Inside the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage from within Russia

Sabotage is secret action designed to damage military assets, disrupt operations, or weaken an opponent. It can involve surveillance, hiding components, supplying information, or helping prepare attacks. These actions matter because they target Russia’s war-making capacity from inside the country.

The operations are “anti-Putin” because Ivan and Foma say they oppose more than the invasion of Ukraine. They also oppose President Vladimir Putin’s regime. Ivan describes helping locate military sites and places to hide drone components. He sent a video that apparently showed explosives hidden near a Russian military airfield.

Ivan believes the regime could fall if Russia loses the war. He says their actions aim to speed up that outcome. The article does not verify his claims, but Ukrainian authorities acknowledge the broad tactics. They say coordinated drone attacks and secret agents form part of Ukraine’s strategy against legitimate targets inside Russia.

Ivan and Foma are Russian men whom the BBC describes as working for Ukraine’s military intelligence service, the GUR. Their accounts are rare because covert activity inside Russia is difficult to observe and verify. Both men use assumed names in the article, and the GUR confirms they work for the agency.

Ivan claims to operate inside Russia. He says he surveils military sites, finds hiding places for drone components, and helps prepare attacks on military assets. Foma lives in exile in Poland. He says he trains undercover volunteers in Russia and provides intelligence about senior officers being considered as targets.

Foma stresses that his volunteers do not carry out attacks. Their role is surveillance and information gathering. He says the GUR suggests targets, while his network checks them independently. The GUR warns that it cannot know the full picture, and Ivan’s handler says he is not sure anyone can be trusted.

The reported targets are mainly linked to Russia’s military operations. Ivan says he surveilled military sites and helped locate places to hide drone components. He claims these preparations supported attacks on strategic bombers, munitions factories, and other military assets inside Russia.

Foma describes a wider intelligence picture. His database reportedly maps storage warehouses, military units, and the homes of generals. It also includes the residences of strategic-bomber pilots who shell Ukraine. His volunteers receive files containing a proposed target’s photograph, personal details, vehicle information, and other identifying data.

The key mechanism is preparation. Surveillance helps identify where people and equipment are, while hidden components can later be assembled into drones. Foma says his network also tracks digital footprints and checks GUR-suggested targets independently. The article cannot verify the men’s specific activities, although Ukrainian authorities acknowledge the general tactics.

The article gives two estimates for the networks’ size. Foma says about 300 to 500 Russians may be doing this kind of work for Ukraine. He separately describes a smaller operational network of about three dozen people spread across Russia, Ukraine, and other parts of Europe.

The larger estimate may include people working across multiple networks and roles. The smaller group includes volunteers inside Russia and people outside the country who provide logistical support. That support can include tracking targets’ digital footprints. Foma says his network is divided between surveillance, training, and assistance.

Neither figure can be independently confirmed. The men and the GUR limit what they reveal, and the article says their activities cannot be verified. The GUR also acknowledges that it cannot know the full picture. Ivan’s handler adds to the uncertainty by saying he is not sure anyone can be trusted except himself.

Sabotage could affect Russia in two connected ways. Damage to bombers, munitions factories, warehouses, or other military assets could disrupt the equipment and supplies used in the war. Surveillance of commanders and officers could identify people whom Ukrainian intelligence considers important targets.

Ivan says a drone assembled from hidden components could destroy an object worth many millions of dollars. Foma says his network supplied intelligence on Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov before Sarvarov was assassinated in Moscow. Foma insists his volunteers do not carry out attacks, but their information can support later operations.

The political effect is less certain. Ivan believes Putin’s regime might fall if Russia loses the war, and says their actions aim to speed that process. The article does not establish that sabotage will produce this result. It shows instead how attacks and intelligence could create military disruption, fear among senior officers, and greater pressure on the leadership.

Ukraine’s stated policy is not to officially admit or claim responsibility for targeted attacks. This keeps the government from publicly attaching itself to individual assassinations while the war continues. It also leaves uncertainty around who ordered or carried out particular operations.

The article gives a clear example of that policy. After Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov was assassinated in Moscow, Foma admitted that he had supplied Ukrainians with intelligence about him. Yet Ukraine did not officially claim the killing. Separately, a Ukrainian intelligence officer previously admitted to the BBC that Ukraine was behind the killing of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov in December 2024.

The policy means public evidence remains limited. The GUR confirms that Ivan and Foma work for it, but says it cannot know the full picture. Their claims and the broader operations therefore remain difficult to verify, even when Ukrainian authorities acknowledge the general strategy.

Military intelligence works by collecting and checking information about people, locations, equipment, and routines. Informants can provide insider knowledge. Surveillance teams can observe targets directly. Covert networks can connect those reports with maps, databases, and digital traces. This matters because information can reveal weak points before any operation begins.

Foma describes volunteers receiving target files with photographs, personal details, vehicle information, and other data. They then follow a senior military official without carrying a phone. His network maps warehouses, military units, and officers’ homes. Ivan describes a different role: locating military sites and hiding places for drone components.

The distinction between intelligence and attack is important. Foma says his volunteers only surveil and check targets. He stresses they never conduct the attacks themselves. Ivan claims to have supported preparations for drone attacks. The article cannot verify these activities, but Ukrainian authorities acknowledge using secret agents and coordinated attacks inside Russia.