Hormuz Is Turning Shipping’s Fuel Bill Into a Supply Crisis

Bunker fuel is the marine fuel used to power a vessel’s engines. Ships need different grades because fuels vary in sulfur content, composition, price, and availability. HSFO means high-sulfur fuel oil, while VLSFO means very-low-sulfur fuel oil. Low-sulfur marine gasoil is another option mentioned in the article.

The difference matters during a supply disruption. A vessel cannot automatically replace one grade with another at every port. Fuel must meet the ship’s requirements and be available in a usable form. The article reports that Fujairah had improved VLSFO availability, while HSFO and low-sulfur marine gasoil remained limited.

This creates a fragmented market. Singapore’s VLSFO lead time reached 11–18 days, while HSFO required 11–17 days. Some Omani ports offered marine gasoil in one to two days. Thus, the right grade, location, and delivery window matter as much as total fuel production.

The market lost or redirected at least 2.8 million tons of fuel monthly across three pressures. Vitol estimated that HSFO flows through Hormuz, including Iranian supplies, were at least 800,000 tons per month below February levels. Attacks on Russian refineries removed an additional estimated one million tons monthly.

North Asian refiners then drew more than one million tons of HSFO for November processing. That volume was not necessarily destroyed, but it was pulled toward refinery use instead of remaining available for shipping. Together, these changes sharply reduced the product pool competing for marine demand.

The total is an approximate lower bound because the North Asian figure is above one million tons and the Hormuz reduction is at least 800,000 tons. Low-sulfur fuel received some support from higher exports from China and Nigeria. However, that support did not offset the broader pressure on supply and distribution.

A global fuel surplus does not guarantee local bunker availability. A vessel needs the correct grade at a specific port and within a commercially workable window. Fuel may be committed to another buyer, awaiting export, stranded behind a disrupted route, or unavailable because barges cannot deliver it.

Fujairah shows the distinction. Its heavy distillate and residual stocks averaged 4.72 million barrels in early October, about 5% above September’s average. Yet bunker availability remained severely constrained. Those barrels were not all uncommitted, immediately deliverable marine fuel. Specifications, ownership, and export obligations limited what buyers could obtain.

This means practical shortages appear before storage tanks are empty. Refinery output, blending components, storage, export capacity, and barge availability must align. A ship needing fuel within three days cannot solve its problem with fuel that takes two weeks to book or cannot meet its grade requirements.

Longer booking windows make fuel procurement a scheduling problem, not just a pricing problem. If a vessel cannot secure the required grade before departure, it may need to wait, alter its plan, or search for another supplier. The article says Singapore VLSFO lead times reached 11–18 days, while HSFO required 11–17 days.

The commercial mechanism is simple. A ship needing fuel within three days cannot absorb a two-week booking window. Delayed replenishment can disrupt voyage schedules and force owners to commit cash earlier or hold more working capital. Higher bunker prices add a direct cost, while uncertainty makes route planning less reliable.

The damage reaches beyond one delayed refueling. When supply cannot accommodate the schedules built into shipping contracts, entire trading routes become less profitable. The article warns that the crisis threatens working capital and the profitability of routes, even before ports completely run out of fuel.

Fujairah recovered part of its fuel-import flow, but the recovery remained incomplete. Reuters reported that third-quarter fuel oil imports rose to 2.6 million tons from 845,000 tons in the second quarter. That improvement showed the system could adapt, but it did not restore earlier reliability.

September imports were still approximately half February’s level. In addition, the security situation around Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman continued to expose incoming supplies to renewed interruption. More cargo arriving over a quarter does not guarantee that the right fuel will be available when a vessel needs it.

The latest assessments underline the problem. VLSFO availability in Fujairah had improved, while HSFO and low-sulfur marine gasoil remained limited. Stocks can also include committed, unsuitable, or non-deliverable product. Therefore, Fujairah’s partial import recovery has not created dependable bunker availability across grades.

When one port or grade becomes difficult, owners can examine other locations and compatible fuel grades. The article identifies improved VLSFO availability in Fujairah, while key Omani ports had a more comfortable marine gasoil position. One supplier there quoted a one-to-two-day delivery window.

Singapore remains another sourcing location, although its lead times were long: 11–18 days for VLSFO and 11–17 days for HSFO. Low-sulfur supplies also received support from increased exports from China and Nigeria. These sources may broaden options, but they do not automatically solve a vessel’s immediate requirement.

The practical choice depends on the ship’s fuel needs, delivery deadline, and route. Switching grades or ports requires suitable availability and coordination. The article presents a geographically fragmented market, not a reliable substitute network. Supply pressure also varies by grade, while renewed disruption around Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman could affect alternatives.

Refinery capacity creates the product, but it is only the first link. The fuel must be blended into the required grade, stored, assigned or released, and moved through export and shipping systems. Barge availability then determines whether it can reach the vessel. Every link must work within the ship’s schedule.

The article’s Fujairah example shows the mechanism. Stocks averaged 4.72 million barrels in early October, about 5% above September’s average, yet local bunker availability remained severely constrained. Product specifications, ownership, and export obligations determined how much could actually be purchased. Fuel held for another customer was not an immediate option.

Commercial decisions also affect the buffer. Strong backwardation encouraged blenders to keep fewer stocks and blend closer to delivery. That reduced exposure to falling prices but increased sensitivity to delayed components. Working capital and contractual commitments therefore shape practical supply, alongside physical infrastructure.