Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali resume talks with ECOWAS after withdrawal from regional bloc

Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, acting through the Alliance of Sahel States, resumed formal discussions with ECOWAS. They agreed to work toward a cooperation framework rather than immediately deciding whether the three countries will rejoin the regional bloc. The talks matter because the countries face shared insecurity across porous borders.

The parties will establish joint thematic working groups. These groups are expected to design a framework cooperation agreement. The meeting in Dakar was the first official ministerial-level engagement between the sides, although discussions had continued since January 2025. Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister Karamoko Traore led the AES delegation, while Senegal’s Foreign Minister Cheikh Niang led ECOWAS representatives.

Both sides highlighted fraternity, mutual respect, openness, good neighbourly relations and national sovereignty. The article does not say that membership will be restored. The immediate outcome is structured dialogue, which could help preserve communication and support practical cooperation against cross-border armed groups.

ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, is a regional organisation that traditionally emphasises democratic governance and cooperation among West African countries. It also supports practical coordination on shared challenges, including intelligence-sharing, border controls and security responses. Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali were previously members.

The Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, is the alliance formed by those three Sahel countries after growing disagreements with ECOWAS. The AES is not the same institution as ECOWAS. It represents their decision to pursue a more independent security and political course, while distancing themselves from France and strengthening ties with Russia.

The difference is therefore both institutional and political. ECOWAS is the broader regional bloc, while the AES is a smaller alliance of three countries. The article says the AES states left ECOWAS in January 2025, but it does not describe the AES’s full institutional structure.

ECOWAS currently has 12 member countries. That total reflects the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali in January 2025 from the regional bloc. The Alliance of Sahel States has three members: Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. These totals clarify the institutional divide created by the three countries’ departure.

The article names the three AES countries and says they officially left ECOWAS. It does not provide a numerical count for either organisation. The current ECOWAS total therefore comes from established information about the bloc after the withdrawals, while the AES total follows directly from the three countries identified in the article.

The difference matters because ECOWAS is the larger regional institution, while the AES is a smaller alliance pursuing a separate political and security path. Renewed talks could create cooperation between them, but the article says it remains unclear whether membership restoration is being considered.

Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali left ECOWAS in January 2025 after growing disagreements with the regional bloc. They formed the Alliance of Sahel States and chose a more independent political and security direction. Their withdrawal reflected a widening gap between the three countries and ECOWAS’s approach to regional governance and cooperation.

The article gives several signs of that change. The AES countries have distanced themselves from France and strengthened ties with Russia. They also want to manage their security and political affairs through their own alliance. The article does not identify one single event as the cause of their departure, so the reasons should be understood as a broader political dispute.

Leaving ECOWAS created difficulties because the countries still face the same armed groups and porous borders as their neighbours. Their decision therefore produced a tension between political independence and the practical need for shared intelligence, border controls and coordinated security action.

If the AES countries remain outside ECOWAS systems, regional counterterrorism efforts could become less coordinated. Armed groups do not stop at national borders, so separate security approaches can make it harder to track fighters, share warnings and respond quickly. The result could be more room for jihadist groups, separatists and other armed actors to operate.

The article points to Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 as a clear sign of collapsed regional cooperation. It also says strained relations with Nigeria risk weakening intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism operations. Those gaps matter as violence threatens northern Benin and Togo, while Nigeria faces Boko Haram, ISWAP, banditry and kidnappings.

The current talks may help limit that damage, but their outcome is uncertain. Working groups could restore practical communication without resolving every political dispute. Unless intelligence, border and military coordination improve, cross-border armed groups may continue exploiting weak state presence and porous borders.

The AES countries and ECOWAS could cooperate through a flexible arrangement that does not require immediate membership restoration. Their first step could be regular ministerial dialogue, supported by joint thematic working groups. This would keep communication open while respecting the AES countries’ stated concerns about sovereignty and political independence.

Practical cooperation could focus on intelligence-sharing, border controls and coordinated responses to armed groups. The parties could exchange threat information, coordinate patrols near shared borders and create emergency contact channels. They could also work with affected neighbours on specific security problems, especially as violence threatens northern Benin and Togo. These measures would address shared risks without settling every political dispute.

The Dakar meeting offers a starting point because both sides accepted fraternity, mutual respect, openness and good neighbourly relations as principles. The article does not say which mechanisms will be adopted. It does say the working groups will develop a cooperation framework, so their design will shape what becomes possible.

Armed groups spread across borders because the Sahel has porous frontiers and areas where state presence is weak. They can move between countries, exploit local grievances and attack places where security forces have limited reach. Al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked groups have used these conditions during more than a decade of insurgency in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

A national response cannot fully address a threat that moves through several countries. Intelligence from one country may reveal an attack planned in another. Shared border controls can restrict movement, while coordinated military responses can prevent armed groups from escaping across frontiers. The article also links violence to northern Benin and Togo, showing the danger of geographic spread.

Regional institutions provide channels for this cooperation. ECOWAS has traditionally supported regional coordination, but relations with the AES countries have weakened. The renewed talks could help rebuild practical links. Without them, shared threats may continue while intelligence and security responses remain divided.