Beyond air power: How long-range missiles are reshaping the rules of war

Long-range stand-off missiles are weapons launched from a distance against targets far beyond the firing position. They can be rockets or cruise missiles. Unlike manned aircraft, they do not need to fly over or near the target to release weapons. This matters because air defences are designed to detect and attack approaching aircraft.

The United States has used long-range one-way cruise missiles as opening weapons since the First Gulf War in 1991. The missiles help “kick open the door” for later operations. The US Army’s Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, has a stated range of 500 km. Iran has also used long-range rockets and missiles to hit targets beyond its borders.

The main advantage is reduced exposure. A missile can be launched from safer positions, while the crewed aircraft stays farther away. Satellites, unmanned systems and sensors extend battlefield awareness, helping commanders find targets for these distant strikes. The article presents this combination as a major change in modern warfare.

The systems span a wide distance band. The Fatah-I is identified in the question as having a 70–140 km range, while the US Army’s Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, is stated in the article to reach 500 km. That means the PrSM’s maximum range is more than three times the upper end of the stated Fatah-I range.

The article gives the PrSM figure directly and describes Pakistan’s Fatah-I and Fatah-II as conventional strike systems. It does not specify their ranges in the supplied text. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan used missiles, rockets and drones against Indian military installations, including a reported Fatah-II launch aimed at the National Capital Region.

These ranges show why missile forces can influence targets far beyond the immediate battlefield. Shorter-range systems can support regional strikes, while weapons reaching hundreds of kilometres can threaten bases and other targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. The spread also strengthens escalation options below the nuclear threshold.

Long-range missiles reduce risk because the launch platform can remain away from the target area. Manned aircraft must enter airspace near their targets to drop bombs or fire weapons. That exposes pilots and aircraft to ground-based air defences, even when friendly forces control much of the sky.

The United States has repeatedly used long-range one-way cruise missiles as an opening weapon. The tactic began in the First Gulf War in 1991 and was later used in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Second Gulf War, Libya, Syria and Iran. These missiles helped open campaigns before, or alongside, further operations.

Air superiority therefore improves freedom of action but does not make crewed aircraft risk-free. Stand-off weapons add distance between aircraft and defenders. The Iran conflict showed this logic clearly: the United States and Israel had air superiority and still used long-range strikes against ground targets. The missiles reduced aircraft exposure while preserving the ability to hit targets.

Iran’s missile arsenal helped preserve its military relevance after its antiquated air force was destroyed in the conflict’s early days. Decades of sanctions had constrained Iran’s broader military capabilities. Long-range rockets and missiles partly compensated by allowing Tehran to attack targets beyond its borders.

The article describes Iran striking countries across the Persian Gulf. Those attacks gave it a credible role in the conflict, even though it lacked an effective air force. Missiles provided a way to project power and defend sovereignty without relying on aircraft that could no longer operate effectively. Their value came from range and survivability rather than air superiority.

This illustrates how missile forces can let a weaker air arm remain strategically important. Iran could still threaten distant targets and impose military pressure. The article also places Iran alongside China and Russia, which maintain extensive rocket forces capable of delivering conventional and strategic weapons. Missiles therefore helped Iran punch above its weight.

During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, long-range strikes became a central tool for both sides. India used missiles against terror targets in Muridke and Bahawalpur. As the conflict continued, it struck Pakistani airbases from Bholari in the south to Sargodha and Nur Khan in the north.

India’s strikes helped bring the Pakistani air force to the ground and contributed to Pakistan suing for peace. Pakistan answered with missiles, rockets and drones aimed at Indian military installations across Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. The article says almost all of these weapons were intercepted or neutralised.

A prominent incident involved a Fatah-II reportedly aimed at the National Capital Region. It was brought down over Sirsa, about 240 km northwest of New Delhi, on May 10, and debris was recovered. The contrasting results exposed Pakistan’s difficulty in penetrating Indian defences and intensified its search for conventional strike options.

Pakistan created the Army Rocket Force Command, or ARFC, after Operation Sindoor revealed weaknesses in its conventional missile forces. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced it on August 13, 2025. The command brings conventional rocket and missile units from several formations and specialist detachments under one organisation.

Previously, surface-to-surface missiles were managed mainly with a strategic, nuclear purpose, while conventional rocket artillery remained under the army’s artillery arm. Different units could answer to different commanders depending on deployment. Centralisation is intended to connect senior decision-makers, including the army chief, the rocket force commander and field units more directly.

A shorter chain of command could allow faster decisions and more concentrated attacks. The ARFC is also meant to provide conventional options between battlefield contact and the nuclear threshold. The article says Pakistan lacked those options during the conflict and could not wrest control of escalation from India. The new command seeks to close that gap.

An escalation ladder describes rising levels of military action. At one end is ordinary, ground-based contact fighting. At the other are nuclear weapons. Between them, states need usable conventional options. Long-range missiles matter because they can deliver powerful strikes without automatically requiring nuclear use.

Pakistan’s experience during Operation Sindoor exposed what the article calls a void in the conventional, non-contact kinetic domain. India used Brahmos to strike 11 airfields, while Pakistan’s conventional systems were not employed until international pressure forced de-escalation. That left Islamabad without enough conventional rungs and unable to control the pace of escalation.

The ARFC is intended to fill this space with missiles retrofitted with conventional warheads. A central command could make those weapons easier to employ quickly and in concentrated attacks. The article presents this as an effort to regain balance, not simply as a hardware change. It changes how Pakistan might manage pressure below the nuclear threshold.