Zelensky: Ukrainian forces have liberated more territory since start of fall than Russia has captured

Zelensky’s claim is a comparison of battlefield control, not a complete wartime balance sheet. He says Ukrainian forces have liberated more territory since the beginning of fall than Russian forces have captured. The article does not provide exact areas, dates, or independent measurements. It presents the claim as part of Ukraine’s active-defense narrative.

The concrete places named include Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, Oleksievo-Druzhkivka, Orikhiv, Novopavlivka, Novoandriivka, and Velykomykhailivka. Zelensky says all are under Ukrainian control. He also says Ukraine is defending areas near Kramatorsk and holding positions in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The current picture is contested and localized. Ukraine is repelling assaults and infiltrations around Dobropillia while applying pressure elsewhere. Russia still attacks and captures positions, but Zelensky says its gains have been smaller than Ukraine’s recoveries since fall. Independent maps would be needed to verify the comparison.

No precise amount is stated. Zelensky gives only a relative comparison: since the beginning of fall, Ukrainian troops have liberated more territory than Russian forces have captured. The report does not specify square kilometers, the number of settlements involved, or the exact start date used for “fall.” Therefore, neither side’s total gain or loss can be calculated from the article.

In battlefield analysis, territory is commonly measured with geospatial maps. Researchers compare the front line on different dates, identify settlements or zones that changed control, and estimate the area between those lines. They also separate confirmed control from contested ground, because fighting can make ownership unclear.

That method matters here because a claim about “more territory” depends on definitions and evidence. A narrow advance may shift a front line without capturing a settlement. The article reports Ukrainian positions and operations, but it does not provide the maps or measurements needed to independently verify Zelensky’s comparison.

In military strategy, active defense combines protection with purposeful attacks. A force tries to hold important positions, stop enemy assaults, and use raids, counterattacks, fires, or other operations to disrupt the attacker. The goal is to prevent a breakthrough while improving the defender’s position. It differs from simply waiting behind fixed lines.

The article gives a practical example. Zelensky says Ukrainian troops are repelling Russian attempts to storm positions near Dobropillia and thwarting infiltrations. He also reports results from the Airborne Forces and the Third Army Corps, calling these operations part of Ukraine’s active defense. Other units are applying pressure across the front.

The approach can preserve key ground while forcing Russia to spend personnel and equipment on attacks. It may also create chances for local Ukrainian advances. However, the article does not describe the size, timing, or results of every operation. Its central point is that Ukraine is defending positions while taking offensive action where possible.

The article places the wider fighting in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, and Oleksievo-Druzhkivka are in or associated with the Donetsk battle area, while Orikhiv is in Zaporizhzhia. The other named settlements are also described as front-line locations. These geographic identifications use established geographic knowledge; the article itself mainly supplies the regional context.

Zelensky says Dobropillia is facing Russian storm attempts and infiltrations. He lists several settlements as under Ukrainian control and says forces are defending areas near Kramatorsk. He also says Ukrainian troops are defeating Russian forces near Zaporizhzhia, 20 kilometers away rather than five.

Such areas matter because control of towns, roads, and approaches can affect movement, resupply, observation, and defensive depth. Holding them may protect larger urban areas and limit an attacker’s routes. The report does not provide detailed maps, troop numbers, or infrastructure assessments, so the precise military value of each location is not established here.

Positions near cities can have consequences beyond the immediate trench line. They may shield urban areas, secure roads and supply routes, and provide observation over likely attack corridors. Holding them can also prevent an opponent from gaining a launching point for operations against a larger city. These effects depend on terrain, logistics, and the strength of each side.

In the article, Zelensky says Ukrainian forces are defending areas near Kramatorsk. He also says they are defeating Russian forces 20 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia, correcting a Russian claim that placed them only five kilometers away. He describes the Ukrainian front as strong and says several nearby places remain under Ukrainian control.

If Ukraine keeps these positions, Russia may face greater difficulty advancing toward the cities and concentrating attacks. Ukraine may retain room for local counterattacks and long-range operations. If positions are lost, pressure on urban defenses and supply networks could increase. The article reports no confirmed future outcome or detailed operational plan.

Airborne and assault units are generally used for rapid attacks, raids, and efforts to seize ground. Mechanized units combine armored vehicles with infantry, giving troops protection and mobility. Drone units observe the battlefield, adjust fires, attack targets, and conduct long-range strikes. Special-operations and intelligence units gather information, target vulnerable points, and support precision missions.

The article names the Airborne Forces, the Third Army Corps, the 82nd Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, and the 128th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade. It also praises the 59th and 414th Separate Brigades of Unmanned Systems. Zelensky credits the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center with delivering long-range strikes into Russian territory.

Together, these capabilities can create a rapid information-and-strike cycle: detect a target, plan an action, attack, and adjust based on results. The article also thanks the SSU, Special Operations Forces, DIU, and FISU for precision. It does not specify each unit’s individual mission in every operation.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, control of Ukrainian territory has changed repeatedly through advances, retreats, and contested fighting. This article does not provide a historical map, a starting percentage, or a complete account of those changes. It reports only Zelensky’s current claim that Ukraine has liberated more territory than Russia captured since the beginning of fall.

The report names Ukrainian-controlled places including Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, Oleksievo-Druzhkivka, Orikhiv, Novopavlivka, Novoandriivka, and Velykomykhailivka. It also describes defensive fighting near Kramatorsk and operations near Zaporizhzhia. These examples show that control is assessed locally, settlement by settlement and position by position.

Small advances can matter in a long war because they may improve defensive depth, disrupt routes, protect cities, or force an enemy to redeploy. Repeated local gains can also affect morale and bargaining positions. Their wider value depends on whether they can be held and supported. The article offers no forecast beyond saying Ukraine’s front is strong.