What Is Behind Bangladesh’s Continuing Law and Order Crisis?

Bangladesh’s continuing law and order crisis means the state is struggling to prevent violence and maintain trusted policing after the 2024 revolutionary mobilization. Political violence, mob attacks, murders, extortion, clashes, and armed incidents have all raised concern. The crisis matters because policing is central to everyday safety and to a peaceful democratic transition.

The scale is visible in recent figures. From July to September, 183 political-violence incidents killed 17 people and injured 1,227. Mob-violence incidents rose from 98 to 137 in one year. Deaths from mob violence increased from 51 in 2023 to 197 in 2025. Registered murder cases rose from 3,023 in 2023 to 3,786 in 2025.

The weakness has deep roots. Police stations were attacked, political patronage damaged professionalism, and reform has stalled. Local power networks also broke apart after the Awami League’s fall. Unless policing becomes more professional and trusted, violence and competition over resources may continue weakening Bangladesh’s transition.

Political and mob violence has become widespread since the 2024 upheaval. Between July and September this year, HRSS recorded 183 political-violence incidents. They killed 17 people and injured 1,227. The number of incidents was 12 percent higher than during the same period last year. These figures show that unrest is not limited to isolated confrontations.

Mob violence also expanded sharply. Recorded incidents rose from 98 to 137 over the comparable period. Ain o Salish Kendra reported that mob-violence deaths increased from 51 in 2023 to 128 in 2024 and 197 in 2025. Police data also show registered murder cases rising from 3,023 in 2023 to 3,786 in 2025.

The pattern includes more than street clashes. Reports also mention extortion, armed violence, and political conflict. Together, these figures point to a broad law and order problem during Bangladesh’s difficult transition from Hasina’s system to a new democratic ecosystem.

When police stations stop functioning, communities lose a nearby institution for responding to confrontations, recording crimes, and maintaining everyday order. The article presents this breakdown as a major reason Bangladesh has struggled to stabilize after 2024. Rising violence then makes ordinary policing more dangerous, especially when officers no longer have strong political backing.

After Hasina’s fall, attacks left 450 of Bangladesh’s 639 police stations nonfunctional. About 30 percent of police positions were temporarily vacant. The interim regime worked to restore stations and the law-and-order system, but distrust remained. The article also reports extortion, political clashes, armed violence, and growing murder cases.

The article does not provide a separate measure of economic losses or detailed community impacts. It does show why economic activity becomes contested: markets, transport terminals, construction contracts, land, and other resources were tied to local political networks. Their collapse produced competition for control, adding pressure to public safety and economic life.

Hasina’s fall left policing weak because earlier governments had used the police to suppress dissent instead of building an independent professional service. The article describes a colonial policing culture inherited by East Pakistan and Bangladesh. Political connections and corruption shaped advancement, so loyalty to the government often mattered more than hard work or professional skill.

The system fractured after the August 2024 collapse. Public anger targeted law enforcement, and attacks made 450 of 639 police stations nonfunctional. Around 30 percent of police positions were temporarily vacant. Officers who had relied on political backing then faced greater risks when intervening in confrontations. People also guarded streets as the wider system broke apart.

Rebuilding trust therefore required more than reopening stations. Uniforms and the police logo were changed twice, but these symbolic steps had little effect. A Police Reform Commission member said the BNP government had not acted on reform recommendations. This left the force operationally strained and publicly distrusted.

The police played a central role in political repression under Hasina’s regime. The article reports nearly 10,000 opposition activists arrested before the 2024 national election. Politically motivated cases, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings became recurring tools. Police authorities were reportedly involved in almost 708 enforced-disappearance cases, while some officers threatened women with rape.

Political control shaped careers inside the force. The article says 349 officers received awards, including one recognized for arresting photographer Shahidul Alam after his criticism of the government. This rewarded service to the regime and weakened the idea that police advancement should depend on professional work. The force therefore became closely associated with repression and government loyalty.

That history explains today’s distrust. After Hasina fell, people directed public anger at law enforcement, and police stations were attacked. A survey found 52 percent disapproved of police performance, compared with 45 percent who approved. The police received the lowest approval among surveyed public institutions.

Rival groups fought over these assets because they were the foundations of local political and economic influence. During the Awami League’s 15 years in power, access was concentrated in organized networks connected to the ruling party. These networks controlled or influenced transport terminals, markets, construction contracts, land, and other resources. Their hierarchy made local authority relatively clear.

The fall of the Awami League disrupted that arrangement. People and groups previously excluded from local power structures began competing for positions and resources once held by the old networks. The article describes a contest for a new owner of the local throne. Without the former negotiated hierarchy, rival claims could produce political clashes, extortion, and armed violence.

This helps explain why the law and order crisis extends beyond police stations. It is also a struggle over who controls economic opportunities and local authority. The article does not identify a settled replacement system. Until new arrangements become clear and legitimate, competition can continue feeding instability.

The rule of law means public authority operates through established laws rather than personal power, political favoritism, or arbitrary repression. Police institutions are essential because they apply those rules in daily life. They must be independent enough to resist political orders, professional enough to investigate and respond properly, and trusted enough for people to seek help and accept their actions.

Bangladesh’s history shows what happens when those conditions fail. The article says successive regimes used police to stifle dissent. Political connections and corruption shaped advancement. Before the 2024 election, nearly 10,000 opposition activists were arrested, while enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings recurred. After Hasina fell, attacks left 450 police stations nonfunctional and public trust remained weak.

The current challenge is rebuilding both capacity and legitimacy. Changing uniforms and logos did little. A survey found 52 percent disapproved of police performance. Reform recommendations were reportedly ignored by the BNP government. Without independent, professional policing, democratic transition and everyday security remain fragile.