Tiger Shroff shooting reveals a shift in Mumbai’s underworld gunmen: The outsiders

The October 18 firing at Tiger Shroff’s car in Juhu is presented as the latest case raising questions about who recruits gunmen and directs attacks. Police arrested three men in Kota, Rajasthan. The case matters because the arrests have not yet answered the larger questions behind the shooting.

Media reports identified two arrested men as being from Haryana and the third as a Bihar native living in Mumbai. However, reported details about their backgrounds varied. The article does not provide confirmed information about their individual roles in the shooting.

Police are still trying to establish how the men were recruited, who arranged the attack, and whether it was connected to an established gang. Those unanswered questions reflect the wider challenge of tracing attacks when alleged gunmen, intermediaries, and organisers may be separated from one another.

In this article, “outsiders” refers to alleged attackers recruited from outside Mumbai and sometimes outside Maharashtra. They are brought in for specific jobs rather than emerging from the neighbourhoods and criminal circles traditionally linked to the city’s gangs. The distinction matters because it changes how gangs can organise violence.

The 1992 J J Hospital shooting provided an early example. Subhash Singh Thakur, from Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh, was among the main accused. He later said Dawood associate Sunil Sawant summoned him to Mumbai and arranged accommodation in Juhu. The attackers also conducted reconnaissance before the shooting.

Later reports described Abu Salem recruiting young men from Azamgarh. Some reportedly had clean records, received money, weapons, and target photographs, and returned home after the job. This model separates the shooter from the local gang structure and makes the attack harder to connect to Mumbai’s established networks.

Three alleged attackers were arrested after the firing at Tiger Shroff’s car. Police arrested them in Kota, Rajasthan. The arrest location does not itself establish where the men came from or who organised the attack.

Media reports identified two of the three as being from Haryana. They identified the third as a native of Bihar who was living in Mumbai. The article cautions that reported details about their backgrounds varied, so those descriptions should not be treated as a complete, confirmed account of their identities or roles.

The regional spread is important because the article examines the use of men from outside Mumbai in underworld operations. Even after the arrests, police had not established how the men were recruited, who arranged the firing, or whether it was linked to an established gang. Those questions remain central to the investigation.

The article describes recruitment as a managed process rather than a simple local gang connection. Men from other states could be brought to Mumbai, given temporary support, and assigned a particular operation. This matters because the people carrying out an attack may not know the full structure behind it.

In the J J Hospital case, Subhash Singh Thakur said Dawood associate Sunil Sawant summoned him to Mumbai and arranged accommodation in Juhu. The attack also involved reconnaissance. Reports about Abu Salem described a more structured method: recruits with clean records allegedly received money, weapons, and photographs of their targets.

After the job, some recruits were reportedly sent home. Intermediaries could pass instructions without exposing senior figures directly. The Tiger Shroff case shows why these mechanisms remain relevant: police are still trying to determine how the arrested men were recruited and who arranged the attack.

Mumbai’s traditional gunmen were closely tied to the city’s underworld. They often came from the same neighbourhoods and criminal networks as gang leaders. Their loyalties could shift between local gangs, but their careers developed inside Mumbai’s established rivalries and relationships.

Maya Dolas began with Ashok Joshi’s gang in the eastern suburbs before becoming associated with the Dawood Ibrahim network. David Pardesi was from Tilak Nagar in Chembur and was described as a 20-year-old shooter in the 1983 killing of Amirzada Nawab Khan. These examples show local roots and continuing gang connections.

The newer model relies more on outsiders recruited for particular jobs. Abu Salem was reportedly linked to recruits from Azamgarh who received support, completed an assignment, and went home. This creates greater distance between the shooter and the gang’s local leadership, complicating investigations and attribution.

Using outsiders can give a gang deniability and reduce the visible trail leading back to its core members. A recruit from another state may have no established Mumbai criminal profile. An intermediary can pass instructions, arrange lodging, and provide resources without exposing the alleged organisers directly.

The article describes Abu Salem’s reported model in clear terms. Young men with clean records were allegedly brought to Mumbai, given money, weapons, and photographs of targets, then sent home after the job. In the J J Hospital case, Subhash Singh Thakur said he was summoned to Mumbai and housed in Juhu. The attack also included reconnaissance.

These arrangements can fragment knowledge of an operation. A shooter may know the target but not the wider plan. A handler may know the assignment but not the gang’s full leadership. That separation helps explain why police still seek answers about recruitment and direction in the Tiger Shroff case.

Organized crime generally means repeated illegal activity coordinated by a group or network for power, money, or control. In the article, Mumbai’s underworld grew around smuggling, illicit liquor, protection rackets, and extortion before gang rivalries increasingly involved shootings. The core issue is coordination, not merely one isolated act.

A decentralized network can divide an operation among recruiters, intermediaries, handlers, and shooters. The article describes recruits receiving money, weapons, and target photographs, while others arranged accommodation or summoned them to Mumbai. Abu Salem’s reported model sent recruits home after a job, keeping them distant from alleged directors.

This separation can make responsibility harder to trace. The shooter may not know who ultimately ordered the violence, while an intermediary may conceal the wider network. The Tiger Shroff investigation illustrates the problem: police arrested three men but had not established recruitment, direction, or an established gang connection.