India needs more fighter jets. It cannot build them fast enough

A fighter squadron is a military unit operating a group of fighter aircraft. In India’s air force, each squadron contains about 18 active aircraft and three or four reserves. Squadrons are the basic operating units used to organise pilots, aircraft and missions.

India wants 42 fighter squadrons because its existing force is shrinking. The MiG-21 has already retired, and Jaguar, MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 squadrons are scheduled to leave service. Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh said India needs two new squadrons each year to keep its numbers from falling.

That target is difficult to reach. India would need 36 to 40 new fighters annually, according to Singh, and possibly more. HAL aims to build 24 Tejas fighters each year, while Rafale deliveries from France could provide additional aircraft. The goal is to prevent retirements from outpacing new inductions.

India’s air force needs about 36 to 40 new fighter aircraft each year to add two squadrons annually. Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh gave that figure while warning that the service faces a critical shortage. Producing at that pace would help replace ageing aircraft and move India toward 42 fighter squadrons.

HAL’s stated target is 24 Tejas fighters annually. Compared with the 36-to-40-aircraft requirement, that is 12 to 16 fewer jets each year. The gap is substantial because each IAF squadron has about 18 active aircraft, with several more held in reserve.

The Rafale programme could narrow the difference. India has cleared 114 Rafales from France, and deliveries could bring annual arrivals closer to 32 or 36 aircraft when combined with Tejas production, according to Gurcharan Singh Bedi. Even then, timely deliveries and controlled retirements remain essential.

The Tejas Mark 1A was delayed because several essential parts of the programme did not arrive or mature on schedule. Its F404 engines come from US manufacturer GE Aerospace, the programme’s only engine supplier. Late engine deliveries slowed aircraft completion and testing.

The aircraft also needed radar, weapons and software systems to work together. Their integration took longer than planned, followed by exhaustive operational evaluations of the avionics suite. These steps were necessary before the fighter could enter service. GE delivered three engines in August and four in September, bringing the total to 14, with 20 due by year-end.

Induction is now expected to begin within one or two months, after being delayed by 2½ years. The episode shows why certification, systems integration and dependable component supply matter as much as assembling the airframe. Production cannot expand smoothly while those elements remain late.

When older aircraft retire faster than new fighters arrive, India’s air force loses squadron strength. It has fewer aircraft available for training, patrols and combat operations. The result is a thinner force at a time when Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh says India already faces a critical fighter shortage.

The MiG-21 fleet’s final 36 aircraft retired last September. Six Jaguar squadrons are due to leave service between 2028 and 2031. Three MiG-29 squadrons and three Mirage 2000 squadrons are also expected to retire through the mid-to-late 2030s. India is even buying nine retired British Jaguars for spare parts.

New Tejas and Rafale aircraft could slow the decline, but timing is crucial. HAL’s 24-jet annual target is below the 36-to-40 aircraft requirement. If production and imports arrive late, retirements will reduce the number of active squadrons before replacements are ready.

Buying 114 Rafales from France would give India another stream of modern fighter deliveries. Gurcharan Singh Bedi said the Rafales, combined with Tejas production, could bring annual deliveries close to 32 or 36 aircraft. That would narrow the gap between current output and the 36-to-40 fighters needed each year.

The Rafale deal could also involve Indian industry. Local reports indicate Dassault Aviation agreed to 50-to-60 per cent “Make in India” content, technology transfers and integration of Indian weapons and systems. Final talks on price and production arrangements remain pending, however.

The purchase would not eliminate the need for Tejas production. India’s fighter requirement is continuous, while ageing Jaguars, MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s are still scheduled to retire. Domestic output must therefore expand and remain reliable. Bedi said genuine acceleration depends on HAL meeting or beating 24 aircraft annually, timely Rafale deliveries and retirements not outpacing inductions.

Modern fighter programmes depend on more than factory floor space. Test pilots must evaluate how the aircraft flies and how its systems perform. Certification staff must prove that the design meets required safety and operational standards. Systems-integration engineers must make radar, weapons, software and other equipment work together.

The Tejas Mark 1A illustrates this mechanism. Its engines arrived late, but radar, weapons and software also took longer to integrate. The aircraft then underwent exhaustive operational evaluations of its avionics suite. Those activities delayed induction even though the airframe itself could be produced.

The article describes certification, integration and engine supply as recurring bottlenecks. It does not quantify shortages of test pilots or specialist staff. More broadly, production can rise only when these expert activities keep pace with manufacturing. Otherwise, completed aircraft may wait for approval, testing or usable systems before joining operational squadrons.

A defence-aerospace supply chain is the network that provides the parts, systems, software and services needed to build and operate military aircraft. It can include engines, radar, weapons, avionics and the companies that assemble and test them. Every major link must arrive and work on schedule.

Tejas shows the risk of relying on one crucial supplier. GE Aerospace is the programme’s only engine supplier, and late F404 deliveries contributed to the Mark 1A’s 2½-year delay. GE shipped three engines in August and four in September, bringing deliveries to 14, while 20 were due by the end of the year. Without engines, aircraft cannot complete testing or enter service.

A single supplier concentrates risk. Any production or delivery problem can affect the whole programme rather than one component. The article links engine supply with certification and systems-integration delays. India’s future output therefore depends on reliable suppliers, faster coordination and strong execution by HAL and the government.