CBI flags lapses at NTA in NET-UG paper leak probe, suggests key measures to govt

The CBI identified weaknesses in both question preparation and physical security at NTA. These weaknesses mattered because confidential material could be accessed, copied, or moved without strong separation and monitoring. The agency described them as procedural lapses, not evidence of criminality by NTA officials.

Some experts worked across multiple stages, including setting, moderating, vetting, translation, and back-translation. Experts could access final question sets. In the confidential section, they received blank sheets for rough work. The CBI said P V Kulkarni used small chits to record all 135 chemistry questions and answer options. CCTV coverage also lacked a dedicated live-monitoring control room.

The former Okhla office retained footage for only 20–25 days, although confidential work ended April 7 and the investigation began May 12. The CBI recommended full CCTV coverage, longer backups, restricted access, separate experts for each stage, and stronger entry and exit checks.

The Central Bureau of Investigation, or CBI, is described in the article as a premier anti-corruption agency. It investigated alleged irregularities and a paper leak in the May 3 NEET-UG examination after the Union education ministry complained on May 12. It can also recommend policy or procedural changes when investigations reveal loopholes.

The National Testing Agency, or NTA, is the agency responsible for the examination process discussed here. Its work included arranging question writing, moderation, vetting, translation, back-translation, and confidential paper-related operations. The relevant confidential work took place at its former office in the NSIC building in Delhi’s Okhla.

In this case, the CBI examined how the papers were prepared and protected. It submitted an assessment report to the Union ministry of education. The report recommended systemic reforms, although the CBI did not find criminality by any government officer posted at NTA.

The CBI reported that subject experts could reach the final question sets during the NEET-UG preparation process. The article does not quantify how many experts had this access, but it says some experts participated in more than one stage. That created a broad access path to highly sensitive material.

The process included item writing, moderation, vetting, translation into vernacular languages, and back-translation into English. Experts were involved in these steps, and the CBI said access to final sets should have been restricted. It also found that CCTV footage at the former NTA office in Okhla was backed up for only 20–25 days.

This short retention period affected the investigation. Confidential work finished on April 7, but the investigation began on May 12. By then, relevant footage was unavailable, making it difficult to reconstruct what happened during the critical period.

Separating roles limits how much confidential information any one person can see. When experts work across stages, they may encounter final questions, translations, and answer options more than once. That can create more opportunities for copying or sharing material. It also makes responsibility harder to trace if a leak occurs.

The CBI said experts received blank sheets for rough work, and P V Kulkarni allegedly used small chits to record all 135 chemistry questions and answer options. The Okhla office had no dedicated CCTV live-feed control room, and footage was retained only 20–25 days. There were also no frisking or metal-detector checks at the confidential section.

These gaps could make a leak easier to carry out and harder to investigate. Investigators may lack video evidence, entry records, or physical-control evidence. The CBI therefore recommended complete coverage and backups for the entire period, alongside tighter access controls.

The CBI’s main charge sheet named three external subject experts as the alleged source of the leak. They were P V Kulkarni, a retired chemistry professor; Manisha Mandhare, a botany teacher; and Manisha Havaldar, a physics teacher. The main charge sheet named 13 individuals in total.

The article links these experts to the question-setting process. It says experts could access final question sets, and that Kulkarni allegedly wrote all 135 chemistry questions and answer options on small chits supplied for rough work. A supplementary charge sheet filed on Wednesday also did not name an NTA official.

The CBI’s report identified procedural weaknesses at NTA but did not find criminality by any government officer posted there. That distinction matters: an institution’s controls can be inadequate without investigators concluding that its officials were criminally responsible. The report focused on systemic reforms and corrective measures.

A safer process would divide responsibility so no individual sees more confidential material than necessary. Different experts could handle item writing, moderation, vetting, translation, and back-translation. Access to final sets could be limited to specifically authorized personnel, with records showing who accessed them and when.

The article gives several concrete safeguards. It says different experts should ideally be assigned to every stage. NTA should provide complete CCTV coverage, maintain backups for the entire period, and create live-feed monitoring for confidential areas. Physical checks could include frisking and metal detectors when experts enter or leave. Rough-work materials should also be controlled and collected.

These measures would not merely deter leaks. They would create evidence if something went wrong. Continuous records could show movements and activity, while separated roles could narrow the possible source. The CBI sent these recommendations to the Union ministry of education for systemic reform.

Chain of custody protects an examination by documenting the movement and handling of confidential material. It answers basic questions: who accessed a paper, when they accessed it, what they did, and what safeguards were present. This matters because high-stakes results depend on confidence that questions remained protected before the exam.

The CBI’s findings show why that record matters. Experts could work across stages and access final sets. Some received blank sheets, while the confidential section lacked frisking and metal-detector checks. CCTV at the former Okhla office was retained for only 20–25 days, so investigators could not fully reconstruct events after the investigation began.

A strong chain of custody would combine separated roles, restricted access, controlled materials, entry and exit checks, and continuous CCTV records. These controls could reduce opportunities for leaks and preserve evidence if one occurred. The CBI recommended such systemic changes after its investigation.