are elected individually by the Sejm for nine-year terms. The fixed number and term structure are intended to give the court continuity and protect judges from direct short-term political pressure.

The Tribunal’s president is not elected directly by the public or appointed alone by the court’s judges. The Tribunal’s General Assembly proposes candidates, and the President of Poland appoints the president from that group. The same constitutional arrangement applies to the vice-president. This creates a two-stage selection mechanism involving the Tribunal and the head of state.

These rules matter in the current dispute because a political demand to remove the president cannot simply replace him immediately. Any change must respect the appointment framework, the judge’s mandate, and applicable statutory provisions. The headlines identify Święczkowski as president but do not report that any replacement procedure has begun.

A demand in the media does not lift a Constitutional Tribunal judge’s immunity. An authorized body must submit a reasoned request concerning criminal liability or detention. The legally competent Tribunal body then decides whether to grant consent. The decision concerns procedural protection, not guilt, and a criminal case would still follow ordinary judicial stages.

Removal from the Tribunal is different. A judge normally serves a fixed nine-year mandate. Ending it early requires a constitutionally or statutorily recognized ground, such as resignation, death, a final disciplinary decision, or another legally specified event. The Tribunal’s president also has a separate leadership appointment, so ending that role and ending judicial membership are not necessarily the same action.

The supplied headlines report Szejna’s calls for both immunity to be lifted and Święczkowski to be removed. They do not state that any formal request, Tribunal resolution, disciplinary ruling, or dismissal decision has occurred. The next step would therefore depend on whether an authorized institution starts either legal procedure.

Constitutional review depends on judges being able to decide cases without improper political pressure. It also depends on public acceptance of the court’s authority. When immunity and leadership become political battlegrounds, citizens may question whether decisions reflect law or changing party interests. That can damage institutional legitimacy even before any legal outcome.

A practical example would be prolonged conflict over the president’s status. If competing authorities dispute who may lead the Tribunal, hearings, administration, or publication of decisions could face uncertainty. Repeated attempts to use immunity procedures as political weapons could also make judges more cautious or deepen institutional divisions. These effects are risks, not reported outcomes.

The headlines show an active dispute involving Szejna and Święczkowski, alongside separate reporting about the Tribunal and other politicians. The forward impact depends on whether the parties follow formal procedures and accept their results. Lawful, transparent decisions could contain the conflict; competing claims could prolong paralysis and weaken confidence.