Russia hijacks Ukrainian drones, sends them to Baltic states; Kyiv apologises again

Ukrainian drones may have strayed into Lithuanian airspace during an operation against Russian military targets. Ukraine said Russian electronic warfare could have diverted them. The incident matters because drones entering NATO airspace can create safety risks and trigger military responses.

Ukraine’s foreign ministry apologised to Lithuania for disruption, risks and concern. The ministry said it would share information with Lithuanian partners. Estonia later reported that a suspected Ukrainian drone entered from Russia and was shot down by a Romanian NATO fighter. Latvia also issued an air threat alert after a drone entered its airspace.

The article links these events to Russian GPS spoofing and jamming. Baltic officials said the interference intensifies during Ukrainian drone attacks. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia said Ukraine had the right to strike Russian military targets, but stressed that Ukraine had not been authorised to launch attacks from their territories.

GPS spoofing means broadcasting false GPS signals to confuse navigation systems. A receiver normally uses signals from satellites to calculate its position and guide movement. If false signals appear more convincing, the receiver can accept an incorrect location or timing. That matters because drones may follow faulty instructions without immediately recognising the problem.

The article says Russian electronic warfare may have diverted Ukrainian drones during operations against Russian military targets. Lithuania’s regulator also reported GPS spoofing and jamming during the incident involving a suspected drone over Estonia. Spoofing changes what the navigation system believes, while jamming disrupts or blocks signals. Both can interfere with autonomous or remotely guided aircraft.

The reported interference has become systemic around the Baltic region, according to Lithuania’s communications regulator. It can affect aviation surveillance and mobile networks as well as drones. Most modern passenger aircraft and major airports have backup navigation tools, but interference still creates operational risks and can complicate safe airspace management.

Lithuania’s communications regulator reported a major expansion of Russia’s GPS-spoofing network near Kaliningrad. Darius Kuliesius said the number of antennae rose from three in early 2025 to 36. The reported growth matters because a larger network can support wider and more persistent interference across nearby countries and airspace.

Kuliesius said the capability could reach a radius of up to 450 kilometres from Kaliningrad. Lithuania estimated that range by analysing disturbances in aviation surveillance ADS-B transmissions. A regulator’s map showed possible effects across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, most of Poland, and parts of Finland, Sweden and Belarus, as well as the Baltic Sea.

The regulator described the interference as systemic and permanent Russian provocation against European security. Russia has denied accusations of electronic interference. The article says spoofing and jamming intensify during Ukrainian drone attacks, so the network could remain especially important during future strikes and airspace incidents.

The incursions created military, transport and public-safety consequences. Estonia’s military said a Romanian NATO fighter shot down a suspected Ukrainian drone after it entered Estonian airspace. Latvia told residents near the Russian border to stay indoors and summoned NATO Baltic Air Policing jets after another drone entered its airspace.

The Latvian alert caused train suspensions, the stoppage of national examinations for ninth-grade students and grocery-shop closures, according to local media. GPS interference affected aviation surveillance and disrupted a Spanish military jet and a plane carrying Ursula von der Leyen near Kaliningrad. It also degraded mobile phone networks near the exclave.

Everyday services were affected as well. Online bus schedules in Klaipeda stopped working during interference spikes because they relied on GPS bus tracking. Passenger aircraft and major airports generally have alternative navigation tools, but the incidents show that spoofing and jamming can still create wider disruption and safety concerns.

Kaliningrad is a Russian exclave on the Baltic coast, located between NATO members Lithuania and Poland. The article describes it as heavily militarised. Its location matters because equipment based there can influence nearby airspace, communications and navigation across national borders, making local interference a regional security issue.

Lithuania’s communications regulator said Russia had expanded GPS-spoofing infrastructure in Kaliningrad from three antennae in early 2025 to 36. The reported signals could reach up to 450 kilometres. A regulator’s map indicated possible interference across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, most of Poland, and parts of Finland, Sweden and Belarus.

This geography places NATO airspace and civilian services close to reported Russian electronic activity. Lithuania said interference began occasionally around the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius and has become systemic. Russia denies accusations of electronic interference, but repeated disruptions and drone incidents have increased concern about Baltic security and airspace management.

NATO and the Baltic countries responded with military action, alerts and investigations. A Romanian NATO fighter shot down a suspected Ukrainian drone over Estonia after it entered from Russia. NATO confirmed the incident and said an investigation was under way. It also said the alliance was ready and able to respond to potential air threats.

Latvia issued an air threat alert, told residents near the Russian border to stay indoors and summoned NATO Baltic Air Policing jets. The alert disrupted trains, examinations and grocery shops. Estonia and Latvia blamed Moscow for the incursions while saying Ukraine had the right to strike Russian military targets. They stressed that Ukraine could not launch attacks from their territory.

Ukraine promised to share information with Lithuania, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine would send experts to Latvia. Future protection can include air-policing patrols, fighter interception, missile engagement when necessary, public warnings, investigations and improved coordination during drone attacks.

GPS-based navigation uses signals from satellites to calculate an aircraft’s position, speed and timing. Aircraft can use that information for route guidance. ADS-B transmissions also provide aviation surveillance data, helping systems observe an aircraft’s reported position. These signals matter because modern transport depends on accurate, continuous location information.

Jamming overwhelms or blocks genuine signals, while spoofing broadcasts false ones that navigation equipment may interpret as real. A drone could then receive a misleading position and follow an incorrect route. Lithuania’s regulator estimated interference by analysing disturbances in ADS-B transmissions. The article also says mobile networks and bus tracking were affected near Kaliningrad.

Most modern passenger aircraft and major airports have several navigation tools if GPS fails. However, backup systems do not prevent every consequence. Pilots, air-traffic services and civilian operators may still face degraded information, extra workload or disrupted services. The Baltic incidents show why even partial interference can create safety and operational concerns.