Pakistan army chief in Tehran: Can diplomacy prevent new US-Iran fighting?

Asim Munir traveled to Tehran to strengthen diplomacy before a possible new US-Iran confrontation. Pakistan wants to revive negotiations without alienating Iran, Saudi Arabia, or the United States. His visit follows warnings that Washington may be preparing to resume fighting.

Munir arrived with Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and was expected to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. His trip came one day after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Tehran. Pakistan has also been involved in talks because it brokered the April 8 ceasefire and hosted later direct US-Iran engagement.

The timing reflects rising pressure. Trump rejected an Iranian proposal on September 26, while the United States deployed another aircraft carrier to the region. Pakistan’s fifth post-ceasefire visit shows Islamabad is trying to use its access to both capitals before diplomacy gives way to military escalation.

Mediation is the use of a trusted intermediary to help opposing sides communicate, negotiate, and reduce the risk of renewed fighting. Pakistan is not described as deciding the dispute for either side. Instead, it provides political access and a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran.

Pakistan brokered a ceasefire on April 8 after the United States and Israel began striking Iran. Days later, Islamabad hosted the highest-level direct engagement between the United States and Iran since 1979. Pakistan also helped produce a 14-point memorandum of understanding in June.

Its role matters because the two sides remain divided over the blockade, the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian assets, and Iran’s nuclear programme. Qatar now handles much of the detailed negotiating, but Pakistan retains access to both capitals through Munir. That combination keeps Islamabad relevant even when its earlier agreement is disputed.

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was a June agreement between the United States and Iran, developed after Pakistan helped stop the fighting. It was intended to create a sequence for further talks rather than settle every dispute immediately. Its purpose was to preserve the ceasefire and address urgent political and economic issues.

Under the MoU, the United States was to lift its naval blockade within 30 days. The Strait of Hormuz was to reopen. About $24bn in estimated frozen Iranian assets was to be released in phases over 60 days of additional talks, which included negotiations about Iran’s nuclear programme.

The planned period expired in mid-August without an extension. Iran says Washington did not meet its commitments, while Tehran kept Hormuz closed and demanded that the blockade be lifted first. Pakistan still calls the MoU useful, but analysts say it may need a new mechanism.

The economic stakes were substantial because the agreement proposed releasing about $24bn in frozen Iranian assets. The money was not to be released all at once. It was tied to phases of further negotiations over 60 days, making the assets part of a broader diplomatic incentive structure.

The diplomatic stakes were equally important. The United States was expected to lift its naval blockade within 30 days, while Iran was expected to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The same process was also meant to include negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. These commitments connected economic relief, maritime access, and security talks.

The arrangement lost momentum when the 60-day period expired in mid-August. Iran says the United States failed to honor its commitments and kept Hormuz closed. Analysts now disagree: one calls the MoU politically alive but operationally dead, while another says a new mechanism is needed.

If the agreement cannot restart negotiations, the central danger is that diplomacy will give way to another round of fighting. The article already describes warnings that the United States may resume attacks on Iran. Trump rejected an Iranian proposal, and American military deployments have increased in the region.

The consequences could spread beyond the US and Iran. Saudi Arabia has faced repeated attacks from the Iran-backed Houthi armed group in Yemen. Pakistan and its allies agreed to accelerate the deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia, linking the diplomatic crisis to wider regional security concerns.

A return to fighting would also make the MoU’s economic and maritime commitments harder to recover. The blockade could remain, the Strait of Hormuz could stay closed, and the proposed release of about $24bn in Iranian assets could remain stalled. Pakistan, Qatar, and Russia are therefore keeping diplomatic channels open as alternatives to escalation.

Multiple channels give Iran and the other parties more ways to communicate when one process stalls. The article says Iran prefers keeping several diplomatic options open rather than relying on one mediator. This creates flexibility during a crisis involving Washington, Tehran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

Qatar increasingly provides the diplomatic machinery and channels proposals between the United States and Iran. Pakistan offers political access, especially through Munir, and previously brokered the ceasefire and shaped the Islamabad MoU. Russia provides a separate high-level channel through Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who discussed the war, Hormuz, and ways to end the fighting in Tehran.

These roles are complementary rather than identical. Qatar manages detailed negotiation, Pakistan connects key capitals, and Russia adds another influential interlocutor. Their separate activity matters because the MoU’s timetable expired, while renewed military pressure makes a single failed channel especially risky.

The Strait of Hormuz is strategically important because it is a maritime chokepoint: a narrow route through which major shipping traffic must pass. The article treats its status as central to the US-Iran dispute. Reopening it was one of the Islamabad MoU’s main commitments, alongside lifting the American naval blockade.

Control of a chokepoint creates leverage because a government can restrict access, delay movement, or make reopening conditional on political concessions. In this case, Iran has kept the Strait closed and insists that Washington first lift the blockade. The United States, meanwhile, was supposed to remove that blockade under the agreement.

That linkage turns maritime access into a negotiating tool. If the Strait remains closed, the MoU’s sequence cannot proceed smoothly, including proposed asset releases and nuclear talks. Its status therefore affects both regional security and the chances of reviving diplomacy. The article does not quantify the trade disrupted by the closure.