‘Hybrid warfare’: Taiwan drives away 16 Chinese ships

Taiwan confronted 16 Chinese vessels during coordinated operations around its main island and Pratas, also called Dongsha. The group included coastguard, research, and fishing vessels. Taiwan said the operations amounted to maritime harassment and were intended to create a false impression that China had jurisdiction. The incident matters because it tested who could enforce rules in disputed waters without a declared military attack.

Taiwan’s coastguard said its vessels took forceful action immediately and effectively neutralised the threats. It reported that some Chinese vessels entered Taiwan’s restricted waters. Four of the vessels were fishing boats involved in simultaneous operations. Taiwan said Beijing was trying to unilaterally alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The confrontation reflects broader pressure around Taiwan. China claims Taiwan, Pratas, and nearby waters, while Taiwan rejects those claims. Taiwan also used water cannon against a Chinese recreational fishing vessel near Pratas on October 1, showing how repeated encounters can escalate tensions.

Hybrid warfare is a broad strategy that mixes military and nonmilitary pressure to influence an opponent. It can include law-enforcement patrols, information activity, research missions, and civilian operations. The aim may be to change conditions gradually while avoiding a clear armed attack. In this article, Taiwan used the term for coordinated maritime operations involving Chinese coastguard, research, and fishing vessels.

Different vessels can perform different functions. Coastguard ships can patrol, challenge other vessels, and enforce the operator’s claimed rules. Research vessels can collect information and maintain a visible presence. Fishing boats can enter contested areas and make the activity look civilian. Together, they can support a claim of regular access or jurisdiction. The article does not identify a separate task for every vessel involved.

Taiwan said the operations created a false impression of Chinese jurisdiction and attempted to alter the status quo. China has increased maritime pressure in recent months. The pattern matters because repeated, mixed-purpose activity can normalise one side’s presence without an announced military operation.

The maritime pressure has expanded sharply compared with the previous year. Taiwanese official data recorded 244 Chinese coastguard, scientific research, and other ships around Taiwan’s main island in July. The comparable figure for July the previous year was 58. That is an increase of 186 vessels, or more than four times the earlier total. The figures show a sustained rise, not just one isolated encounter.

The pressure continued into August. Taiwan detected 152 vessels during the first 21 days of that month. Most were Chinese Coastguard ships, but fishing boats and research vessels also took part. China’s naval warships were present around Taiwan nearly every day, although the article counts those separately from the other vessels.

These figures indicate a broader and more frequent maritime presence. They do not by themselves prove that every vessel took part in harassment. They do show that Taiwan must respond to many more encounters and that China can maintain regular activity around disputed waters. Continued increases could produce more confrontations.

China and Taiwan both assert authority over Taiwan and Pratas, but the article does not explain the historical origins of those competing claims. It states that Beijing claims Taiwan and Pratas as part of China’s territory. It also says China asserts jurisdiction over surrounding waters, while Taipei rejects those claims. The immediate reason for the dispute is therefore disagreement over sovereignty and control.

That disagreement affects daily activity at sea. If China treats the waters as under its jurisdiction, its coastguard and other vessels can appear to enforce Chinese rules. Taiwan treats the claims as unacceptable and confronts vessels it considers to be operating in restricted waters. The same patrol can therefore be presented by one side as enforcement and by the other as harassment.

The conflict remains unresolved in the article. China has long threatened to use force to regain control of Taiwan, while recent activity has focused on coastguard, research, fishing, and naval presence. Repeated operations can make competing claims more visible and increase the chance of further confrontations.

Control of waters is demonstrated not only through combat. It is also shown by who patrols, challenges vessels, applies rules, and responds when others enter an area. Repeated activity can make a disputed claim appear normal in practice. This matters because control on the water can shift gradually, even while both sides avoid declaring war.

The article gives a clear example. Chinese coastguard, research, and fishing vessels operated simultaneously around Taiwan and Pratas. Taiwan said some entered restricted waters and described the activity as an attempt to create a false impression of jurisdiction. Taiwan confronted the vessels and said it took forceful action to neutralise the threats. It also fired water cannon at a Chinese recreational fishing vessel near Pratas on October 1.

More patrols mean more opportunities for encounters and enforcement actions. China’s recorded presence rose from 58 vessels in July the previous year to 244 in July. If this pattern continues, routine confrontations could intensify pressure and raise the risk of an incident, even without a formal military attack.

Each vessel type can contribute differently to a maritime dispute. Coastguards are law-enforcement forces that patrol and challenge ships. Fishing boats can enter contested waters as civilian actors. Research vessels can maintain presence and conduct scientific work. Naval warships provide overt military power and can deter or intimidate, although their presence may carry greater escalation risks.

The article reports coordinated activity by Chinese coastguard, research, and fishing vessels around Taiwan and Pratas. Four fishing boats took part in simultaneous operations that Taiwan called hybrid warfare. Taiwan’s coastguard confronted the vessels and said some entered restricted waters. China also deploys warships around Taiwan nearly every day, but those ships are counted separately from the other vessels.

These roles can operate together. Civilian or law-enforcement vessels can create frequent contact, while naval ships remain a separate military backdrop. The article does not assign a specific mission to every vessel. It does show that China’s maritime pressure involves several types of ships and that Taiwan responds through its coastguard.

Territorial waters generally mean a coastal state’s near-shore maritime zone, where it claims sovereignty subject to international law. Restricted waters are areas where entry or particular activities are limited, such as for security or other stated reasons. The article does not define Taiwan’s exact boundaries or the legal basis for its restrictions. It reports that some Chinese vessels reportedly entered waters Taiwan considers restricted.

Maritime jurisdiction determines which country claims the power to set rules, patrol, inspect, or remove vessels. In this case, China claims Taiwan, Pratas, and nearby waters. Taiwan rejects those claims and confronted Chinese vessels operating around the islands. China’s coastguard presence can therefore appear to Beijing as enforcement, while Taipei describes the same activity as harassment or an attempt to create a false impression of jurisdiction.

Because both sides assert authority, enforcement becomes politically significant. Every patrol or removal action can reinforce one side’s claim and challenge the other’s. The article shows this dynamic through Taiwan’s response to 16 vessels and its earlier use of water cannon near Pratas.