Russia seeks a summit bypassing Ukraine – Arkady Moshes compares it to the 19th-century Congress of Vienna

Putin proposed a summit where the leaders of Russia, China, and the United States would discuss Ukraine’s future. Ukraine would not be invited. The meeting could take place alongside the APEC summit in China on 18–19 November. The United States has not agreed to it.

The proposal was reportedly made during Putin’s phone call with Donald Trump on 9 October. Its format matters because it treats Ukraine’s fate as an issue for great powers to settle. Senior researcher Arkady Moshes called this “19th-century great-power diplomacy,” recalling the Congress of Vienna.

The proposal may benefit Russia even without a meeting. If held, Putin could present himself as one of three major world leaders. If rejected, he could still tell Trump that he was ready to negotiate. Moshes says such an agreement could not by itself end the war, because Ukraine and Europe would not simply accept a dictated settlement.

The summit would bring together three countries: Russia, China, and the United States. Moshes says this reflects Putin’s view that only these three are truly significant powers. In that framework, other actors, including Europe, are pushed outside the central decision-making group.

The proposed arrangement is therefore more than a possible peace meeting. It is also a statement about how international politics should work. Putin would be placing Russia alongside Washington and Beijing, even though Russia depends heavily on China and seeks its approval for major initiatives.

The meeting has not been accepted by the United States, so the three-power format remains only a proposal. If it happened, Putin could claim a place among three global leaders. If it did not, Russia could still use the proposal to show Trump that it was willing to discuss the war directly.

APEC is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which brings economies from the Asia-Pacific region together for cooperation, especially on trade and economic issues. The source identifies its next relevant meeting as taking place in China on 18–19 November. It does not describe the forum’s agenda in greater detail.

The proposed political meeting could use the APEC gathering as a setting because senior leaders would already be in the same country at the same time. Putin reportedly suggested holding the Russia-China-United States summit alongside that event. This would make a separate meeting easier to arrange logistically, while giving it a highly visible international backdrop.

The plan remains uncertain. The United States has not agreed to the meeting, and Ukraine would be excluded from the proposed format. Even if the leaders met, Moshes argues that their agreement alone would not end the war, because Ukraine and Europe would still have to respond.

The Congress of Vienna was a great-power meeting held in 1814–1815. Europe’s leading states divided the continent into spheres of influence and decided the futures of many smaller countries without those countries taking part. It represents an older model of international politics, centered on powerful states managing the continent.

Moshes compares that model with Putin’s proposed summit. Russia, China, and the United States would discuss Ukraine’s fate, while Ukraine would be excluded. Europe would also be outside the proposed group. The key mechanism is control by major powers: decisions affecting smaller or less powerful countries are made without their consent.

The comparison highlights why the proposal is politically significant beyond the war itself. It suggests a return to influence-based diplomacy rather than inclusive negotiations. Moshes says a settlement could not simply be dictated to Ukraine or Europe. As long as Europe supports Ukraine, he believes Ukraine will continue fighting.

A country’s political future is normally shaped by its people and institutions, not imposed by outsiders. Excluding Ukraine from talks about Ukraine would challenge that principle directly. It would treat the country as an object of great-power bargaining rather than as a participant with its own interests, consent, and ability to accept or reject a settlement.

The proposed format also excludes Europe, even though European governments support Ukraine and would be affected by the war’s outcome. Moshes compares this to the Congress of Vienna, when great powers decided smaller countries’ futures without their participation. The mechanism is simple: those with military and diplomatic power make the decision, while those most affected are denied influence.

Moshes says such an agreement could not automatically end the war. Ukraine might continue fighting, especially while Europe provides support. The proposal also signals, in his view, that Putin is not ready for political dialogue with Europe. That could deepen divisions over European security rather than settle them.

China plays a central enabling role in Moshes’s assessment. He rejects the idea that Beijing is neutral in the war. The source says Russia could not have continued fighting without China. China also benefits geopolitically when the war weakens and divides the West, while observing Western strengths, weaknesses, and disagreements.

China’s role includes more than direct political support. The war lets Beijing study how Europe and the United States cooperate, how united the transatlantic relationship is, and how Western resources are used. The conflict also ties down those resources. This gives China information and strategic advantages while Russia remains dependent on Chinese acceptance.

Putin’s inclusion of China therefore signals dependence as well as partnership. Moshes says Putin effectively acknowledges that China’s approval is necessary for initiatives of this kind. A three-power summit would give China influence over any proposed settlement and would place Russia’s diplomacy within a framework Beijing accepts.

A deal among the United States, China, and Russia could claim to settle Ukraine’s future, but it would lack the participation of those directly affected. Moshes says Ukraine and Europe could not simply be handed such a solution. If Ukraine rejected it, the fighting could continue. European support would remain decisive because it helps Ukraine sustain its resistance.

The agreement could also reshape European security without European governments having a seat at the table. Russia’s message would be that Europe is not a necessary negotiating partner. China could gain from a weakened and divided West, while observing disagreements between Europe and the United States. The proposed format would therefore give strategic weight to exclusion itself.

The article does not predict a definite outcome, and the United States has not accepted the meeting. Still, Moshes argues that great-power agreement alone cannot determine the war. Its consequences would depend on whether Ukraine and Europe accepted the arrangement and continued acting together.