Beyond fighter jets: What India needs to prepare for the wars of tomorrow

Standoff weapons are missiles and other munitions designed to hit targets from a distance. They matter because aircraft can attack while staying farther from hostile air-defence systems. This reduces the chance that enemy missiles or guns can threaten the attacking aircraft.

The article gives two examples. Longer-range air-to-air weapons can engage enemy aircraft at greater distances. Air-to-ground weapons can let pilots attack targets without entering as deeply into an adversary’s defensive envelope. The key mechanism is distance: the weapon travels toward the target while the launching aircraft remains relatively safer.

This changes how India should judge fighter strength. More aircraft are useful, but their value rises when they carry longer-range weapons. The article highlights a lighter BrahMos for smaller fighters, the Rudram anti-radiation missile programme and longer-range Astra air-to-air missiles. Together, these efforts could extend the reach of India’s existing and future aircraft.

India’s fighter fleet has fallen below 30 squadrons, while the cited benchmark is approximately 42.5. The basic arithmetic shows a gap of more than 12.5 squadrons. Since the current strength is described only as “below 30,” the precise shortfall cannot be calculated from the article.

The figure matters because squadrons represent operational fighter capacity. A smaller fleet can limit how many aircraft India deploys, protects, rotates and keeps available for different fronts. Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh therefore called for induction of 38–40 fighters annually as the Indian Air Force rebuilds its strength.

The article also adds an important qualification. The benchmark was described as authorised by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, rather than the Cabinet Committee on Security. More fighters remain necessary, but Gupta argues that numbers alone are insufficient. Aircraft also need longer-range weapons, unmanned support and protected bases.

Buying more fighters increases fleet size, but weapons determine what those aircraft can safely accomplish. The article argues that adding aircraft without improving their munitions may deliver less military advantage than expected. Better missiles can extend reach, reduce exposure and make every available fighter more capable.

For example, longer-range air-to-air weapons can threaten enemy aircraft at greater distances. Air-to-ground standoff weapons can strike targets while the pilot stays farther from defensive systems. The mechanism is straightforward: the missile covers more of the distance, while the aircraft avoids flying deep into the adversary’s defensive envelope.

This does not make new fighters unnecessary. India’s fleet remains below 30 squadrons against a benchmark of about 42.5. But the article presents the lighter BrahMos, Rudram anti-radiation missile and longer-range Astra as ways to strengthen existing and future aircraft. The result could be a more balanced force built around aircraft, weapons and protected infrastructure.

When inexpensive drones or missiles force an opponent to launch costly interceptors, the defender can face an uncomfortable economic imbalance. The attacker may spend relatively little to create pressure, while the defender spends much more to destroy each incoming weapon. Repeated attacks can therefore impose costs even without a large conventional air force.

The article points to Ukraine, Iran and the Houthis as examples of forces using missiles and drones against stronger opponents. It specifically highlights attacks on infrastructure and the problem of costly interceptors being used against cheaper weapons. The mechanism is not simply destruction; it is the financial and operational burden placed on the defender.

This does not prove that drones or missiles can replace manned aircraft in every mission. Gupta said India has too much at stake to rely exclusively on drones, loitering munitions or missiles. India instead needs affordable, layered defences that match different threats while combining manned and unmanned capabilities.

Layered air and missile defence means using several types of systems rather than expecting one shield to defeat every threat. The article says different weapons require different interception options. This matters because threats vary in speed, range and cost, while defensive responses also differ in capability and expense.

Gupta discussed lower-level interception capabilities, Akash, the S-400 and indigenous interceptor development. These systems represent different parts of a broader defensive response. The key mechanism is matching the defence to the incoming weapon, especially when destroying a cheap drone with a very costly interceptor creates an economic imbalance.

The stakes reach beyond military bases. Gupta linked protection against missile attacks to civilian morale and economic confidence. India therefore needs defences that are both effective and affordable across several threat types. Layering can help preserve military installations, support national stability and prevent one weak point from carrying the entire burden.

India’s airpower planning should not focus primarily on Pakistan, according to Gupta. China must shape the longer-term assessment because India may face a more powerful and sophisticated adversary. That changes the question from meeting an immediate regional requirement to building a force able to remain effective against a stronger opponent.

The article connects this assessment to more than fighter numbers. India must consider the combination of aircraft, longer-range weapons, unmanned systems, layered air defences and protected bases. Fighters may need to operate from infrastructure that can withstand enemy strikes, while their missiles must threaten targets without requiring deep penetration into hostile defences.

This wider perspective affects both scale and design. India’s fleet is below 30 squadrons against a benchmark of about 42.5, but simply closing that gap may not be enough. The country must rebuild numbers while improving reach, survivability and defensive depth. China therefore becomes central to judging how sophisticated the overall capability must be.

Deterrence is the ability to prevent an attack by making its likely costs unacceptably high. In the article, that does not come from fighter numbers alone. It comes from a connected force that can threaten attackers, absorb or defeat attacks and keep operating under pressure.

Fighters can provide airpower, while longer-range missiles let them strike from safer distances. Drones and loitering munitions can add affordable pressure, and layered defences can protect military sites, civilians and economic confidence. Protected bases matter because aircraft are less useful if enemy strikes can disable their infrastructure. Submarines are not mentioned in the article; generally, their survivable capabilities can strengthen deterrence.

India therefore needs a mix suited to the target and adversary. The article rejects relying exclusively on manned aircraft, drones or missiles. Its central idea is integration: aircraft, weapons, unmanned systems, defences and bases must work together so an adversary doubts that an attack would succeed or remain affordable.