Trump Open to Meeting Putin and Xi Without Zelensky, Says Ukraine Needs New Negotiator

Trump said he would be willing to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in China next month. The proposed meeting could take place during the APEC summit in Shenzhen on Nov. 18–19. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky might not attend, which has triggered strong objections from Kyiv.

Trump said the main purpose would be discussing nuclear weapons and denuclearization. He also said he would do whatever he could to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The possible summit follows a report that Putin was seeking talks with Trump and Xi, potentially to pursue terms favorable to Russia.

No meeting has been finalized. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the idea had been mentioned but that no proposal, agreement, or agenda existed. China’s Foreign Ministry said it had no information. Ukraine warns that excluding Kyiv could encourage Putin rather than end the war.

Nuclear disarmament means reducing, limiting, or eliminating nuclear weapons. Denuclearization can also mean removing the weapons, materials, or systems needed to build and deploy them. The goal is to lower the risk of nuclear war and reduce the destructive power available to governments.

For example, countries might negotiate limits on warhead numbers, delivery systems, production, or military stockpiles. They could also create inspection rules to check whether commitments are being followed. These talks depend on verification, because governments need evidence that others are carrying out their promises. The article does not describe any proposed targets or inspection system.

Trump said nuclear weapons and denuclearization would be the main subject of a possible meeting with Putin and Xi. He said Ukraine could also be discussed. However, the Kremlin said no formal proposal, agreement, or agenda had been established, so the meaning and scope of any future talks remain undefined.

Established global estimates put the world’s nuclear inventory at roughly 12,000 weapons, spread across nine nuclear-armed countries. The exact total changes as countries retire, dismantle, produce, or modernize weapons. The United States, Russia, and China are three of those countries and would be central to any talks involving their leaders.

The main mechanism in such negotiations is setting limits and creating confidence that commitments are being followed. Talks could address deployed weapons, reserve stockpiles, missiles, bombers, submarines, production, or verification. The article only says the proposed summit would focus on nuclear disarmament; it gives no arsenal figures or negotiating terms.

Russia and the United States possess the largest arsenals, while China’s arsenal has been expanding, according to established estimates. These numbers show why a three-country discussion could matter globally. They do not prove that a summit will occur, because the article reports no formal proposal, agreement, or agenda.

Ukraine says it must participate because the war is being fought on its territory and any settlement would directly determine its future. Decisions about borders, security, sovereignty, and political responsibility cannot be implemented legitimately if Kyiv is excluded. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said a US-Russia-Ukraine meeting could help end the war, but a meeting without Ukraine could do the opposite.

The key mechanism is ownership of an agreement. A government that is absent from negotiations may reject the result, making implementation difficult or impossible. Even the Kremlin acknowledged that a final settlement would require Ukrainian participation, saying someone from Kyiv would need to assume responsibility.

Kyiv therefore opposes a summit where Putin negotiates Ukraine’s future with Trump and Xi. Sybiha warned that such a setting could give Putin international standing and encourage him to continue the war. The article gives no alternative negotiating format beyond its call for Ukrainian involvement.

Ukraine warns that giving Putin a high-profile meeting with Trump and Xi, while excluding Kyiv, could weaken pressure on Russia. It might signal that major powers can discuss Ukraine’s future without Ukraine. Andrii Sybiha said such a three-way meeting would encourage Putin to continue the war rather than help end it.

The mechanism is diplomatic legitimacy and bargaining power. A summit with two of the world’s largest economies could present Putin as a leader entitled to shape a settlement. If the participants reached terms favorable to Russia, Ukraine could reject them because it had no role in creating or accepting them. That would undermine implementation.

The article does not say a summit will occur or predict its exact result. The Kremlin says no formal proposal or agenda exists, while China says it has no information. Still, Kyiv wants a ceasefire and genuine willingness from Putin before another high-profile diplomatic platform is offered.

Putin has repeatedly refused to meet Zelensky before a peace agreement is finalized. He has also questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy, pointing to the expiration of the Ukrainian president’s five-year term. This position lets Moscow argue that a direct meeting should wait until Ukraine’s political status is settled.

Ukraine rejects that argument. The country points to constitutional and legal provisions governing elections during martial law. Martial law was imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, and those provisions address how elections operate during that emergency. The article does not describe the provisions in detail or set a new election date.

The dispute creates an obstacle to direct diplomacy. Russia uses the expired term to challenge Zelensky’s standing, while Ukraine says its legal framework continues to govern leadership during wartime. The article reports that any final settlement would still require Ukrainian participation, even though Putin refuses a pre-agreement meeting with Zelensky.

Sanctions are intended to make war harder by restricting trade, finance, technology, or revenue. Energy exports can work in the opposite direction when they bring a government additional income. Military assistance affects access to weapons, ammunition, intelligence, and other support needed to sustain operations. Together, these tools shape a country’s ability to continue fighting.

The article gives a direct example. Trump defended a deal involving Russian diesel exports and waived new sanctions against Moscow. Zelensky argued that easing restrictions could give Russia additional energy revenues to finance its invasion. Sanctions therefore operate partly by limiting money available for military activity, while exports can restore or increase that money.

The article also links Washington’s sanctions decisions with tensions over intelligence-sharing and military assistance. It does not quantify the financial or battlefield effects. It shows, however, why Kyiv wants sanctions to remain while killings continue and why changes in US policy could influence Russia’s capacity and incentives to continue the war.