Congress’s post-truth politics of distrust, undermining democracy: Rajnath Singh

Post-truth politics is a style of public debate in which false propaganda, distorted narratives, and emotional appeals gain more influence than verifiable facts. It matters because citizens may form opinions from repetition and outrage rather than evidence. Democratic institutions can then lose credibility without proof of wrongdoing.

Ordinary political disagreement is necessary for better policymaking. Parties can challenge decisions, demand accountability, and present different evidence. In the article, the dividing line is clear: dissent is described as democracy’s lifeblood, but it is not a licence for falsehoods. Unsupported allegations repeated and amplified become a campaign to manufacture distrust.

The article applies this idea to India’s EVM debate, electoral-roll revision, and criticism of the Election Commission. It argues that some opposition groups repeat claims despite Supreme Court findings supporting electoral safeguards. The wider danger is lasting public cynicism, where truth becomes difficult to distinguish from political messaging and trust in constitutional institutions continues to erode.

The article identifies three connected areas of dispute: Electronic Voting Machines, the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls, and the Election Commission of India. These are not separate technical arguments alone. They concern the reliability of voting, the accuracy of the voter list, and confidence in the constitutional body responsible for elections.

EVM allegations claim that voting machines can be manipulated. The SIR controversy concerns an exercise to check and revise electoral rolls. The article says the Supreme Court linked that exercise directly to accuracy, completeness, and integrity. Criticism of the Chief Election Commissioner extends the dispute to the institution overseeing the process.

The article presents these controversies as part of a wider campaign by some opposition groups to discredit electoral institutions. It says the Supreme Court rejected unsupported EVM claims and upheld the legitimacy of electoral-roll revision. The continuing challenge is to allow criticism while preventing claims without evidence from weakening confidence in elections.

The article says Congress governments retained executive control over appointing the Chief Election Commissioner for nearly seven decades. That description presents appointment power as concentrated within the government rather than shared through a broader institutional process. The issue matters because appointment arrangements can influence public confidence in an election authority’s independence.

The article says the government changed this system by institutionalising the appointment process. It created a multi-member Selection Committee rather than leaving the process under executive control alone. Crucially, the committee includes the Leader of the Opposition. That inclusion is presented as a formal mechanism for wider participation in selecting the Election Commission’s top official.

The article places this change within a broader dispute over the ECI’s credibility. It argues that attacks on the Chief Election Commissioner overlook the appointment reform and that Congress’s institutional record was not consistently protective of independence. The practical implication is that transparent, shared selection is meant to strengthen trust in election administration.

An Electronic Voting Machine is a device used to record votes electronically instead of using paper ballots. A Special Intensive Revision is a systematic exercise to review and update electoral rolls. The article treats both as safeguards, but they protect different parts of the election process: EVMs concern how votes are recorded, while SIR concerns who is correctly listed as a voter.

The Supreme Court’s 2024 judgment rejected demands to return to paper ballots and dismissed EVM challenges based only on suspicion and doubt. In 2025, the Court said electoral-roll integrity is foundational to free and fair elections. It described accuracy, completeness, and integrity as integral to the Election Commission’s constitutional mandate.

Supporters therefore see EVMs and SIR as complementary. Reliable machines help record votes, and reliable rolls help ensure the electorate is properly identified. The article says the revision had a direct and rational connection to a credible electoral process. Its broader point is that protecting eligible voters also requires preventing inaccurate or incomplete rolls.

Democracy depends not only on elections being conducted properly, but also on citizens trusting the institutions that conduct them. When allegations are repeated without cogent material or data, they can make proven procedures appear illegitimate. The article warns that manufactured distrust can erode public confidence in constitutional institutions.

The EVM controversy illustrates the mechanism. The Supreme Court said repeated challenges based on suspicion and doubt were “execrable and undesirable” and rejected demands to return to paper ballots. Yet, according to the article, opposition groups continued repeating the allegations. Repetition can amplify a claim even after judicial examination has found no supporting basis.

The consequences extend beyond one election. Citizens may question results, officials may face sustained attacks, and political disagreement may become demagoguery. The article links such campaigns to anarchy and to efforts to hide repeated electoral rejection. Its forward concern is that truth could become not only the first casualty, but the final casualty of political contests.

For EVMs, the article says the Supreme Court examined challenges several times before its 2024 Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India judgment. The Court rejected demands to return to paper ballots and criticised repeated claims based on suspicion and doubt without cogent material or data.

For electoral rolls, the article cites a 2025 judgment with the same case title. The Court affirmed that electoral-roll integrity is foundational to free and fair elections. It found that accuracy, completeness, and integrity were part of the Commission’s constitutional mandate, and that the reasons for revision had a direct and rational connection to a credible process.

The article does not identify a separate Supreme Court judgment directly deciding the broad independence of constitutional institutions. Instead, it discusses a multi-member appointment committee including the Opposition Leader and recalls amendments that limited judicial scrutiny during the Emergency. These details frame independence as an institutional safeguard, not as a holding the article attributes to a particular case.

Constitutional checks matter because executive power can become unchecked when no institution can review, question, or limit it. Judicial review tests government action against constitutional requirements. Legislative oversight examines executive decisions through representatives. An independent election authority protects the process by which citizens choose those representatives.

The article shows why these safeguards matter through history and current elections. It says the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951 curtailed freedom of speech after a Supreme Court judgment. During the Emergency, amendments made the Emergency proclamation non-justiciable and placed the Prime Minister’s election beyond judicial scrutiny. The article also highlights appointment reform involving the Opposition Leader.

These examples show that institutions need real powers, not merely formal titles. The article presents the Election Commission’s credibility as essential while defending electoral safeguards against unsupported attacks. The forward implication is twofold: governments must respect institutional limits, and political critics must challenge decisions with evidence rather than undermine the institutions that protect democratic accountability.