Prior nod to probe bribe demand by cop not needed under anti-graft law: SC

The Supreme Court held that prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was unnecessary to investigate the alleged bribe demand by constable Tejaram. The ruling matters because it defines the limits of protection given to public servants before an inquiry or investigation begins.

The court said Section 17A applies when an alleged offence relates to a public servant’s official decision or recommendation. Tejaram was accused of demanding money, allegedly on behalf of the superintendent of police. The bench said receiving or demanding a bribe is not part of protected official decision-making.

Justices S V Bhatti and N V Anjaria dismissed Tejaram’s appeal against the corruption charge. The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court’s refusal to stop the case. Tejaram’s defence was that investigators lacked prior approval, but the court rejected that argument.

Tejaram was allegedly asked to demand ₹1.5 lakh. The money was allegedly sought on behalf of the superintendent of police, according to a complaint by fellow constable Devendra Kumar. This amount became the central figure in the bribery allegation.

Devendra Kumar sent an email complaint on April 22, 2021. The records identified Tejaram as posted at the deputy superintendent of police’s office in Sirohi, Rajasthan. An FIR was later registered under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.

Tejaram was arrested on September 1, 2021. The Supreme Court did not decide that the allegation was proved at trial in this ruling. It decided that the investigation and charge could proceed without prior approval under Section 17A, because the alleged conduct was a bribe demand rather than an official decision.

Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act concerns an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences related to recommendations made or decisions taken by public servants during official duties. Its purpose is to protect public servants from prosecution or investigation based merely on protected official decision-making.

The Supreme Court focused on the section’s wording, especially “discharge of official functions or duties.” It said the section applies only when there is a decision or recommendation by the public servant under investigation, and that act occurred while performing official duties. The court said offences such as receiving bribes fall outside this scope.

The provision therefore does not automatically cover every allegation against a public servant. In Tejaram’s case, the alleged demand was treated as separate from an official decision or recommendation. The court consequently found no need for prior Section 17A approval before investigation.

The court distinguished the acts because Section 17A protects decisions or recommendations made while a public servant performs official duties. It does not protect every act connected with a public office. This distinction prevents the approval requirement from becoming a blanket barrier to corruption investigations.

In Tejaram’s case, the allegation was that he demanded ₹1.5 lakh on behalf of the superintendent of police. The court said alleged bribery is not the same as making an official recommendation or taking an official decision. Earlier judgments also identified receiving bribes and other offences as outside Section 17A’s scope.

This reasoning allowed the investigation to proceed without prior approval. The court still recognised that lawmakers intended Section 17A to protect public servants from prosecution linked to genuine official decisions. Its protection depends on the nature of the alleged act, not simply on the accused person’s public-service status.

When no prior approval under Section 17A is required, investigators can begin or continue probing an alleged bribe demand without waiting for that approval. The Supreme Court’s ruling removes that procedural objection where the alleged conduct is not linked to an official decision or recommendation.

Tejaram argued that the investigating agency had not obtained the required approval. The court rejected the argument because he was accused of demanding ₹1.5 lakh, allegedly for the superintendent of police. It held that receiving or demanding a bribe is outside Section 17A’s protected area.

The immediate consequence was that Tejaram’s case continued. The Supreme Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the charge framed under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The ruling does not itself establish guilt, but it allows the corruption case to move forward under the ordinary legal process.

Devendra Kumar sent an email complaint on April 22, 2021, alleging that Tejaram demanded ₹1.5 lakh on behalf of the superintendent of police. An FIR followed on June 4, 2021, under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.

Tejaram was arrested on September 1, 2021. Prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was granted on December 8, 2023. A chargesheet was then filed on January 19, 2024, moving the case toward trial.

A special court in Pali framed a charge under Section 7 on September 12, 2024. Tejaram challenged that order, but the Rajasthan High Court dismissed his revision petition on March 26, 2025. The Supreme Court then dismissed his appeal and upheld the charge.

India’s Prevention of Corruption Act balances two concerns. Section 17A protects public servants from investigation linked to decisions or recommendations made while performing official duties. The court said this safeguard reflects the legislature’s intention to prevent public servants from being prosecuted over protected official work.

At the same time, the protection is limited. Section 17A does not apply automatically to every allegation against a public servant. The Supreme Court said the required link is a decision or recommendation made in the discharge of official functions. Offences such as receiving bribes fall beyond that protection, so they can be investigated without prior approval.

Tejaram’s case illustrates the balance. His alleged demand was treated as bribery, not official decision-making. The charge therefore survived the approval challenge. The ruling preserves a safeguard for official judgment while allowing corruption cases to proceed when the alleged conduct is separate from that judgment.